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The Louisiana Legislation of 1940f
JAMES A. BUGEA,*

CARLos

E.

LAZARUS,** AND

WILLIAM T. PEGUES***

The regular session of the Louisiana legislature for the year
1940 may be aptly described as not only one of the most important in the legislative history of the state, but likewise one of the
busiest sessions of recent years. With a record number of 1,430
bills introduced in both houses for consideration, a total of 411
official legislative acts resulted.' This latter figure includes twenty-eight proposed constitutional amendments for submission to
the electorate in November of 1940,2 and also thirteen concurrent
t This paper does not include a discussion of the enactments of the
1940 regular session dealing with political and administrative reform and
changes in the tax structure of the state. This important legislation is separately considered elsewhere. Dakin, Louisiana Tax Legislation of 1940 (1940)
3 LOUISIANA LAW

REVIEW

55; Hyneman, Political and Administrative Reform

in the 1940 Legislature (1940) 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 1.
* Research Assistant, Louisiana State University Law School.
* Formerly Research Assistant, Louisiana State University Law School;
presently Instructor in Law, Loyola University (New Orleans).
"* Research Assistant, Louisiana State University Law School.
The authors acknowledge their Indebtedness to Paul M. Hebert, Acting
President and Professor of Law, Louisiana State University, for advice and
assistance in the preparation of this paper, and also to Clyde W. Thurmon,
Instructor in Law, Louisiana State University, who prepared the section
herein dealing with legislation on mineral rights.
1. Of the total of 1,430 bills introduced in both houses, 432 were introduced In the Senate and 998 were Introduced in the House. Of the 432 Senate
Bills, 205 passed and were sent to the House; 12 defeated; 130 withdrawn;
14 reported by substitute; 64 unreported by committee; 2 reported without
action; 5 indefinitely postponed. Of the 998 House Bills, 404 passed and were
sent to the Senate; 32 defeated; 353 withdrawn; 84 reported by substitute;
85 unreported by committee; 1 reported favorably but no action taken; 1
reported without action; 31 returned to calendar; 5 indefinitely postponed;
2 tabled.
Of the 205 bills which passed the Senate and were sent to the House, 142
passed the latter chamber and were sent to the Governor; 9 were proposed
constitutional amendments and were passed; 6 defeated; 1 unreported by
Legislative Bureau; 12 returned to calendar; 33 indefinitely postponed; 2
tabled. Of the 404 bills which passed the House and were sent to the Senate,
313 passed the latter chamber and were sent to the Governor; 19 were proposed constitutional amendments and were passed; 12 defeated; 31 unreported by committee; 29 indefinitely postponed.
Of the 142 Senate Bills which were sent to the Governor, 99 received his
approval, 28 were vetoed, and 15 became law without his approval. Of the
313 House Bills which were sent to the Governor, 229 received his approval,
57 were vetoed, and 27 became law without his approval.
2. Nine of these originated in the Senate, while nineteen originated in
the House.
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resolutions.8 Of the total of 370 legislative acts having the effect
of law, forty-two became effective by limitation without the approval of the Governor.4 The intensive consideration accorded
all measures presented for executive approval after final passage
is made manifest by the record number of eighty-five vetoes exercised by the Governor. Such widespread use of the veto power
was in part made necessary by errors and duplications resulting
from crowded calendars during most of the session. As a result
there was not sufficient time to coordinate measures which dealt
directly or indirectly with the same subject matter. One veto by
the Governor was later recalled and executive approval given.5
Members of the legal profession in Louisiana will be directly
affected by three significant measures of this legislative session.
These are (1) the repeal of the law which had created the State
Bar of Louisiana;( (2) the enactment of a statute which memorializes the Louisiana Supreme Court to provide for the organi7
zation and regulation of the Louisiana State Bar Association;
(3) the enactment of a new law which defines and regulates the
practice of law. In abolishing the statutory organization and control of the legal profession, the legislature ordained that the Bar
3. Six of these were Senate Concurrent Resolutions and seven were
House Concurrent Resolutions.
4. La. Acts 325-339, 341-367 of 1940.
5. La. House Bill 176 of 1940, creating a civil service system for certain
municipal fire and police departments, became La. Act 253 of 1940 when the
Governor recalled his veto and signed the bill.
Concerning the power of the chief executive to recall a veto, in State
v. Junkin, 79 Neb. 532, 538, 113 N.W. 256, 258 (1907), it was stated: "As long
as the bill remained in his [the governor's] possession, it was subject to his
action. It was still within his power after he had notified the secretary of
state by telephone that he had vetoed the bill, and before the bill with the
accompanying veto was filed in the office of the secretary of state, to change
his views as to the propriety of such legislation and to affix his approval to
the measure. In such case we think there would be no question but that the
act would become effective. So long as he was free to change his views,
and to make such change effective by his approval, the bill was still susceptible to the exercise of the lawmaking power, and, until, by his voluntary
action, the governor had put it beyond his power in any manner to affect
the measure, he was still in as full and actual control of it as if he had
never signed the veto message or notified the secretary that he desired to
file it in his office." A bill signed by the governor does not become law while
it remains in his possession within the time limited, but he may reconsider
and retract any approval previously made. Harpending v. Haight, 39 Cal.
189, 2 Am. Rep. 432 (1870); State v. Savings Bank, 79 Conn. 141, 64 Atl. 5
(1906); People v. Hatch, 19 Ill. 283 (1857); People v. McCullough, 210 Ill. 488,
71 N.E. 602 (1904); Commissioners of Allegany County v. Warfleld, 100 Md.
516, 60 Atl. 599, 108 Am. St. Rep. 446 (1905). See Hebert and Lazarus, The
Louisiana Legislation of 1938 (1938) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REvIzw 80, n. 2.
6. La. Act 55 of 1940, repealing La. Act 10 of 1934 (2 E.S.), as amended
by La. Act 21 of 1934 (3 E.S.) [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 449.6-449.47J.
7. La. Act 54 of 1940.
8. La. Act 163 of 1940.
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shall be a self-governing body empowered to regulate the affairs
of all licensed attorneys in the state under the supervision of the
Supreme Court, without interference from any other governmental department. The court already has begun proceedings in
compliance with the legislative memorial by issuing an order
announcing the formation of an advisory committee of fifteen
lawyers to assist the court in this work.9
Of further interest to the legal profession was the first biannual report made to the legislature by the Louisiana Law Institute. 10 This report was accompanied by seven specific proposals
of changes in the criminal law and criminal procedure of the
state, designed to remedy a number of obvious defects in the
machinery of the criminal law which were brought to light by
recent prosecutions for crimes growing out of the political scandals of the past few years. These proposals were in the form of
specific statutory measures, all of which were approved by the
legislature and enacted into law." The Institute was directed to
prepare a draft of a code of the substantive criminal law of Louisiana. Copies of this code will be submitted to the Governor, the
Attorney General, and the legislature not later than April, 1942.12
The most discussed work of the 1940 legislative session was
the complete reorganization of the governmental and fiscal administration of the state and the enactment of election and civil
service reforms. Because of the need for more extensive treatment than space here permits, these laws are not embraced within the scope of the present paper.'3 Furthermore, the tax structure
9. Order of the Supreme Court of Louisiana of August 22, 1940, In the
Matter of the Creation of the Louisiana State Bar Association.
10. The Louisiana State Law Institute was established by authority of
La. Act 166 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 9284.18-9284.22]. See Hebert and
Lazarus, The Louisiana Legislation of 1938 (1938) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
80-82; Tucker, The Louisiana State Law Institute (1938) 1 LOUISIANA LAW
REvWW 139.
11. La. Act 6 of 1940 (providing for the selection of jurors in the trial of
criminal cases); La. Act 7 of 1940 (instructing the Institute to prepare a
projet of a Criminal Code for the State of Louisiana); La. Act 15 of 1940
(punishing the making or presenting of false claims against the state); La.
Act 16 of 1940 (punishing a conspiracy to defraud or to commit an offense

against the state); La. Act 17 of 1940 (authorizing the Institute to adopt a
plan of membership); La. Act 57 of 1940 (providing the manner of charging
certain offenses and the grading thereof); La. Act 259 of 1940 (punishing
dual office holding).
12. La. Act 7 of 1940. A commission, composed of three lawyers in the
state, was created and empowered by La. Act 137 of 1936 to draft a criminal
code for the state. It was instructed to complete its report by 1938, but that
date was extended to 1940 by La. Act 98 of 1938. Arts. 583.1-583.5, La. Code
of Crim. Proc. of 1928 (Supp. 1939).
13. Hyneman, Political and Administrative Reform in the 1940 Legislature (1940) 3 LOUISIANA LAW RiviEw 1.
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of the state has been subjected to an extensive overhauling. New
tax statutes have been enacted and many of the present existing
ones have been amended. These taxation measures likewise have
14
been treated separately elsewhere.
The enacted legislation of 1940 ranges over many divergent
matters, and the volume of material is so great that it is impossible to attempt here anything approaching a detailed analysis
of every enactment of this session. It has, therefore, been necessary to eliminate all matters which are purely local in nature.
Also, appropriations, many regulatory measures, statutes relating
to highways, public health and institutions, and many laws pertaining to political subdivisions have been omitted from the
present discussion. In many instances, the classification is arbitrarily adopted for purposes of convenience and clarity. The
order of presentation is not intended to reflect the relative importance of the matters discussed.
I. MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE CIVIL CODE

A.

AMENDMENTS TO SPECIFIC CODE ARTICLES

Article 348. Tutor Authorized To Invest Minor's Funds
In Insured Homestead Stocks
Article 34715 directs the tutor to invest in the minor's name
the excess of revenues over expenses, whenever such excess
amounts to five hundred dollars. Failure to do so renders the
tutor liable for legal interest on such excess. 6 Article 34817 enumerates the types of security permissible for such investments,
and requires court approval in each case. 18 A high degree of protection is thus assured to the minor.
The only effect of the 1940 amendment to Article 34811 is to
list an additional type of security in which the minor's funds
may be invested. The addition is patterned on Section 62 (h) of
the Louisiana Trusts Estates Act 20 so as to include shares of any
14. Dakin, Louisiana Tax Legislation of 1940 (1940) 3 LOUISIANA LAW REvisw 55.
15. La. Civil Code of 1870.
16. Glenn v. Elam, 3 La. Ann. 611 (1848); Bird v. Black, 5 La. Ann. 189
(1850).
17. La. Civil Code of 1870.
18. Cf. Mather v. Knox, 34 La. Ann. 410 (1882).
19. La. Act 370 of 1940.
20. With only two additional legal investments listed, the classes of securities in which the trustee may invest the trust funds are identical with
those enumerated under Article 348. Louisiana Trust Estates Act, La. Act

81 of 1938, § 62 [Dart's Stats. (1939)

§ 9850.62].
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building and loan or homestead corporation, or association when
such shares are insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. The amount of the investment in the shares of
any one homestead is limited to the amount that is so insured.
The list of permissible securities in Article 348 is all-inclusive
so that the tutor may not invest the minor's funds in any other
manner.21 This amendment extending the list of authorized 22securities applies also to fiduciaries other than tutors of minors.
Article 386. Judgment of Emancipation May Be
Entered During Vacation
In cases of judicial emancipation, Article 386 authorizes the
judge, after appropriate hearing, to enter a decree of emancipation relieving a minor of all disabilities and conferring upon him
the full powers of majority. 2 The 1940 amendment provides specifically that the judgment may be rendered "either during term
time or during vacation" 24 and eliminates any uncertainty as to
the validity of such a decree entered during vacation time. The
new amendment also provides that the decree may be entered
in open court or in chambers.
Article 741. Holders of Mineral Interest Must Be
Parties to Partitions by Licitation
An important change was effected by Act 336 of 1940, amending Article 741 of the Civil Code. As a result, the holdings of at
least three supreme court cases are directly affected.
In the recent case of Amerada Petroleum Corporation v.
Reese,2 5 the court held that a lessee holding a mineral lease from
21. The burden of proof is on the tutor to show that an investment was
made in compliance with law. Succession of Buddig, 108 La. 406, 32 So. 361
(1906).
rf loss results from an investment in unauthorized securities, the tutor
is under personal liability. Art. 347, La. Civil Code of 1870. Glenn v. Elam, 3
La. Ann. 611 (1848). An investment in unauthorized securities yielding more
than five per cent interest will not entitle the tutor to keep the surplus;
all profits actually earned by the investment become part of the minor's
estate. Carbello v. Carbello, 171 La. 735, 132 So. 127 (1931).
22. Arts. 50 (curator of absentee), 415 (curator of interdict), La. Civil
Code of 1870.
23. Cf. Arts. 366 (emancipation by notarial act), 379 (emancipation by
marriage), La. Civil Code of 1870.
24. La. Act 308 of 1940 amends Article 386 so that it now reads: "The
Judge, either in open court or in chambers, either during term time or during vacation, after hearing the parties, shall render judgment in the premises.
If there be a decree of emancipation, it shall declare that the minor is fully
emancipated and relieved of all the disabilities which now attach to minors,
and with full power to do and perform all acts as fully as if he had arrived
at the age of twenty-one years."
25. 195 La. 359, 196 So. 558 (1940).
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some co-owners in indivision without the consent of the others
could not interfere with the absolute right of the co-owners to
partition the property by licitation. Despite the contentions based
on Act 205 of 1938,26 such lessee was held not a necessary party
to the proceedings. 27 The court was very emphatic in stating that
the legislature enacted Act 205 of 1938 for the sole purpose of
vitiating the decision in Gulf Refining Company of Louisiana v.
Glassell;28 and it did not intend to overrule the settled jurisprudence of the state to the effect that property which is leased
by one co-owner in indivision without the consent of the others
may judicially be partitioned by licitation, and the title pass free
of the lease if the property is sold to a third person.
The court was undoubtedly correct in stating that a mineral
lessee could not institute a partition proceeding; 29 and, in the
light of the then existing law, the argument of plaintiff to the
effect that he was deprived of a valuable property right without
having been made a party to the proceedings was held without
merit. In sustaining this latter proposition the court followed
Bickham v. Pittso wherein it was held unnecessary to join lessees and royalty owners in a suit to partition land by licitation
where there had been no development, although they have been
26. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4735.4-4735.5. A complete discussion of the act
is found in Hebert and Lazarus, The Louisiana Legislation of 1938 (1938) 1
LouIsLANA LAW REvisw 80, 100-102.

27. Unless all of the co-owners in Indivision of the property to be partitioned are made parties, the proceedings will be vitiated as to all. Art. 1412,
La. Civil Code of 1870. Guidry v. Guidry's Heirs, 16 La. 157 (1840); Kendrick's
Heirs v. Kendrick, 19 La. 36 (1841); Willey v. Carter, 4 La. Ann. 56 (1849);
Rightor v. De Lizardi, 4 La. Ann. 260 (1849); Boutt6 v. Executors of Boutt6,
30 La. Ann. 177 (1878); -Ware v. Vignes, 35 La. Ann. 288 (1883); Union National Bank v. Choppin, 46 La. Ann. 629, 15 So. 304 (1894); Gibbs v. Executor
of Estate of Jackson, 47 La. Ann. 767, 17 So. 291 (1895); Smith v. Smith, 131
La. 970, 60 So. 634 (1913); Crayton v. Waters, 146 La. 238, 83 So. 540 (1920);
Wheeler v. Mann, 149 La. 866, 90 So. 225 (1921); Latham v. Glasscock, 160
La. 1089, 108 So. 100 (1926); Stoma v. Smith, 172 So. 202 (La. App. 1937).
28. 186 La. 190, 171 So. 846 (1936). Act 205 of 1938 was passed to change
the rule of this case. The act elevated a lease from the classification of a
personal right to that of a real right. See Hebert and Lazarus, The Louisiana Legislation of 1938 (1938) 1 LOUISIANA LAw REviEw 80, 100-102.
29. Article 1310 of the Civil Code prohibits a tenant from instituting a
partition suit. Cf. Daggett, Mineral Rights in Louisiana (1939) 160: "This
Act (205 of 1938) might be interpreted to permit a mineral lessee to bring
an action for partition against his lessor and his lessor's co-owners, thus
overruling Gulf Refining Co. v. Hayne. Such an interpretation would seem to
be unfortunate, as it would inflict a great hardship on landowners. Since
partition of the mineral lease has been allowed there would seem to be no
necessity for the application of this statute to partition the lands upon
which the lease bears. The theory of partition is between the owners of the
'thing held in common.'"
30. 185 La. 930, 171 So. 80 (1936).
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held to be proper and necessary parties where the land was producing oil.1 While both cases are correctly decided under Article
741 as it appeared prior to the 1940 amendment, their rulings
left the holders of mineral rights without an adequate remedy
to protect their rights against an ex parte proceeding instituted
for the purpose of depriving them of their mineral interest.
In Spence v. Lucas," the third case invalidated by the 1940
act, the lessees of an oil and gas lease sought a judgment recognizing their lease on an undivided half interest in the property.
The lessees sought to be granted at least a preference over the
owners in the proceeds of a sale for the value of their right of
lease.8 8 The court ordered a partition by licitation and, citing
Article 1338 of the Civil Code, 84 refused to order a separate appraisement Of the mineral rights or pay the holders thereof by
preference from the proceeds of the sale.
Founded upon several articles appearing in the Proposed
Mineral Code, which was rejected by the 1938 legislature, Act
336 of 1940 was passed for the purpose of changing the rules of
the above cases.8 8 Article 741 of the Civil Code, as it now reads,86
31. Liles v. Barnhart, 152 La. 419, 93 So. 490 (1922).
32. 138 La. 763, 70 So. 796 (1916).
33. 138 La. at 768, 70 So. at 797.
34. Art. 1338, La. Civil Code of 1870: "In all judicial partitions where
the property is divided in kind, the mortgages, liens and privileges existing
against one of the coproprietors, shall, by the mere fact of the partition,
attach to the shares allotted to him by the partition, and cease to attach
to the shares allotted to his coproprietors. If any return of money be required to be made to any coproprietor whose share is mortgaged or otherwise incumbered, by reason of the share allotted to him being of less value
than the other shares, then such sums of money shall remain in the hands
of the parties bound to contribute them respectively, and shall be secured
by mortgage on their respective shares, and be subject to the demand of
those creditors of their coproprietors who possessed mortgage or privilege
claims against him, and according to the rank and priority of the creditors.
That in all judicial partitions, where a partition is made by licitation, the
mortgages, liens and privileges existing against any one or more of the coproprietors, shall be by order of court transferred to the proceeds of sale
in the hands of the notary, and the rights of all creditors shall be reserved
on the said proceeds of sale to be urged by them, either before the notary
or before the court, as may be necessary, provided the holders of such
mortgages, liens and privileges be made parties to such judicial partition."
35. Arts. 149-156, La. Proposed Mineral Code of 1938.
36. Art. 741, La. Civil Code of 1870: "In any suit for partition by licitation
all parties having an interest in either the land or mineral Interest shall be
made parties thereto. If it be determined that the property be disposed of
by licitation, and the grantor of a mineral interest, or his successor who may
be responsible for his warranty, becomes the owner of the whole, such mineral Interest as he may have previously granted covering the whole of the
property shall thereafter exist on the entire estate as If he had been always
the sole owner.
"But before the property shall be offered for sale, there shall be an appraisement thereof by a Notary and two appraisers appointed by the Court,
in which appraisement there shall be, first, an appraisement of the entire
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requires that all 'persons holding mineral interests in land be
made parties to a partition by licitation. This should be interpreted as being for the sole purpose of protecting their property
rights against consent proceedings, and not as giving them the
right to institute suit for partition against their lessor and their
lessor's co-owners. 7 This latter interpretation would do injustice
to the theory of partition, which is a right to demand division of
property held in common. 8
Article 1863. Rescission on Account of Lesion
In Contracts of Exchange
Article 186131 provides that lesion beyond moiety is available
estate as a whole, and second, a separate appraisement of the rights of each
party holding a record mineral interest in the property or in any portion
thereof, or in any undivided interest therein. Such appraisement shall be
submitted to the Court for homologation, and the definitive judgment directing the sale of the property shall provide for an equitable division of
the total price of the property as a whole to the interested parties in the
proportion the interest of each bears to the whole.
"If by the licitation the estate be adjudicated to a third person, all mineral interests in the property shall become extinct, and the owners of such
interests shall be relegated to the proceeds of the sale of the property for
distribution or partition of the proceeds as hereinabove set out. But if the
adjudication be to anyone who has granted in any way a mineral interest
of any kind, such mineral Interest shall ipso facto be perfected to the extent
of the interest In the property acquired by such grantor.
"Provided, however, that the title to mineral interests In the property
shall not be affected by any sale to effect a partition by licitation in any
case where the title in and to the mineral interest may emanate from the
whole of the co-owners of the land whether descending by single or separate
title.
"The term 'mineral interests', as hereinabove used, is hereby defined
and shall mean any form of interest in minerals, whether it be oil, gas and
mineral leases, or an interest in the mineral rights, or a royalty interest,
or any other form of interest whatsoever in which minerals or mineral
rights In the property may be affected."
Prior to 1940, Article 741 read as follows:
"If in the suit for a partition it be determined that the estate be disposed of by licitation, and he who has granted the servitude becomes owner
of the whole, the servitude then exists on the whole estate, as if he had
always been the sole owner.
"But if by the licitation the estate be adjudicated to any other of the
coproprietors, the servitude becomes extinct, and the person who granted it
Is bound to return the price he received for it."
37. Such an interpretation is in accord with Articles 149 and 150 of the
Proposed Mineral Code, which was the source of the 1940 amendment to
Article 741.
Art. 149, La. Proposed Mineral Code of 1938: "The action for partition
does not lie between the owner (whether one or more) of a tract of land
who has alienated the right to an undivided interest in the minerals and
the owner of such right."
Art. 150, La. Proposed Mineral Code of 1938: "Neither does such action
lie in any case in favor of or against one who is the owner by any species
of title of a mere royalty in a given tract of land."
38. Arts. 1289 et seq,, La. Civil Code of 1870.
39. La. Civil Code of 1870. Article 1861 first appeared as Article 1855, La.
Civil Code of 1825. The corresponding article of the French Civil Code (Art. 1118)
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in only two cases, sale and partition. Prior to 1940, Article 186340
stated, by way of emphasis, that rescission for lesion may be had
in no other contracts, "not even in exchange, which bears some
resemblance to the contract of sale." However, the Civil Code
was self-contradictory in that it allowed rescission on account
of lesion in the contract of exchange in certain cases provided by
Articles 2664, 2665, and 2666.41 This anomaly was resolved by the
reads as follows: "La 1aion ne vicie lea conventions quo dana certains contrats ou 4 l'gard de certainea personnes, ainst qteil sera expliqud en Za midme
section." (Translation) "Lesion only vitiates agreements in certain contracts
or with respect to certain persons, as is explained in the same section."
Under the French Civil Code, rescission may be had because of' lesion in
the following cases: Art. 1079 (divisions made by parents and other ascendants between their descendants); Art. 1305 (contracts made by minors);
Art. 1313 (certain contracts made by persons of full age); Arts. 1674-1685
(sales).
40. La. Civil Code of 1870. There is no corresponding article in the French
Civil Code. Article 1863 first appeared in Louisiana as Article 1857 of the
Civil Code of 1825.
41. La. Civil Code of 1870. Under the French Civil Code there can be
no rescission because of lesion in the contract of exchange. Art. 1706, French
Civil Code provides: "La rescision pour cause de Idsion n'a pas lieu dana Is
contrat d'6change." (Translation) "Rescission on account of lesion does not
take place in contracts of exchange."
Art. 2664, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The rescission of the contract on account of lesion is not allowed in contracts of exchange, except in the following cases."
Art. 2665, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The rescission on account of lesion
beyond moiety takes place, when one party gives immovable property to
the other in exchange for movable property; in that case, the person having
given the immovable estate may obtain a rescission, If the movables which
he has received, are not worth more than the one-half of the value of the
real estate.
"But he who has given movable property In exchange for immovable
estate, can not obtain rescission of the contract, even in case the things
given by him were worth twice as much as the immovable estate."
Art. 2666, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The rescission on account of lesion
beyond moiety, may take place on a contract of exchange, if a balance has
been paid in money or immovable property, and If the balance paid exceeds
by more than one-half the total value of the immovable property given in
exchange by the person to whom the balance has been paid; in that case it
is only the person who has paid such balance who may demand the rescission of the contract on account of lesion." (Italics supplied.)
It should be noted that, in the French version of the corresponding articles of the Civil Code of 1808 (p. 370, 7.7) and the Civil Code of 1825 (Art.
2636), the expression used is "in movable" instead of the word "immovable,"
as In the Code of 1870, and which is italicized above. The phrase "s'il y a
eu une soulte en argent ou en effets mobiliers," was incorrectly translated
and should read, "if a balance has been paid in money or in movable property." However, the correct translation appears in the English versions of
the Codes both of 1808 and 1825. See David v. Houren, 6 Rob. 255 (La. 1843);
Phelps v. Reinach, 38 La. Ann. 547 (1886); Straus v. New Orleans, 166 La.
1035, 118 So. 125 (1928); Sample v. Whitaker, 172 La. 722, 135 So. 38 (1931),
to the effect that the French text is controlling In the event of a difference
between the French and English versions. Cf. Bradley v. Yancy, 195 So. 110
(La. App. 1939) to the effect that the Revised Civil Code of 1870 must be
Interpreted like any other act of the legislature, without any controlling
effect given to the French texts of the Codes of 1808 and 1825.
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1940 amendment which provides: "Persons of full age are relieved for lesion in no other contracts than those above expressed, except as hereinafter provided regarding the contract of
exchange.''42

Article 2632. Selection of Jury in Expropriation Suit
Article 2632 is concerned with the procedure to empanel a
jury for the trial of an expropriation suit. Prior to the 1940
amendment 43 this article required members of the jury to appear
on the tenth day after the date of the summons." This delay
was for the purpose of giving 45interested counsel an opportunity
to investigate their eligibility.
The time available for such investigation has been reduced
one-half by the 1940 amendment which provides that the jury
drawn and summoned shall "attend on the day fixed in the order
of court, provided that the summons shall be served on the freeholders not less than five calendar days, prior to the date fixed
for attendance."46 This shortening of the period may work a considerable hardship in certain instances.
It should also be noted that the original forty-eight freeholders selected by the clerk and sheriff has been increased to
fifty; and that thirty-six are now drawn from this initial list,
while formerly only twenty-four were selected.
Prior to the 1936 amendment 47 to Article 2632, no peremptory
challenges were allowed. In Orleans-Kenner Electric Railway
Company v. Christina,," it was contended that the Code of Practice, which allowed four peremptory challenges in civil cases,
should prevail over Article 2632 of the Civil Code which allowed
no peremptory challenges. The court said:
"We do not, however, find the quoted provisions of the re42. La. Act 280 of 1940.
43. La. Act 187 of 1940.
44. In Orleans-Kenner Electric Ry. v. Skidmore, 14 Orl. App. 241 (La.
App. 1916), an undated summons which directed the jurors to appear in
court on August thirteenth was served on August third. This service was
held to be in compliance with Article 2632, the date accorded an undated
summons being either the date of its issuance or the date of service thereof.
45. In Louisiana Highway Comm. v. Treadaway, 173 So. 209 (La. App.
1937), the defendant contended that a juror became ineligible by answering
falsely questions concerning his ownership of real property. The court held,
however, that the matter was one of which counsel should have availed
himself before the commencement of the trial; since he did not investigate
the qualifications of the jurors, his acceptance of them made it impossible
later to raise any objections.
46. La. Act 187 of 1940.
47. La. Act 276 of 1936, § 1.
48. 139 La. 470, 71 So. 770 (1916).
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spective Codes 'contrary or repugnant' to each other, since
those of the Code of Practice relate to civil cases, in general,
and those of the Civil Code to a particular class of cases which
the law has thought proper to make, in the matter of challenges as well as in other matters, an exception to the general
rule."49 (Italics supplied.)
Act 267 of 1936 was passed for the sole purpose of providing "the
same number of peremptory challenges as is allowed by law in
the trial of ordinary civil suits." This change is properly carried
over into the 1940 amendment.
At the recent session of the legislature, an additional proviso
was added to Article 2632: "If, for any reason, a jury cannot be
empaneled from the thirty-six freeholders whose names are
drawn as set forth, then, from the remaining fourteen freeholders
the court shall have the right to summon as many additional
freeholders as the court may deem necessary to complete the
empanelling of the jury." Since the manner of selecting jurors
under Article 2632 is an exception to the general rule, this special
method of drawing additional jurors would likewise control instead of the general rules under Act 135 of 1898.50
The only finding that the jury of freeholders in an expropriation suit can make is a determination of the value of the land
with its improvements, and what damages, if any, the owner will
sustain, in addition to the loss of the land, by the expropriation.9 '
Neither Article 2632, nor any other article in the Code, confers
on the jury the function of determining the necessity for expro2
priation.

Article 3369. Extension of Effect of Inscription of Mortgages
. Prior to 1940, Article 3369 provided that where the mortgages
and privileges secure the payment of obligations which mature
more than nine years from date, the registry preserved the evi49. 139 La. at 472, 71 So. at 771.
50. This act has been amended by La. Act 58 of 1904, § 1, and La. Act 99
of 1938, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1952]. Orleans-Kenner Electric Co. v.
Christina, 139 La. 470, 71 So. 770 (1916) holds that the manner of selecting
Jurors under Article 2632 is an exception to the general rule, thus rendering
Act 135 of 1898 inapplicable. See also Bradley v. Shreveport Gas, Electric
Light & Power Co., 139 La. 1029, 1034, 72 So. 725, 726 (1916).
51. See Kansas City Ry. v. Meyer, 166 La. 663, 117 So. 765 (1928).
52. This proposition becomes evident from New Orleans Terminal Co. v.
Teller, 113 La. 733, 37 So. 624 (1904) wherein it was said that a jury created
under Article 2632 is not an ordinary jury in a court of general jurisdiction,
but Is one in a court of special jurisdiction, capable of passing on only those
matters which the law has prescribed shall be submitted to it.
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dence of such mortgages and privileges for one year after the
maturity of the last maturing note, bond or other obligation as
fixed by the original instruments. Act 247 of 1940 extends this
period to six years after the last maturing obligation. Also, it
provides that the recordation of a supplemental written agreement between the parties extending the maturity of the last
maturing obligation shall preserve the evidence of the original
mortgage for six years from the last mentioned date.
Under the Code, the action on negotiable and non-negotiable
bills and notes is prescribed by five years.'3 It consequently follows that since the primary obligation will not be enforceable at
the expiration of the five year period, the accessory obligation
securing their payment would likewise fall.5 4 It is only when the

notes are kept alive beyond the expiration of this five year prescriptive period that advantage can be taken of the full six years
of the amended provision."
B.

STATUTES RELATING TO CIVIL CODE SUBJECT MATTER

Adoption
Since 1924, adoption has been a fertile field for legislation.
The successive enactments, however, have always left more or
less confusion and uncertainty in the law of adoption and in the
status of the artificial parent-child relationship.5 8
Act 169 of the 1940 legislature has proved to be no exception.
It provides that the adoption of persons over seventeen years of
age shall be effected by notarial act signed by the adopter and
the adopted (or the legal representative of the latter if he is a
minor) and registered with the clerk of court in the parish where
executed, or with the registrar of conveyances if the act was'
passed in the Parish of Orleans. Unless the repealing clause of
the act is to be disregarded, no other formality is required.
In providing for adoption by notarial act, the 1940 statute
returns to the procedure of Act 109 of 1924. The procedure provided by this earlier act had proved inadequate and it was super53. Art. 3540, La. Civil Code of 1870.
54. Art. 3285, La. Civil Code of 1870. Aillot v. Aubert, 20 La. Ann. 509
(1868).
55. A complete discussion of Article 3369, together with the 1938 amendment (La. Act 322 of 1938), was made in Hebert and Lazarus, The Louisiana
Legislation of 1938 (1938) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 80, 92.
56. The 1940 adoption act (La. Act 169 of 1940) culminates a series of
measures beginning in 1865. See Comment (1938) 1 LOUISIANA LAw Rnviw
196, 197, n. 6.
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seded by Act 46 of 193257 which divided adoptions into two
58
classes: the adoption of persons under seventeen years of age,
and adoption of persons over the age of seventeen. For the adoption of persons over seventeen, the 1932 act required a petition to
the district court and an investigation by the Board of Charities
and Corrections. It is for this class of adoptions that the 1940
statute reintroduces the simple procedure of a notarial act. It is
open to serious question whether such important changes in
legal status and its incidents should be permitted without investigation and supervision by some public welfare agency.
Insofar as Article 214 of the Civil Code provided that any
person may be adopted except those illegitimate children who
cannot be legally acknowledged, it was repealed by the 1932 and
1938 acts, both of which authorize the adoption of any person
"except one who has in him or her the blood of another race."5 9
It was, no doubt, through an oversight that no such proviso is included in the 1940 act. If the repealing clause is not to be disregarded in this matter, the applicable provision of Article 214 is
not revived, for the "repeal of a repealing law does not revive
the first law."60 Thus, while it is not possible to adopt a person
under seventeen who has in him the blood of another race, the
1940 act permits any person over twenty to adopt any person
over seventeen, regardless of impediments which would prevent
legal acknowledgment.
In order to render the general law of adoption free from the
present ambiguities and uncertainty, it is suggested (1) that
there be enacted a procedure for adoption under the careful supervision of some reliable welfare agency similar to that provided by Act 46 of 1932 (over seventeen) and Act 428 of 1938
(under seventeen); (2) that Article 214 of the Civil Code be
amended to provide that adoption shall confer upon the adopted
the identical status of a child born in lawful wedlock, and that
there be substituted the entire family of the adoptive for that
57. As amended by La. Act 44 of 1934 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4827-4839.2].
58. With regard to the adoption of children under seventeen, La. Act
46 of 1932 was superseded by La. Act 233 of 1936, which was repealed by
La. Act 428 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4839.26-4839.41]. The present
status of the law requires that such an adoption be perfected entirely by
judicial procedure in the juvenile court with investigation by the State Department of Public Welfare. For a discussion of the 1938 act see Hebert
and Lazarus, The Louisiana Legislation of 1938 (1938) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REv'zw 80, 96.
59. La. Act 46 of 1932, § 1, as amended by La. Act 44 of 1934, § 1 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 4827]; La. Act 428 of 1938, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4839.26].
60. Art. 23, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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of the adopted,"1 rather than the mere substitution of parents as
is the law at the present time; 62 (3) that from a purely social
viewpoint those persons (except one who has in him the blood
of another race) who are barred from acknowledgment be not
likewise barred from adoption.
Other statutes relating to adoption are Acts 234, 269, and 271
of 1940. Act 234 authorizes the Registrar of Vital Statistics to
receive and record foreign adoption decrees which have been
properly certified. Act 269 requires that every person adopted
prior to the effective date of Act 428 of 1938 shall present to the
Central Bureau of Vital Statistics his birth certificate, together
with a certified copy of the final adoption decree or notarial act
of adoption. This is for the purpose of causing a record to be
made in the archives of the Central Bureau of the date of birth
and the new name of the adopted, if such name has been changed,
and the name and address of the adoptive parent or parents. With
regard to the adoption of persons under seventeen years similar
requirements are imposed by Act 428 of 1938, 68 whereas Act 169
of 1940 contains no provisions for making new birth records in
the event the adopted is over seventeen years of age.64
Act 271 confers on an unmarried mother, whether over or
under twenty-one years of age, the right to surrender by notarial
act the legal care, custody, and control of her illegitimate child
to any institution or social agency approved by the State Department of Public Welfare. In the cases of unmarried mothers under
twenty-one, the notarial act must make reference to an order of
a court of competent jurisdiction authorizing her to surrender
the child. In such event, she relinquishes all rights to the custody
of the child; and the institution or social agency to which the
child has been surrendered is given the right to place it for adoption and to act as its legal custodian in the adoption proceedings.
The purpose of the statute is to make possible the adoption of a
61. Such a statute would not be unconstitutional. Article Iv, Section 16 of
the constitution provides that "no law shall be passed abolishing forced
heirship." This section means only that forced heirship as an institution
be not abolished and does not prevent the legislature from effecting a change
in the status of a person. On this point see Comment (1938) 1 LOUISIANA LAW
ReviEw 196, 202.
62. See Comment (1938) 1 LOuISIANA LAW REvi-w 196, 203.
63. La. Act 428 of 1938, § 10 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4839.35].
64. La. Act 46 of 1932, § 7 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4833), requires that the
act of adoption, together with the order of approval, shall be filed and recorded in the office of the recorder of deeds in the parish where the judgment of approval was rendered. Since La. Act 169 of 1940 contains no similar
provision, it may to this extent be interpreted as not superseding the 1932
act.
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child from an institution without fear that the mother may later
claim its custody on the ground that her previous surrender was
invalid on account of her minority.
In connection with the foregoing legislation on adoption, it
is also proper to note Act 370 of 1940 which creates a Juvenile
Court Commission whose duty is to make a survey of juvenile
delinquency, neglect and dependency throughout the state, with
a view of protecting children and modernizing the juvenile court
system. It is commissioned to prepare recommendations to the
Governor, for subsequent enactment into law.
Amendment Relative to Ranking of Tax Privileges
Prior to 1940, the state, in all instances, had a privilege on
the property of a tax debtor 5 to secure the payment of taxes
due, or which might become due; this privilege was of the highest rank and enjoyed a preference over all others.66 Property
taxes on immovables do not constitute a personal obligation of
the owner, but are charges only against the specific immovables. 67
Property taxes on movables, however, are not only secured by
a first privilege upon all the movables of the taxpayer, 8 but also
constitute a personal liability of the tax debtor.6 9
Act 368 of 194070 creates a general privilege on both movable
and immovable property of the tax debtor to secure the payment
of the general occupational license tax.7 1 It has been held that
65. See the provisions of the tax statutes cited in note 71, infra.
66. It has been repeatedly held that this right to be paid by preference
is the same as a first privilege on the property or its proceeds. Cleveland.
Steel Co. v. Joe Kaufman Co., 155 La. 529, 99 So. 428 (1924); Morelock v. Morgan & Bird Gravel Co., 174 La. 658, 141 So. 368 (1932).
67. See Louisiana Oil Refining Co. v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 167 La.
605, 606, 120 So. 23 (1929).
68. Cleveland Steel Co. v. Joe Kaufman Co., 155 La. 529, 99 So. 428 (1924).
69. Louisiana Oil Refining Co. v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 167 La. 605,
120 So. 23 (1929).
70. La. Act 368 of 1940 amends and reenacts La. Act 15 of 1934 (3 E.S.)
§ 52, as amended by La. Act 429 of 1938, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 86433.
71. La. Act 368 of 1940, § 1, provides that all the "property, assets and
effects of such corporation shall be subject to seizure and sale for the payment of such unpaid franchise tax." In this respect it differs from the tax
privileges on either movables or immovables.
Other statutes creating general privileges on all the property of the tax
debtor to secure the payment of taxes are: Local Assessments Due Levee
Boards, La. Act 65 of 1894, § 4 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 6768] (on all property
of the owner of lands); Severance Tax, La. Act 24 of 1935 (2 E.S.) §§ 1, 11
[Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 8522, 85321 (on all property of the taxpayer and on all
property from which minerals are severed); Income Tax, La. Act 21 of 1934,
§ 101, as last amended by La. Act 231 of 1938, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §
8587.101] (on all property of the taxpayer); Pipeline Franchise Tax, La. Act
15 of 1934 (3 E.S.) § 41, as amended by La. Act 333 of 1936, § 1 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) § 8629.11 (on all property of the carrier); Corporation Franchise Tax,
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where a tax privilege embraces all the property of the taxpayer,
its collection should be so apportioned as to avoid prejudice to
third persons claiming a special privilege only on certain prop1 The 1940 statute goes further. It subordinates the primary
erty.7
rank previously accorded the privilege of the state to secure its
claims by providing that the tax shall take its rank as to all prior
encumbrances as of the date of its filing, and that it shall take
priority over all claims which shall be subsequently recorded,
except
"(1) Vendor's lien retained in any act of transfer of property to such corporation;78 and

"(2) Mechanics' and materialmen's liens growing out of
construction in process at the time of the creation of the lien,
privilege and mortgage herein authorized."
In voluntarily subordinating the primary claim of the public
fisc, there was inadvertently created a conflict between the 1940
act and those articles of the Civil Code dealing with privileges.
The statute makes possible instances where the "vicious circle,"
so often found in our law where three or more privileges are
asserted on the same property, comes into operation, thereby
leaving to the judiciary the final determination as to which should
obtain preference.1 '
Crop pledges. Act 309 of 1940 reduces the fee which the Recorder of Mortgages is entitled to charge for the recordation and
filing of crop pledges to "not more than fifty cents for crop
pledges for five hundred dollars and less, and not more than one
dollar for crop pledges for more than five hundred dollars."1 5
La. Act 10 of 1935 (1 E. S.) § 8 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8729] (on all property
of the corporation); Electricity Excise Tax, La. Act 25 of 1935 (2 E.S.) § 6
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8793] (on all property of producers of electricity).
72. White Co. v. Hammond Stage Lines, 180 La. 962, 158 So. 353 (1935).

73. Although at this point the statute only uses the word "corporation,"
yet from a reading of the act as a whole it is clear that what is meant is
"person, association of persons, firm or corporation."
74. One example of a "vicious circle" created by the 1940 act Is found
in the case of movable property which is subject to a vendor's privilege, a
tax privilege, and a lessor's privilege. The first named primes the second,
which primes the third, and which in its turn primes the first. Art. 3263, La.
Civil Code of 1870, and La. Act 368 of 1940.
75. La. Act 309 of 1940 amends and reenacts La. Act 114 of 1934, § 3
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 5063.3], which exacted the following charges for recording and filing crop pledges: "Crop pledges for five hundred dollars and
less, fifty cents; for more than five hundred dollars and up to and Including
one thousand dollars, one dollar; for more than one thousand dollars and
up to and Including two thousand dollars, two dollars; for more than two
thousand dollars, three dollars."

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. III

Donation of life insurance policies. Act 292 of 1940 provides
that the laws regulating the form of donations inter vivos shall
not apply to donations of life insurance policies, nor to the naming of beneficiaries therein. It thus crystallizes the settled jurisprudence of this state to the effect that life insurance is not
70
governed by the Code articles on donations.
In Sizeler v. Sizeler77 it was held that the proceeds of life
insurance policies form no part of the estate of the deceased, but
inure to the beneficiary directly and by the sole terms of the
policy itself. Naming a concubine as beneficiary is not a prohibited donation mortis causa within Article 1481.78
In Sherwood v. New York Life Insurance Company0 a man
died leaving insurance policies payable to certain of his children,
with a proviso that in the event of the death of any of the named
beneficiaries the proceeds should be divided among the surviving
brothers and sisters. While the payments were being made, one
of the beneficiaries died. It was held that the children of the
deceased beneficiary were not entitled to their parent's share
under the policy because the benefit inured to the brothers and
sisters designated in the policy. The court stated:
"It is the settled jurisprudence of this court that life insurance
policies are neither donations inter vivos nor mortis causa,
and that the provisions of the Civil Code relative to donations
and collation will not be applied to such policies." 80
Although the courts have said that the rules of donations
are not applicable to life insurance, they have never said that
one could by insurance set at naught the rules of the Civil Code
pertaining to forced heirship.s While the language of Section 1
of the 1940 act is sufficiently strong to enable such a complete
76. Sherwood v. New York Life Ins. Co., 166 La. 829, 118 So. 35 (1928);
Sizeler v. Sizeler, 170 La. 128, 127 So. 388 (1930).
77. 170 La. 128, 127 So. 388 (1930).
78. La. Civil Code of 1870.
79. 166 La. 829, 118 So. 35 (1928).
80. 166 La. at 834, 118 So. at 37. The Louisiana Trust Estates Act, La.
Act 81 of 1938, § 10 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 9850.10], makes it possible to
create a life insurance trust in this state. Prior to its passage, Article 1520
of the Civil Code prohibited the creation of fidei commissa even by life insurance, although a sort of modified trust was possible by virtue of the
Sherwood case.
81. For a discussion of insurance as the only method used effectively to
defeat the legitime of forced heirs, see Daggett, General Principles of Succession on Death in Civil Law (1937) 11 Tulane L. Rev. 399, 405; Nabors,
Civil Law Influences Upon the Law of Insurance in Louisiana (1932) 6
Tulane L. Rev. 369, 384, 515. See also Comment (1938) 12 Tulane L. Rev.
262, 266.
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evasion, Section 2 of the act states that "the adoption of this Act
shall not be construed as effecting a change in the existing laws
of this State. . . ." In view of the constitutional protection of
forced heirship, 2 Act 292 of 1940 cannot be interpreted as affording a possible means of evading the laws of forced heirship.
Inventory and Appraisement of Minor's Estate
Act 327 of 1940, repealing Act 220 of 1934,83 provides that an
inventory and appraisement may be dispensed with where the
estate of a minor or interdict does not exceed five hundred dollars. To obtain the benefit of this exemption, the person applying
for the tutorship or curatorship must annex to his application a
sworn descriptive statement of the value of the property of the
minor or interdict.
The 1934 act may have been intended to apply to all cases
of interdicts, whether majors or minors, but Section 2 limited its
scope to minor interdicts only. This is now remedied by the 1940
act, which covers all situations.
Mineral Legislation
The legislature at its regular 1940 session passed seven statutes relating to the mineral law of this state. Each covers a different phase of the subject and therefore requires separate
treatment.
Conservation. Act 157 of 1940 was enacted for the recited
purpose of conserving the oil and gas resources of the state. It
prohibits the waste and depletion of those minerals and delegates
the authority to enforce effectively the provisions of the act to the
Commissioner of Conservation. The Commissioner is given authority to make, after notice and a hearing,"such reasonable rules,
regulations and orders as may be necessary from time to time in
the proper. administration and enforcement of the Act. ...)J84
In order to effectuate its announced purpose the act contains a
detailed enumeration of matters over which the Commissioner
is to have jurisdiction. No rule, regulation or order can be made
until after notice and a public hearing, except in case of an
emergency, and in the latter event an order shall not remain
in force longer than fifteen days. The Commissioner is vested
82. La. Const. of 1921, Art. IV, § 16: "No law shall be passed abolishing
forced heirship ......
83. This act Is set out as Articles 316.1-316.3 in the supplement to Dart's
Louisiana Civil Code.
84. La. Act 157 of 1940, § 3.
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with broad authority, including the power to regulate the drilling, casing, plugging and operation of oil and gas wells and production therefrom, pooling of two or more separately owned
tracts, and proration.
The statute prohibits the "sale, purchase or acquisition, or
the transportation, refining, processing, or handling in any other
way" 8 of illegal oil, gas or products thereof, and prescribes penalties for violations. Illegal oil and gas are defined as oil and gas
"produced within the State of Louisiana from any well or wells
in excess of the amount allowed by any rule, regulation or order
of the Commissioner. ."...80 An illegal product is defined as any
"product of oil or gas, any part of which was processed or derived, in whole or in part, from illegal oil or illegal gas or from
''8
any part thereof.

7

Section 21 repeals Act 134 of 192488 and Act 225 of 1936.19 It
repeals all other laws only insofar as they are in direct conflict
with the provisions of the statute under consideration. All orders,
rules, and regulations issued under the 1936 act are to continue
in effect until repealed or superseded by new orders or regulations. This section also contains an express proviso to the effect
that no crime committed or criminal prosecution instituted under
previous laws shall be condoned, affected or defeated. 0
Monthly report to holders of mineral interest. Act 245 of 1940
requires "all operators taking or producing oil or gas from any
lands in Louisiana, and who do not market same through a pipe
line company" 91 (Italics supplied) to furnish by registered mail
a monthly report to each owner of royalty, oil or gas interest
showing "the amount of all oil or gas produced from such lands
during the previous calendar month,"9 the amount sold or disposed of and the amount on hand. Each owner must furnish his
name and address to the operator affected by this statute. 3
85. Id. at § 18.
86. Id. at § 2(k), (1).
87. Id. at § 2(m).
88. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4719.
89. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 9482.1-9482.16.
90. Section 22 of Act 157 of 1940 authorizes the transfer of powers of the
Commissioner of Conservation to the new department created by the general
reorganization of the executive department of the state government. Cf. La.
Act 47 of 1940, tit. XXII.
91. La. Act 245 of 1940, § 1.
92. Ibid.
93. Section 2 of La. Act 245 of 1940 prescribes penalties for violations of
the statute. Cf. La. Act 93 of 1936, §§ 15, 16 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4725.15,
4725.16], for provisions requiring daily reports of production under leases
granted by the State Mineral Board.
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State Mineral Board authorized to explore and develop mineral resources of state lands. Act 311 of 1940 authorizes the State
Mineral Board "to explore for and to develop the mineral resources of any vacant and unappropriated lands belonging to the
State of Louisiana, title to which is in the public, including rights
of way, road beds, lake and river beds and other bottoms, land
adjudicated to the State at tax sales and other lands and water
bottoms whatsoever by whatever title acquired. . . ,,94 The board
is authorized to conduct surveys and to undertake such exploration and development as it deems proper or necessary. The
statute permits operations by the board acting directly through
any appropriate agency or department thereof or by contract
with any independent contractor upon such terms and condition
as it thinks most advantageous to the state. The advisability of
the state entering into the oil and gas business as an operator is
questionable.,
Use, lease, or sale of cemeteries for mineral development
prohibited. Act 81 of 1940 was enacted for the ostensible purpose
of preventing the recurrence of the regrettable events depicted
in the suit of Humphreys v. Bennett Oil Corporation."' In that
case the court awarded substantial damages to the plaintiffs for
mental anguish resulting from the desecration by the defendant
of the cemetery where their relatives were buried. Although the
graves and tombs of plaintiffs' relatives were not physically disturbed, other graves in the cemetery were desecrated by defendant.
Sections 1 and 2 of the 1940 statute make it "unlawful for
any person or persons, organization, copartnership, association,
corporation, city, town, village, municipality or any other political subdivision of the State of Louisiana, who has platted, laid
out and/or dedicated any tract of land for cemetery purposes
and permitted human bodies to be interred therein, to use, lease
or sell said tract of land or any part thereof for the purpose of
94. La. Act 311 of 1940, § 1. It is believed that this provision will be
limited in its operation to those lands under the direct control and supervision of the state. Cf. Placid Oil Co. v. Hebert, 194 La. 788, 194 So. 893 (1940);
State v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 197 So. 140 (La. 1940). Cf. also La. Act
162 of 1940 (supra p. 118) granting to all political subdivisions of the state
the right to grant mineral leases on lands owned by them.
95. Section 5 of Act 311 of 1940 authorizes the transfer of powers of the
State Mineral Board to the new department created by the general reorganization of the executive department of the state government. Cf. La. Act
47 of 1940, tit. XXII.
96. 197 So. 222 (La. 1940).
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prospecting and/or drilling and/or to drill, mine or prospect for
oil, gas, sulphur and/or other minerals thereon. 91 7 Section 3
makes it a misdemeanor for any person or persons and the officers and agents of the other parties or agencies enumerated in
Sections 1 and 2 to violate any of the provisions of those sections,
and prescribes the penalties for violation. 8 Section 4 provides
that each day on which the violations are committed or carried
on shall be deemed a separate offense punishable by the penalties
prescribed."'
Although the civil liability incurred by the invasion of the
rights described above might not be a sufficient deterrant in all
cases, it is believed that the criminal penalties imposed by the
statute will forever prevent the recurrence of incidents such as
gave rise to the Humphreys case.
Lease of state lands. Act 92 of 1940 amended the State Mineral Board Act'00 in certain details. The principal changes effected by the amendments were: (1) to authorize the State Mineral
Board, prior to leasing state land, to secure additional information by geophysical and geological surveys; (2) to limit the maximum quantity of land that could be included in any one lease
to five thousand acres; (3) to make the operation of the statute
more flexible by allowing the Board receiving the bids to lease
all or any part of the lands advertised and, in the event all bids
were rejected, to immediately and publicly offer for competitive
bidding all or any portions of the land advertised, the offering to
be made under the provisions set forth in the statute. 1 1
Lease of lands owned by state agencies or subdivisions and
sixteenth section lands. Act 162 of 1940 grants full authority to
the various levee districts, drainage districts, road districts, school
boards, other boards, commissions, parishes, municipalities, state
universities, state colleges, or penal or eleemosynary institutions
of the State of Louisiana, or any subdivision of any of them, as
well as any other subdivisions, agencies, units or institutions of
the State of Louisiana to execute mineral leases covering any
97. La. Act 81 of 1940, § 1. Section 2 is substantially similar.
98. Id. at § 3.
99. Id. at § 4.
100. La. Act 93 of 1936, as amended by La. Act 80 of 1938 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) §§ 4725.1-4725.21].
101. Sections 4 and 5 of La. Act 92 of 1940 contain provisions authorizing
the transfer of the powers of the State Mineral Board and the Louisiana
Highway Commission to the new departments created by the general reorganization of the executive department of the state department. Cf. La. Act
47 of 1940.
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land owned by each, irrespective of the method by which the
title was acquired. The same authority is granted to the school
boards of the respective parishes to execute mineral leases covering sixteenth sections or indemnity lands granted by Congress to
0 2
The agency desiring to
the state for public school purposes.
the State Mineral
direct
lease the property may by resolution
of the land
leasing
Board to advertise for and proceed with the
for mineral
lands
in the manner provided for the leasing of state
03
purposes' or it may proceed to lease the same in accordance
with the detailed procedure outlined in the statute. The procedure to be followed in either instance is for all practical purposes
the same as that prescribed for the leasing of state lands by the
State Mineral Board, 10 4 except in those instances where the
agency grants the lease, it must be approved by the State Mineral Board and countersigned by the Board's duly authorized
officer. 105
This statute applies to the various levee districts throughout
the state, and to that extent supersedes the provision contained
in Act 93 of 1936,108 as amended, relative to the authority of the
State Mineral Board to grant mineral leases on the lands granted
by the state to the levee district.
Section 11 contains the general repealing clause and in addition repeals certain acts by number. 1'
In the case of Placid Oil Company v. Hebert'0 8 it was held
that Act 93 of 1936 did not expressly or by implication "authorize
the State Mineral Board to lease the streets of a municipality
102. See Act of April 21, 1806, 2 Stat. 391, c. 39; Act of March 3, 1811, 2
Stat. 665, c. 46, § 10; 37 Stat. 90, 30 U.S.C.A. § 77 (1927). See also La. Const.
of 1921, Art. XII, § 18.
103. La. Act 162 of 1940, § 3. Cf. La. Act 93 of 1936, as amended by LaAct 80 of 1938 and La. Act 92 of 1940 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4725.1-4725.21].
104. Ibid.
105. La. Act 162 of 1940, § 10.
106. La. Act 93 of 1936, § 4, as amended by La. Act 80 of 1938, § 2 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 4725.4].
107. Section 11 repeals by number La. Act 160 of 1936 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§ 4735.3], which authorizes any municipality, parish or school board to grant
mineral leases upon any lands owned by them; La. Act 20 of 1922 [Dart's
Stats. §§ 4726-4727], which authorizes parish school boards to execute mineral
leases upon lands owned by such school board; La. Act 66 of 1928 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) 8H 6867-6868], authorizing the boards of commissioners of the
various levee districts to execute mineral leases owned or hereafter acquired
by said levee districts; and those portions of Revised Statutes, Section 2962
as amended by La. Act 129 of 1908 and La. Act 54 of 1910 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§ 7249] and Section 30 of La. Act 100 of 1922 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2550]
to the extent that they authorize parish school boards to grant mineral
leases on sixteenth section lands.
108. 194 La. 788, 194 So. 893 (1940).
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for the production of oil, gas or other minerals." Mention was
made of the fact that Act 160 of 19361-0 authorizes a municipality
to grant mineral leases upon lands belonging to it, but an interpretation of the act was not necessary under the pleadings.
In the case of State v. Humble Oil and Refining Company" °
the court held that Act 93 of 1936, as amended, authorizing the
State Mineral Board to grant leases on "'any lands belonging to
the State or the title to which is in the public, including rights
of way, road-beds, lake and river beds and other bottoms, lands
adjudicated to the State at tax sale, and any other lands and
water bottoms by whatever title acquired' """ is a general law
and did not divest the parish school boards of the authority
granted them by a special statute to execute mineral leases on
sixteenth section lands.
The obvious purpose of the act is to coordinate the laws
relative to the leasing of the public lands which are not under the
direct control of the state and to designate with certainty the
authorities entitled to exercise that power."12
Mineral reservation under lands acquired by federal government made imprescriptible. Act 315 of 1940 provides that
when the United States of America or any of its subdivisions or
agencies acquires land by conventional deed or contract, condemnation or expropriation proceedings, which act or judgment
contains a reservation of minerals or royalties or is made subject
to a prior sale or reservation of minerals still in effect, the mineral rights so reserved or previously sold are imprescriptible. 11
Mortgages to Trustees to Secure Notes or Bonds
Act 72 of 1914114 authorizes the execution of conventional

mortgages to fiduciary trustees to secure the payment of two or
109. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4735.3.
110. 197 So. 140 (La. 1940).
111. 197 So. at 143.
112. La. Act 162 of 1940, § 12, authorizes the transfer of powers of the
State Mineral Board to the new department created by the general reorganization of the executive department of the state government.
113. Section 2 of Act 315 of 1940 is the general repealing clause and in
addition repeals by number Act 68 and Act 151 of 1938. It will be noted that
Act 68 of 1938 provides that mineral reservations under lands sold to or acquired by the State of Louisiana for spillway or floodway purposes are imprescriptible, and Act 151 of 1938 provides that prescription shall not run
against mineral or royalty reservations contained in acts whereby the United
States of America and the State of Louisiana or any of its subdivisions acquire real estate for use in any public work. The failure to Include the
acquisitions made by the State of Louisiana within the terms of the 1940
statute is worthy of note.
114. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 5003-5004.
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more bonds, notes, or other obligations.'1 5 The right to foreclose
and to bring all actions connected with the mortgage is restricted
to the trustee as the "irrevocably appointed special agent and
representative" of the creditors. However, upon the trustee's
failure to act, after having been requested so to do by a sufficient
number of creditors, the bondholders or noteholders themselves
may proceed independently to enforce their mortgage rights. 11
Under the 1914 act, it was permissible for the mortgage to provide that the trustee shall not be obligated to foreclose unless so
instructed by a certain proportion of the creditors-"not less than
ten per cent. of the total outstanding indebtedness secured by
such mortgage, and not more than fifty per cent. thereof"-who
agree to indemnify the trustee for expenses and costs of suit. It
is only in connection with this possibility that the 1940 amendment 7 effects any change, omitting the specific statutory limits
as to the number of creditors necessary to request the trustee to
act, and leaving the parties a much wider latitude by requiring
18
that this matter be fixed in the mortgage."
Such a restrictive provision serves as a condition precedent
to the creditor's right to take individual action and is inserted
to avoid "unnecessary and burdensome costs and charges of independent suits by the individual bondholders."' 19 Such provisions have been held constitutional and are not to be viewed as
depriving the creditors of all right of action or tending to oust
the courts of their inherent jurisdiction, but rather as agreements
115. La. Act 72 of 1914, § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 5004], provides that the
provisions of the Civil Code relative to substitutions, fidel commissa or other
trust dispositions are not to affect conventional mortgages executed in conformity with the provisions of the act.
116. In Rowe v. Louisiana Agricultural Corp., 155 La. 241, 99 So. 206
(1924), it was held that where a bondholder sought to enforce a mortgage
running to a fiduciary trustee without first having requested the trustee to
bring suit, the mortgagor was entitled to insist that foreclosure suit be
brought by the trustee. Nor was the plaintiff allowed to enforce his rights
via ordinariarather than via executiva, the law not allowing one to do indirectly that which he is prohibited by his voluntary contract from doing
directly. On the same point, and citing the Rowe case with approval, see
Shepherd v. Highland Baptist Church of Shreveport, 155 So. 787 (La. App.
1934).
117. La. Act 291 of 1940.
118. "The provisions in different indentures vary in respect to the amount
necessary to be held by the requesting holders, prerequisite to an individual
bondholder's right to sue upon the trustee's failure to act, but the amount
usually exceeds twenty-five per cent of the bonds outstanding." Note (1927)
27 Col. L. Rev. 579, 582.
119. Rowe v. Louisiana Agricultural Corp., 155 La. 241, 245, 99 So. 206,
207 (1924).
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which the mortgage creditors were at liberty to make and which
10
are not illegal or contrary to public policy.
Payment of Taxes Preceding the Transfer of Property
There are two statutes requiring the payment of taxes before
the execution of an act of sale transferring immovable property.121 Act 116 of 1938 is a special enactment applicable only
in the Parish of Orleans 122 and requires that payment of taxes
be shown by a tax certificate annexed to the act of sale, except
the payment of those taxes for the year in which the tax research
certificate are applied for. 2 Act 110 of 1938 applies generally
throughout the state,2 4 and this was amended by Act 235 of 1940
so as to except the payment of those taxes for the year within
which the transfer takes place. From a practical viewpoint this
1940 amendment is desirable because it makes the law uniform
through the state.

25

Recordation of Writs Affecting Immovable Property
Prior to 1940 it was unnecessary (except in Orleans and
Jefferson parishes) to record notice of the execution of any writ
affecting immovable property in order to preserve the resulting
lien and privilege.12 6 Act 89 of 1940 requires the sheriffs of all
120. Moore v. Tumwater Paper Mills Co., 181 Wash. 45, 42 P.(2d) 29 (1935)
and cases cited therein.
121. La. Act 110 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 8449-8450] and La. Act
116 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 6247.12-6247.16]. For a discussion of these
two acts, see Hebert and Lazarus, Louisiana Legislation of 1938 (1938) 1
LoUIsIANA LAw REViEW 80, 135.
122. Dart's Stats. (1939) H§ 6247.12-6247.16.
123. La. Act 116 of 1938, § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 6247.13] provides: "The
tax collectors of all such municipal corporations (with a population in -excess
of three hundred thousand inhabitants) are hereby required, when making
out tax research certificates to make a research and report the condition
of the tax-rolls for ten years only, prior to the first of January of the year
"
in which said tax research certificates are applied for ...
In Charles Wirth Realty & Inv. Co. v. Tropical Clothing & Mfg. Co., 160
So. 455 (La. App. 1935), which arose in Orleans Parish, it was held that a
sheriff could not retain out of the proceeds of the sale of property an amount
sufficient to cover the taxes for the year in which the sale took place. La.
Act 116 of 1938, § 2, codified this ruling for cases where the taxes for the
current year were not yet due at the time of the sheriff's sale; and it is submitted that the same rule should apply regardless of whether the taxes for
the current year were due at the time of the conveyance of the property.
124. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 8449-8450. La. Act 110 of 1938 repealed La.
Act 348 of 1936 which in turn repealed La. Act 170 of 1898, §§ 74, 75, the
provisions of which were amended and reenacted by the 1938 act.
125. For a discussion of the confusion resulting from amending a statute
applicable outside Orleans Parish while failing to amend the one pertaining
to Orleans Parish, see Third Dist. Land Co. v. Geary, 185 La. 508, 169 So. 528
(1936).
126. Williams v. Heffner, 30 La. Ann. 1193 (1878); First Nat. Bank V.
Powell, 130 La. 856, 58 So. 687 (1912).
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parishes of the state, other than Orleans and Jefferson, to record
in the office of the recorder of mortgages a notice of the execution of any writ affecting real property. The evident purpose of
this statute is to make the recordation operate as notice to third
parties of the existence of the privilege granted by the law to
the seizing creditor. Sections 3625-3629 of the Revised Statutes12"
require a similar method of recordation in Orleans and Jefferson
parishes. It is submitted that the 1940 act, like the statute which
applies to Orleans and Jefferson, is mandatory and that hereafter
2 8
an unrecorded writ will be inoperative as against third parties.'
Hence, as regards the requirement of registry, the 1940 statute
makes uniform the law throughout the state.'2 9 In the parishes
of Orleans and Jefferson the sheriff is not required to take actual
possession of property in order to make a valid seizure; a fictitious
seizure is sufficient. 13 0 This is done by the sheriff making out

three notices describing the property: the first is served upon
the judgment debtor at the time of giving him notice of the seizure, the second is recorded in the mortgage records, and the third
is recorded in his seizure book. 13 In parishes other than Orleans
and Jefferson, the taking of actual possession by the sheriff is
1 2
required as essential to a valid seizure. 1
Whether the 1940 act will be interpreted so as to render a
fictitious seizure sufficient and bring the practice in the rest of
the state in unison with that of Orleans and Jefferson parishes
seems doubtful in the light of the different terminology used in
the two statutes.13 It appears, however, that an actual possession
127. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 7499-7503.
128. Whiteside v. Lafayette Fire Insurance Co., 143 La. 675, 79 So. 217
(1918). See also First Nat. Bank v. Ft. Wayne Artificial Ice Co., 105 La. 133,
141, 29 So. 379, 383 (1900).
129. An illustration of the desirable effect of such a statute may be found
in First Nat. Bank v. Ft. Wayne Artificial Ice Co., 105 La. 133, 29 So. 379
(1900), wherein it was held that a seizure under a writ of attachment recorded in conformity with Sections 3625-3629 will take precedence over a sale
recorded after the seizure.
130. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, §§ 3625-3629 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 74997503]. Baltimore v. Parlange, 25 La. Ann. 335 (1873); Tharp v. Edmiston, 179
La. 720, 155 So. 2 (1934).
131. Ibid.
132. Arts. 256, 257, 642, 656, 657, 658, 660, 661, 734, 736, La. Code of Practice
of 1870. Winn v. Elgee, 6 Rob. 100 (La. 1843); Major v. Hewes, 135 La. 354,
65 So. 487 (1914); Whiteside v. Lafayette Fire Ins. Co., 143 La. 675, 79 So.
217 (1918); Harris v. First National Bank in Arcadia, 185 La. 284, 169 So. 341
(1936); Lewis v. Martin, 169 So. 269 (La. App. 1936); Turner v. Glass, 192 La.
478, 188 So. 147 (1939).
133. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 3629 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 7503], which
applies to Orleans and Jefferson parishes, provides: "The recording of the
description and notice mentioned in the three thousand six hundred and
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of the property is still essential to a valid seizure and that the
only effect of the 1940 act should be that of notice to third parties
of the existence of the privilege granted by the law to the seizing
creditor.
Sale of "Easements" or Flowage Rights
By Succession Representative
Under previous law, an administrator, executor or curator
could obtain an order for the sale of immovables only when it
was necessary to sell the property in order to discharge the debts
and legacies of the succession.13 4 Act 168 of 1940 broadens their
power in this matter by authorizing and empowering them to
execute and sign a formal deed in favor of the United States of
America, where the decedent had granted an option for the acquisition of "easements" or flowage rights in any of the spillways
in the state and had died prior to its execution. However, the
administrator, executor or curator must first obtain an order
from the district court having jurisdiction of the estate of the
1 5
deceased.

Well Drillers', Operators', and Materialmen's Privilege
Act 100 of 1940 creates a well drillers', operators', and materialmen's lien and privilege, and provides for its enforcement
by the writ of provisional seizure without bond. It is more favorable to the lien holder than was its predecessor' 8 by supplying
an added security on all the oil produced from the wells and
stored on the lease where the wells are located.17 It should also
be noted that the time for filing notice of the privilege, setting
forth the nature and amount thereof, was extended from sixty to
ninety days.
This lien and privilege is declared to be superior to all others,
except a tax lien or a bona fide vendor's lien and privilege. Howtwenty-seventh section, shall be deemed and considered as the seizure and
possession by the sheriff of the property therein described, and it shall be
unnecessary to appoint a keeper thereof." La. Act 89 of 1940 contains no
corresponding section. However, Article 657 of the Code of Practice provides: "If it be land or a plantation which he (sheriff) has taken, unless the
same has been leased or rented, it shall remain sequestered in his custody
until the sale. Consequently, he may appoint a keeper or an overseer to
manage it, for whom he shall be responsible."
134. Arts. 1049, 1164-1167, 1668-1670, La. Civil Code of 1870. Under Article
1669, a testamentary executor may sell immovable property when he Is authorized by the will to do so.
135. Cf. Art. 1165, La. Civil Code of 1870.
136. La. Act 100 of 1940 amends and reenacts La. Act 145 of 1934 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) §§ 5101.1-5101.5].
137. La. Act 100 of 1940, § 1.
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ever, the vendor's lien and privilege on immovable property must
exist and be filed for record before the work is begun or materials
furnished, and on movable property it must be filed within seven
days after the property subject to the privilege is delivered. The
effect of the filing prevents the movables from becoming immovable by nature or destination. These liens on immovables are
to be recorded in the manner provided by existing law; and liens
on movables are to be recorded in the manner provided for the
recordation of chattel mortgages.

II. MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE CODE OF PRACTICE

A. AMENDMENTS TO SPECIFIC CODE ARTICLES
Article 165. Exceptions to rule of suit at domicile. Article 165
of the Code of Practice enumerates ten exceptions to the rule
that a civil suit must be brought at the domicile of the defendant.
The ninth of these exceptions provides
"In all cases where any person, firm, or domestic or foreign corporation shall commit trespass, or do anything for
which an action for damage lies or where any domestic or
foreign corporation shall fail to do anything for which an action for damage. lies, such person, firm or corporation may be
sued in the parish where such damage is done or trespass
committed or at the domicile of such person, firm or corporation."' (Italics supplied.)
When this exception was originally adopted, it was applicable exclusively to suits against corporations, and even then only
when the fault which was alleged to have caused the damage
was one of commission.2 In 1908, however, the article was so
amended as to make the exception also applicable in suits against
corporations when the damage was caused by an omission.8 In
1926, the article was again amended in order to make the excep1. Art. 165(9), La. Code of Practice of 1870, as amended by La. Act 282

of 1940.
2. Art. 165(9), La. Code of Practice of 1870: "In all cases where any corporation shall commit trespass, or do anything for which an action for damage lies, it shall be liable to be sued in the parish where such damage is
done or trespass committed."
3. Ibid., as amended by La. Act 108 of 1908: "In all cases where any corporation shall commit trespass or do or fail to do anything for which an

action for damages lies it shall be liable to be sued in the parish where such
damage is done or trespass committed."
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tion applicable in cases of suits against individuals, 4 but its effect
was of only limited operation, because the exception remained
applicable only when the injury complained of was the result
of an act of commission, and not when the damage was occasion5
ed by a failure to act.
In the light of the above, it is important to determine what
has been accomplished by the present amendment. At the outset,
it must be noted that it is sought to make the act applicable to
foreign as well as to domestic corporations. Insofar as domestic
corporations are concerned, the law has always been to the effect
that in actions for damages, the suit can be brought either at
the place where the cause of action arose or at the domicile of
the corporation.8
With regard to foreign corporations, however, the situation is
somewhat different. A foreign corporation is amenable to suit
to enforce personal liability only when it is doing business within
the jurisdiction in such a manner and to such an extent as to
warrant the inference that the corporation is present there, and
in such cases, service of process may be made upon its resident
agent appointed for that purpose, or upon any other proper person designated by law.7 As presently amended, therefore, Article
165 (9) of the Code of Practice could apply only to those foreign
corporations which are amenable to suit in Louisiana, and its
provisions could not be extended to any other foreign corporation. In the light of the foregoing, therefore, it is submitted that
the amendment accomplishes nothing; prior to the amendment
the article was broad enough to include such foreign corporations.8
4. Art. 165(9), La. Code of Practice of 1870, as amended by La. Act 130 of
1926: "In all cases where any person, firm or corporation shall commit trespass, or do anything for which an action for damage lies or where any corporation shall fail to do anything for which an action for damage lies, such
person, firm or corporation may be sued in the parish where such damage Is
done or trespass committed or at the domicile of such person, firm or corporation."
5. Tripani v. Meraux, 184 La. 66, 165 So. 453 (1936); Esthay v. McCain,
185 So. 670 (La. App. 1939).
6. Art. 165(9), La. Code of Practice of 1870, as amended by La. Act 130
of 1926. Cope v. Louisiana State Live Stock Sanitary Board, 176 So. 657 (La.
App. 1937); O'Brien v. Delta Air Corp., 188 La. 911, 178 So. 489 (1938); Pelt
v. Louisiana State Live Stock Sanitary Board, 178 So. 644 (La. App. 1938).
See also Wisemore v. First Nat. Life Ins. Co., 190 La. 1011, 183 So. 247 (1938).
7. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602, 19 S.Ct. 308,
43 L.Ed. 569 (1899); St. Louis S. W. R.R. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 33 S.Ct.
245, 57 L.Ed. 486 (1913); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Chatters, 279 U.S. 320, 49
S.Ct. 329, 73 L.Ed. 711 (1929).
8. The article provides that In all cases "where any ... corporation shall
commit trespass . . . such . . .corporation may be sued in the parish where
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In order to appreciate fully the present amendment, however, an examination of prior legislation and jurisprudence becomes necessary. It has been generally recognized that suits
against foreign corporations on causes of action resulting from
trespass, offenses or quasi offenses were governed by the provisions of Act 179 of 1918.1 Nevertheless, that act contains two
provisions which are apparently conflicting and irreconcilable.
Section 1 (6d) provides that:
"Where the [foreign] corporation has established an office in
a parish other than where its agent for service of process re-,
sides, the venue of the suit shall, at the option of the plaintiff
be in either the parish where the cause of action arose or in
the parish of the residence of the corporation's agent for service of process, if the cause of action result from a trespass or
an offense, or quasi offense. ..."
On the other hand, Section 1 (6f) states that the venue of the
suit "shall at the option of the plaintiff, be either at the domicile
of the corporation, or where it has its main office, or in the parish
where the cause of action arose ... "
Under Section 1 (6d) it is evident that when a foreign corporation has established an office in a parish other than the one
in which its agent for service of process resides, a plaintiff may
sue, either at the domicile of the agent, or at the place where the
cause of action arose. The presence of subsection 6f, however,
has caused much confusion which the courts have not as yet
satisfactorily removed. The argument has been advanced that
this latter subsection could in no manner apply to foreign corporations, since a foreign corporation can have no domicile other
than that of the state of incorporation, and that it cannot be presumed, in the absence of proof, that a foreign corporation would
maintain its principal office in Louisiana. The conclusion to be
drawn is that Section 1 (6f) can reasonably be construed to apply
only to domestic corporations, and that its proper place is under
Section 1 (5) of Act 179 of 1918, which deals with domestic corporations, and from which there is conspicuously absent the provision relating to venue of suits in cases of torts committed by
such damage is done or trespass committed or at the domicile of such ...
corporation." It appears that the words "any corporation" are broad enough
to include any corporation, whether domestic or foreign if amenable to suit
in Louisiana.
9. La. Act 179 of 1918, § 1(6d), (6f), as amended by La. Act 48 of 1932, §
1 (Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1933, (6d), (6f)]. Abadie v. National Petroleum Corp.,
150 La. 1076, 91 So. 516 (1922).
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them.10 The Louisiana Supreme Court, however, has held other1
wise. In Abadie v. National Petroleum Corporation, suit was
brought in Orleans Parish, where the defendant maintained an
office from which it supervised all the affairs of the corporation
in the state. The cause of action arose in Jefferson Parish. The
defendant's agent for service of process resided in Iberville
Parish. Though it was earnestly contended that under the provisions of Section 1 (6d) the suit should have been brought either
in Jefferson or Iberville, the court held that Section 1 (6f) controls, it being the latest expression of the legislative will, and
that since suit had been brought in the parish where the defendant had its "main office in the state" the lower court had juris2
diction rationae personae.1
This decision is difficult to support in view of the well settled
principle of statutory construction that in construing different
provisions of a statute, the court should, insofar as practicable,
reconcile them, and, if possible, give a sensible and intelligent
effect to each.' The two provisions in question are not entirely
irreconcilable, and they may be construed together so as to
give effect to both. In all cases where the foreign corporation
maintains an office in a parish other than that in which its agent
resides, suit may be brought either at the place where the cause
of action arose, or at the domicile of the resident agent; but if
the corporation also maintains a "main office in the state" suit
may also be brought in the parish where the main office is located. The corporation can always be sued at its domicile in the
state of incorporation, regardless of the provision of the statute.
The result of this construction is to allow the plaintiff an option
10. O'Niell, J., dissenting in Abadie v. National Petroleum Corp., 160 La.
1076, 1078, 91 So. 516, 517 (1922).
11. 150 La. 1076, 91 So. 516 (1922).
12. The court nevertheless admitted that a foreign corporation could
not be regarded as having a domicile in this state.
13. Reynolds v. Baldwin, 1 La. Ann. 162 (1846); Woodruff v. Producers'
Oil Co., 142 La. 368, 76 So. 803 (1917); Downs v. Drew, 166 La. 439, 117 So.
454 (1928); Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 148 So. 37 (1933); Jackson State
Nat. Bank of Jackson v. Merchants' Bank & Trust Co. of Jackson, 177 La.
975, 149 So. 539 (1933); Shreveport Armature & Electric Works v. Harwell,
172 So. 463 (La. App. 1937); Post Office Employees' Credit Union v. Morris,
192 La. 891, 189 So. 566 (1939).
The rule announced in the Abadie case appears to have been followed in
Nelson v. Continental Asphalt & Petroleum Co., 11 La. App. 450, 123 So. 474
(1929). But in Armes v. Williams Bros., 17 La. App. 555, 136 So. 160 (1931),
suit was brought in the parish of the agent's domicile and the court upheld
the jurisdiction of the court, apparently giving full force and effect to Section 1 (6d) of the statute. See also Brown v. Texas & P. Ry., 18 F. (2d) 677
(W.D. La. 1927); Boykin v. Hope Production Co., 58 F. (2d) 1041 (W.D. La.
1931).
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of bringing suit at either of four places: (1) the domicile of the
corporation in the state of incorporation; (2) the place where
the cause of action arose; (3) the residence of the agent, if he
resides in any parish other than that wherein an office is maintained; and, (4) the parish where the corporation has its main
office in the state, if it has such an office.
In view of the foregoing, it is difficult to see that the amendment under discussion has accomplished anything. It provides
that a foreign corporation may be sued either at its domicile
(which can mean nothing more than its state of incorporation)14
or at the place where the cause of action arose.
It may be said that Act 282 of 1940 repeals the provisions of
Act 179 of 1918; but since it contains no repealing clause, the repeal can be only of all those laws that are inconsistent or in conflict with its provisions. 1 5 It is submitted, however, that the two
acts are not in conflict: both provide for suits to be brought in
the parish where the cause of action ariose or at the domicile of
the corporation, and although the latter act stops there, it cannot
be implied that other laws on the same subject matter which are
not in conflict are impliedly repealed. On the contrary, all laws
on the same subject matter are to be construed together and
effect given to both wherever possible. 1"
Act 282 of 1940, therefore, has accomplished nothing, except,
perhaps, to create doubt and more confusion on this subject. It is
urged that adequate legislation be enacted to do away with the
present situation which has been aggravated by the unfortunate
adoption of this act.
Article 259. Release of attached property. Prior to its amendment in 1940,17 Article 259 of the Code of Practice provided that
the defendant could obtain the release of property that had been
attached by giving a bond for one and one-half times the value
of the property upon condition that he would satisfy any judgment rendered against him in the suit, to the value of the property attached. 18
14. Abadie v. National Petroleum Corp., 150 La. 1076, 91 So. 516 (1922).
15. Bank of Lecompte v. Lecompte Cotton Oil Co., 125 La. 844, 51 So.
1010 (1910); New Orleans v. New Orleans Jockey Club, 129 La. 64, 55 So. 711
(1911); State v. Grace, 173 La. 215, 136 So. 569 (1931); State v. Standard Oil
Co. of Louisiana, 188 La. 978, 178 So. 601 (1938); Stoker v. Police Jury of
Sabine Parish, 190 So. 192 (La. App. 1939).
16. Art. 17, La. Civil Code of 1870. In re De Armas, 10 Mart. (O.S.) 158

(La. 1821); State v. Coco, 152 La. 241, 92 So. 883 (1922); Shreveport v. Urban
Land Co., 177 La. 357, 148 So. 256 (1933).
17. La. Act 281 of 1940.

18. Art. 259, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
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As presently amended, the article provides that property attached may be released by the defendant upon his giving bond
"equal to one and one-fourth (1%) the value of the property
attached, or exceeding by one-fourth (4) the value of the claim,
with the surety of a good and solvent person ... that he will
satisfy such judgment, to the value of the property attached, as
may be rendered against him in the pending suit."'
It is evident that the purpose of the amendment is to allow a
defendant greater liberty and opportunity for bonding property
attached, especially in cases where the claim is small and the
value of the property great, and at the same time to afford sufficient protection to the plaintiff. As the law stood prior to this act,
if a defendant were sued for a claim of one hundred dollars and
the property attached were valued at one thousand dollars, he
could not secure the release of the property unless he gave bond
of fifteen hundred dollars. Under the present law, he may give
bond for only $125 (one-fourth over and above the value of the
claim). In such a case the judgment could not be in excess of the
amount claimed and the bond would be sufficient to protect the
plaintiff.
Article 593. Time allowed for taking devolutive appeal
changed. Article 593 of the Code of Practice provides the periods
of time within which devolutive appeals shall be brought. Insofar
as nonresidents are concerned, the prescriptive period prior to
the present amendment was two years, computed from the day
20
on which the final judgment was rendered.
As amended by Act 130 of 1940, the article now provides that
as against nonresidents who have not made or caused to have
been made a personal appearance in the case, the prescriptive
period shall be two years from the day the final judgment is
rendered; but that when the nonresident appears either personally or through counsel employed by him, the time granted shall
be only one year.21 With regard to those judgments rendered less
than one year prior to the effective date of this act, nonresidents
who have made an appearance either personally or through
19. Ibid., as amended by La. Act 281 of 1940.
20. Art. 593, La. Code of Practice of 1870; Kraeutler v. The Bank of the

United States, 12 Rob. 456 (La. 1846); Scott v. Rusk, 2 La. Ann. 266 (1847);
S. Blum & Co. v. Wyly, 111 La. 1092, 36 So. 202 (1904); Bank of Webster v.
McDonald, 137 La. 574, 68 So. 959 (1915). Such was the rule even where the
nonresident had made a personal appearance in the case. S. Blum & Co. v.
Wyly, supra.
21. Art. 593, La. Code of Practice of 1870, as amended by La. Act 130
of 1940, § 1.
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counsel employed by them, and whose right to appeal was in
existence on the date the act became effective, the prescriptive
period is fixed at six months, to be computed from the effective
22
date of the act.

Thus, in those cases where nonresidents have appeared in
the suit either personally or through counsel appointed by them,
the evident intention of the legislature is to limit the time within
which they may appeal and to allow them the same time now
given to residents. From the very language of the statute, nonresidents who are sued upon substituted service through the appointment of a curator ad hoc and who have not therefore made
a personal appearance, still have two years within which to lodge
an appeal.
The act also provides that in cases involving questions concerning the validity of any bonds or certificates of indebtedness
of any public board or political subdivision or of any taxes or
assessments necessary to pay the same, the prescriptive period
for an appeal shall be thirty days from the date on which the
judgment was rendered. It is not unlikely that the validity of this
provision under the Louisiana constitution may be questioned.
It will be noted that this is a new provision, not formerly in the
article of the Code, and that the title of the amendatory act does
not in terms indicate that this addition is to be made. 28 However,
there is a well settled principle that the title of an act which states
as its object the amendment and reenactment of a particular section of a statute or a particular article of a code, sufficiently meets
the constitutional requirement 24 without stating the nature of the
amendment, if the amendment is germane to the subject covered
in the original section or article. 25 As to whether or not the subject covered by the paragraph in question is germane to the
22. Id. at § 2.
23. The title of La. Act 130 of 1940 reads: "An Act To amend and reenact Article 593 of the Revised Code of Practice; to provide the period
within which a non-resident who has caused a personal appearance to be
made for him may appeal; and to repeal all laws in conflict herewith."
24. La. Const. of 1921, Art. III, § 16: "Every law enacted by the Legislature shall embrace but one object, and shall have a title indicative of such
object." La. Const. of 1921, Art. III, § 17: "No law shall be revived or amended by reference to its title, but in such cases the act revived, or section as
amended, shall be re-enacted and published at length."
25. State v. Garrett, 29 La. Ann. 637 (1877); Williams v. Western Star
Lodge, 38 La. Ann. 620 (1886); State v. Brown, 41 La. Ann. 771, 6 So. 638
(1889); State v. Read, 49 La. Ann. 1535, 22 So. 761 (1897); State v. American
Sugar Refining Co., 106 La. 553, 31 So. 181 (1901); State v. Williamson, 133
La. 1052, 63 So. 515 (1913); State v. Louisiana Oil Refining Corp., 181 La. 659,
160 So. 290 (1935).
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subject matter already covered in the original article of the Code
of Practice is a question upon which no opinion can be readily
afforded within the limits of the present discussion. 2

Article 986. Suits on unliquidated claims against executor.
As originally adopted, Article 986 of the Code of Practice provided that in the enforcement of money claims against successions, the plaintiff could bring his action "in the ordinary manner
before the court of probate where the succession was opened, or
before the district court, according to the amount involved." 27

(Italics supplied.)
The original reason for the provision relating to the choice
of courts in which the action must be brought is evident. The
Constitution of 1868 established the parish courts wherein all
successions must be opened or settled. 28 It was also provided
therein that all suits in which a succession was either plaintiff
or defendant should be brought in either the parish or district
courts, according to the amount involved.2 9
The jurisdiction of parish courts was exclusive and original
in cases involving more than one hundred and less than five
hundred dollars. District courts had jurisdiction of all matters
involving five hundred dollars or more; so that a suit to enforce
a money claim against a succession had to be brought in the
parish court where the succession was opened, if the claim was
less than five hundred dollars, and in the district court, if the
claim was for more than that amount.' 0
With the abolition of parish courts in 187931 and the establishment of district courts with "unlimited original jurisdiction
in all ...

probate and succession matters and when a succession

is a party defendant, ' 32 the pertinent language of Article 986 of
26. Cf. La. Act 140 of 1932, § 67, as amended by La. Act 44 of 1934 (2
E.S.) § 3 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 744.35] (providing for the time of taking
appeals from orders appointing bank liquidators); La. Act 24 of 1930, § 1
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2210] (fixing the time within which appeals are to be
taken from judgments rendered in divorce or separation cases); La. Act 46
of 1932, § 12 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4838] (providing for the time for taking
appeals in adoption cases); La. Act 26 of 1926, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §
5983] (regulating the time for taking appeals for the purpose of contesting
decisions of sewerage districts); La. Act 135 of 1880, § 6 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§ 7667] (prescribing the time for taking appeals in suits to remove local
officials).
27. Art. 986, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
28. La. Const. (1868) Arts. 73, 87.
29. Id. at Art. 87.
30. Ibid.
31. La. Const. (1879) Art. 80. Cf. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 1.
32. La. Const. (1879) Art. 109. Cf. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 35.
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the Code of Practice relating to the jurisdiction of courts before
which suits to enforce money claims against successions were to

be brought has become obsolete, since all such suits must now
be brought in the district courts. "8
The 1940 amendment

4

strikes out the outmoded language,

and in addition provides that such actions may be brought either
in the ordinary manner or by way of opposition to the account
filed in the succession proceedings by the curator or administrator.
Article 1029. Homologation of partition by notary. Because
all judicial partitions are made by a notary appointed for that
purpose by the judge before whom the action is brought, 5 it is
necessary that the partition as made by the notary be homologated by the court.
Since 1932, when Article 1029 of the Code of Practice was
amended, the party seeking the homologation has been required
to file a copy of the proces verbal of the partition proceedings
with the clerk of the court having jurisdiction. Notice of the filing of such proces verbal must be afforded by publishing the
same in the newspapers three times in ten days. The notice must
warn all interested parties to make opposition to the proces verbal within ten days from the first publication of such notice. If
there is no opposition, he may petition and obtain the homologation of the partition by simply showing that the publication had
been made according to law and that no opposition had been filed
6
within the time prescribed.3

Article 1029 of the Code of Practice, as originally adopted,
provided a more adequate and less complicated method for the
homologation of partition proceedings: The party seeking the
homologation was required only to file in court a copy of the
proces verbal and rule the co-owners into court to show cause,
within ten days from the service of the order, why the partition
33. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 35.
34. La. Act 283 of 1940: "If the claim be not liquidated, or if the curator
or testamentary executor or administrator has any objection to it, and consequently refuses to approve it, the bearer of the evidence of such claim,
whatever may be its amount, may bring his action against the curator or
testamentary executor or administrator in the ordinary manner, or by way
of opposition to the account filed in the said succession proceedings by the
curator or administrator."
35. Art. 1027, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
36. Art. 1029, La. Code of Practice of 1870, as amended by La. Act 208
of 1932, § 1.
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should not be homologated.8 1 It is difficult to see in what respect
the amendment of 1932 offered any additional advantage. Not
only did it substitute a most undesirable method of public notice
in place of personal citation on the rule to show cause, but it also
made the method more cumbersome and expensive.
Fortunately, however, the legislature by adopting Act 369 of
1940 has restored the article of the Code of Practice to its original
form.
B. STATUTES RELATING TO CODE OF PRACTICE SUBJECT MATTER

Cross-examination of adversary. Legislation authorizing litigants to examine their opponents as under cross examination was
first enacted in 1908. The act then simply provided that in such
cases the parties availing themselves of the provisions of the
statute were not to "be held as vouching to the court for the
credibility of the opponents" nor as estopped from thereafter impeaching their testimony.""
It must be noted that the act did not make provision as to
who is the proper person to be examined in cases where the opponent is a corporation or other legal entity. Since a corporation
can only act through its officers, it may have been logical to conclude that the officers of such corporation or other body were
subject to cross-examination under the act. In such cases, the
testimony thus elicited would be binding on the corporate body.
This question, however, was never adjudicated by the appellate
courts, although in one instance at least, cross-examination of
the president of a corporation was permitted without question. 9
It was perhaps this confusion which prompted the legislature'
to pass Act 115 of 1934.40 The new act embraced verbatim the
provisions of the act of 1908, and in addition it provided that
"where any of the parties ... is a corporation ... or other legal
entity, other than an individual, the parties examining shall be
entitled to examine ... the particular officer or officers or other
representatives ... having ... knowledge, charge or supervision
37. Art. 1029, La. Code of Practice of 1870: "When the partition is completed by the notary, any person interested may deposit a copy of the proceedings on it, in the office of the court which directed it, and may move
that his co-heirs shall be called to state, within ten days after service of the
order on them for that purpose, any reasons that they may have why the
partition shall not be homologated."
38. La. Act 126 of 1908, § 1, superseded by La. Act 115 of 1934, § 1 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 1995].
39. Interstate Rice Milling Co. v. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co., 176 La.
308, 145 So. 548 (1933).
40. La. Act 115 of 1934 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 1995-1995.2].
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... of the matter in question," irrespective of whether or not the
person was at the time still connected with the corporation.,'
However, it should be noted that, by the very language of
the act, the testimony thus elicited from these officers or representatives will be binding on the corporation only insofar as it
is connected with the particular matter of which they had knowledge, charge or supervision. Act 310 of 1940 has so amended this
section of the 1934 statute as to allow the parties to cross-examine
their opponent's agent or representative when the opponent is
an individual. The evident purpose of this is to allow the parties
an opportunity to discover the true state of affairs in matters
whereof the agent, and not the individual, has knowledge, charge
or supervision. As the act stood prior to 1940, if a person's agent
had negligently injured a plaintiff, the latter could not call the
agent for the purpose of cross-examining him under the act as
to the matters pertaining to the accident. The recent amendment
has remedied this situation, with the result that the testimony
which might thus be elicited from the agent will be binding upon
the principal insofar as the particular transaction in question is
concerned.
In this connection it is important to consider the well settled
principle that the testimony of a defendant, elicited under the
provisions of the statute, is not binding upon and is not to be
considered as against a codefendant.42 To what extent is this
rule changed by the adoption of the amendment in question? It is
well settled that when an agent and a principal are co-defendants, the testimony of one cannot be used as evidence against the
other.48 In Parks v. Hall,44 a case involving an automobile accident, the question presented was whether or not at the time of
the accident, the agent (Hall) had reentered and resumed his
services as the agent of his codefendant, after having been engaged on a mission of his own. In order to show that he had so
reentered the employment of his principal, the agent was called
for cross-examination, under the act, and questioned as to what
he was doing, and where he was going at the time of the accident. The court of appeal ruled that the testimony so obtained
41. Id. at § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1995.1].
42. Edwards Bros. v. Berner, 154 La. 791, 98 So. 247 (1923); Parks v. Hall,
179 So. 868 (La. App. 1937); Schwartz Supply Co. v. Breen, 184 So. 228 (La.
App. 1938).
43. Parks v. Hall, 179 So. 868 (La. App. 1937).
44. 179 So. 868 (La. App. 1937). The decision in this case was annulled
and causes remanded by the supreme court, 189 La. 849, 181 So. 191 (1938),
but on a different point.
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from the agent, insofar as the other defendant was concerned,
should have been excluded upon the timely objection by counsel.
In other words, the court held that the testimony of the agent
was not competent to prove his destination at the time.
Does the act of 1940 change the above conclusion? Had the
agent in the Hall case not been a party defendant, he would certainly have been regarded as an agent having knowledge, charge
and supervision of the "matter in question." Does it not follow,
then, that his testimony as to where he was going would be binding on the principal? Would the principal be allowed to prove
that the agent was going South when the agent had already testified that he was going North? It appears that the effect of the
amendment is to make the testimony of an agent binding on the
principal insofar as the particular matter in question is concerned, and a principal will be bound by the testimony of his agent
relative to the particular transaction in which he was employed.
Would the rule be different in cases wherein both the principal and the agent are made parties to the suit? It is submitted
that the rule of the case of Parks v. Hall is still in force. As
already stated, the purpose of the amendment was to allow the
parties a better opportunity to elicit facts pertinent to the case,
by permitting the cross-examination of witnesses (other than
opponents) who may have knowledge of those facts, without the
necessity of vouching for their credibility. The amendment was
not designed to overrule the settled jurisprudence to the effect
that the testimony of one of the parties on the same side, cannot
bind the other.
Discovery procedure. Act 304 of 1940 creates a new and far
reaching discovery procedure 45 for the benefit of the state and
its political subdivisions. It enables them to ascertain prior to
trial what action, if any, may be available to them, and what defenses may be interposed. The procedure afforded may be brought
into play for any claim in excess of five hundred dollars (exclusive of interest and costs) arising out of contracts, transactions, and other acts in connection therewith.4

The act was

evidently designed to facilitate the prosecution of suits in the
state scandal cases by permitting the Attorney General to de45. For an excellent discussion of the present discovery statutes in Louisiana, see Comment (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 525, 536 et seq.
46. Some of the provisions of the act are similar to the Illinois Discovery Statute, Rule 17 (Dec. 1933) of the Supreme Court of Illinois (Ill. Ann.
Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1936) c. 110, § 259.17].
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termine even prior to the filing of suit, whether or not the state's
claim will meet with an insuperable defense.
The act provides that whenever the state, or any of its political subdivisions, including public boards and commissions,
believes that it probably has an action such as described above
against a person or corporation, it may file a petition to this effect
praying that such person or corporation be cited to appear to
testify as to matters pertaining to the contract or transaction or
other acts from which the probable right of action will arise.
The petition must set forth the name and address of the defendant in the action for discovery, and it must state that the
petitioner probably has a right of action against the defendant
for a sum or property amounting to more than five hundred dollars. It must also contain a description of the contract or transaction upon which the right of action is probably founded. The
petition must also contain averments to the effect that the plaintiff has not sufficient information to enable it to ascertain whether
or not it has a right of action against the defendant for the recovery of the relief to which it is probably entitled; that the
defendant has such information which can be obtained only by
the examination of the defendant and other persons and from
the inspection of documents or other papers in their possession.
Finally, it must be alleged that the defendant has refused to disclose such information upon written demand by the plaintiff, or
has so evasively disclosed the facts that the plaintiff has not been
sufficiently informed.
If the petition conforms substantially to the provisions of the
act, the court must issue an order authorizing the plaintiff to
proceed to the examination of the defendant and other witnesses
on a date set forth for the purpose, and after the defendant has
been duly cited. The plaintiff is entitled to examine the defendant, if an individual, or any officer or officers, if a corporation or
other legal entity. He may also examine any other person or
persons not defendants residing in the parish wherein the action
for discovery is brought. Such examination is conducted orally
as under cross-examination.4 7 The defendant, however, is not
permitted to question any of the witnesses.
There are provisions in the act with respect to witnesses who
reside outside the parish where the examination is conducted, or
who, though residing in the parish, are physically unable to at47. Cf. Rule 17 (Dec. 1933) of the Supreme Court of Illinois [Ill. Ann,
Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1936) c. 110, § 259.17].
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tend. These persons may be examined by the plaintiff either
orally under commissions or in response to written interrogatories. In such cases, the defendant may object to any questions
submitted, or to the introduction of any documents; but he can
not propound inteirogatories nor question any of the witnesses.
Since it is provided that "the provisions of law with respect to
the taking of testimony under commissions in other actions shall
govern the taking of testimony in actions for discovery and investigation" unless otherwise provided, it is evident that the
state may examine such nonresident witnesses as under cross4
examination under the doctrine of Soule v. West.

In addition to the power granted with respect to the testimony of witnesses, the state is also allowed to require the disclosure of a list of documents or other papers relating to the
matter with respect to which the action for discovery is pending.
The list should contain two schedules: one which shows all those
documents the defendant is willing to produce and the names
and addresses of the persons in possession of them, and another
which lists those papers the defendant refuses to produce, and
his reasons therefor, together with the names and addresses of
the parties in possession thereof. The plaintiff may require that
any documents or papers described in this latter list be copied
and photographed. No documents not so produced can be admitted in evidence at the instance of the defendant "in any other
'' 9
action between the plaintiff and the defendant.

4

The state may also apply to the court for an order for a subpoena duces tecum directed against the defendant or any other
person, requiring the production of documents or other records
or papers which are alleged to relate to the matter with respect
to which the action for discovery is pending. If, however, it is
inconvenient to bring such records into court, the party subpoenaed may be ordered either (1) to produce certified copies
thereof, or (2) to allow the inspection of the originals to be copied
and photographed by the plaintiff. The penalty for non-compliance with the subpoena is the exclusion of such documents from
evidence on the behalf of the defendant "in any action between
the plaintiff and him."
Another important provision is that the plaintiff may require
the defendant to admit or deny the genuineness of any document
48. 180 La. 1092, 158 So. 567 (1935).
49. Cf. Rule 17 (Dee. 1933) of the Supreme Court of Illinois [ill. Ann.
Stat (Smith-Hurd, 1936) c. 110, § 259.17].
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which is produced in connection with the testimony of any witness,50 and if the defendant admits that a document is genuine,
he cannot thereafter deny its authenticity in "any other action
between the plaintiff and him."
Both plaintiff and defendant are relieved from the payment
of costs. The plaintiff, however, must .pay the usual fees to the
official court stenographers and officers taking testimony under
commissions, when the latter do not receive salaries. These sums
so expended by the plaintiff may be recovered from the defendant in a suit against him for the claim with respect to which the
action for discovery arose.
Failure to comply with the provisions of the act is punishable by fine not exceeding two hundred and fifty dollars and by
imprisonment for not more than thirty days.
Final judgments affecting immovable property must describe
property affected. Act 30 of 1940 provides that all final judgments,
whether rendered by the district or appellate courts, which affect
the title to immovable property, shall particularly describe the
property thereby affected.
At the outset it should be noted that the evident purpose of
the act is to make judgments rendered in suits in which title to
specific immovable property is involved, or is to be affected, so
certain that everyone may know, without further examination,
which was the particular property involved or affected thereby.5 1
At common law, all judgments affecting the title to real estate must contain an adequate description of the property, and
if there is no description, or if the description given is uncertain
or incorrect, the judgment is void, even as between the parties.5 2
However, since identification of the property is the purpose of
the requirement, if this can be done by reference to the pleadings
or other records, the judgment will be good.53
In Louisiana, the question as to validity of judgments lack50. Cf. Rule 18 (Dec. 1933) of the Supreme Court of Illinois [Ill. Ann.
Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1936) c. 110, § 259.18].
51. The act can have no application to personal money judgments which,
when recorded, operate as a judicial mortgage on the property of the party
against whom rendered. The judgment per se does not affect the property;
It is the recordation which creates the mortgage. Art. 545, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
52. Newport v. Hatton, 195 Cal. 132, 231 Pac. 987 (1925); Latham v. Lindsay, 130 Ky. 669, 113 S.W. 878 (1908); Moore v. Unknown Heirs of Gilchrist,
273 S.W. 308 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
53. Latham v. Lindsay, 130 Ky. 669, 113 S.W. 878 (1908); Moore v. Unknown Heirs of Gilchrist, 273 S.W. 308 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
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ing a sufficient description of the property affected thereby, has
apparently never been squarely presented to the courts. How54
ever, in MacManus v. Stevens the court reversed a judgment
maintaining a possessory action, and assigned as its ground the
fact that the property was not adequately described in the plead55
ings, and consequently no valid judgment could be rendered,
5
and in the case of Hill, McLean & Co. v. Miller, a plea of discussion was disallowed because the surety claiming the right
57
failed to give an adequate description of the property. In Che58
nault v. Howard, the court on appeal reversed a judgment in
a partition suit wherein the description of the property was different from that given by the plaintiff in his petition.
However, in the case of Baptiste v. Southall," it was held
that a judgment fixing the rights of the parties to certain community property, which failed to describe the property could be
"interpreted" so as to include therein an adequate description.
From the foregoing, it may well be said that the rule in Louisiana in this respect is to the effect that a judgment which affects
the title to the immovable property involved in a suit is void and
ineffective if it lacks a description of the property and the property cannot be identified by reference to the pleadings; or when
the description of the property in the pleadings differs from that
appearing in the judgment. However, the court will interpret
such a judgment so as to include therein a proper description if
54. 10 La. Ann. 177 (1855).
55. Commenting on the refusal of the lower court to dissolve the injunction obtained, the supreme court took occasion to say: "The district
Judge seems to have perceived the embarrassment occasioned by his having
overruled the defendant's exception, when he came to draw up a decree,
and he sought to remedy it by ordering the plaintiff to be put in possession
of 'the land in controversy, up to the time certified to by John F. McKneely
and John East.'"

"It is fatal error to leave these things to be determined after judgment.
The pleading and judgment taken together, should disclose with certainty
the thing adjudged, that litigation may have an end." (Italics supplied.) 10
La. Ann. at 178.
56. 7 La. Ann. 621 (1852).
57. In the course of the opinion the court states: "How can it be ascertained that a given quantity, a quarter section of land, in a large tract, is,
or not, In litigation, unless a description of it be had? It may be ascertained
by those familiar with the facts; but, in a majority of cases, the Inquiry
would be full of embarrassment.
"The more the subject is considered, the more apparent will be the
necessity of requiring from the surety, such a description of the property
which he requires the creditor to discuss, as will enable him fully to understand its situation, extent, title, and condition, as available to him for the
payment of his debt." 7 La. Ann. at 624.
58. 151 La. 991, 92 So. 587 (1922).
59. 157 La. $3, 102 So. 420 (1924).
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the parties so request it, and such an interpretation is not such
an amendment as is prohibited by Article 547 of the Code of
Practice.6 0
Be that as it may, however, it appears that Act 30 of 1940 is
mandatory, and requires all such judgments to contain a particular description of the property affected thereby under pain
of nullity. Such being the case, a reference to the pleadings in
order to identify the property in question will not be permitted.
However, it is apparent that in all cases where an adequate description is contained in the pleadings or other records, the parties interested may apply to the court for an "interpretation" of
the judgment so as to include therein a complete description,
under the rule stated in Baptiste v. Southall.
Judicial advertisements. In all parishes of the state, except
the Parish of Orleans, judicial advertisements are required to be
published (with certain exceptions)6 1 in an English newspaper
printed in the parish in which the proceedings are held. 2 Since
the primary purpose of publishing legal notices and judicial advertisements is to give them the widest publicity possible, it is
often difficult to fix the distinction between a newspaper, as that
term is used in the statutes, and the numerous publications devoted to some special purpose, and which circulate only among
certain classes of people, and which are not within the purview
of statutes requiring publication of legal notices in some newspaper.6 8 Prior to 1940, the question of whether a particular journal could be regarded as a newspaper was one to be determined
from the facts in each particular case"' Act 155 of 1940, however,
60. To the argument that the "interpretation" constituted an amendment
to the judgment prohibited under Art. 547, La. Code of Practice of 1870, the
court answered: "It cannot be successfully contended that a judgment which
takes nothing from, and adds nothing to, an original judgment, except a
particular description of properties in which the original judgment decrees
the appellant to be without right, title, or interest to any part thereof, is an
alteration or amendment of that judgment." 157 La. at 337, 102 So. at 421.
61. ".

.

. and if there be no newspaper published in the parish, the ad-

vertisements or notices shall be made by posting them at or near the front
door of the courthouse, or the place used as such, and at two other public
places in different parts of the parish ... " La. Act 49 of 1877, § 16 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 4435].
62. Ibid.
63. State v. Commissioner of Public Finances, 161 La. 915, 109 So. 675
(1926).
64, McDonald v. Shreveport Mut. Bldg. Ass'n, 178 La. 645, 152 So. 318
(1933); Pugh v. Prudhomme, 181 La. 113, 158 So. 638 (1935). See also In re
Sterling Cleaners & Dyers, 81 F. (2d) 596 (C.C.A. 7th, 1936). The nullity of a
foreclosure sale because the advertisement thereof was defective (in a publication not a "newspaper") is not an absolute nullity but only an irregularity or relative nullity, and is therefore subject to ratification by the party
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lists the characteristics which a periodical must have if it is to be
classed as a newspaper. Accordingly, the term is defined as
follows:
".

[a] publication appearing at regular intervals, which

shall be at least once a week, having a second-class mailing
privilege, having a bona fide paid circulation to actual subscribers, publishing an average of at least forty (40%) news
matter, and containing reports of happenings of recent occurrence of a varied character, such as political, social, moral and
religious subjects, and designed for the information of the
general reader; providing such newspaper at the date of insertion of such advertisements or notices, shall have been
regularly and continuously printed and published in such
parish for at least two (2) years." 6

However, much of the benefit to be derived from the act is nullified by the phrase, "nothing contained here shall affect newspapers now in operation.",6
Payment of costs as condition precedent to issuance of order
discontinuing suit or reconventional demand. The Code of Practice provides that the plaintiff may discontinue his suit at any
state of the proceedings prior to judgment, upon paying the costs
of court. 67 After discontinuance the plaintiff may bring his action
anew, but no further proceedings can be had therein until the
costs of the first suit shall have been paid, and the defendant may
cause the second to be dismissed upon his exception to the effect
68
that the costs by him expended have not been paid.
whose property has been sold. Bryson v. Lee, 181 La. 1019, 160 So. 797 (1935);
Williams v. Burnham, 189 La. 376, 179 So. 459 (1938). An absolute want of
advertisement may be cured by the prescription of five years. Louaillier v.
Castille, 14 La. Ann. 777 (1859).
65. La. Act 155 of 1940, § 1.
66. Ibid.
67. Art. 491, La. Code of Practice of 1870. This right is not permitted,
however, when the rights of a defendant will be prejudiced thereby. Davis v.
Young, 35 La. Ann. 739 (1883); State v. Howell, 139 La. 336, 71 So. 529 (1916);
McMillan v. Lorimer, 160 La. 400, 107 So. 239 (1926); Person v. Person, 172
La, 740, 135 So. 225 (1931); Rives v. Starke, 196 So. 657 (La. 1940).
In earlier decisions, a distinction was made between a judgment of dismissal and a judgment of nonsuit; accordingly a plaintiff in a suit had no
right to insist upon a judgment of voluntary nonsuit under the provisions
of this article. It is now well settled, however, that there is no essential difference between a discontinuance and a voluntary nonsuit and that a plaintiff Is entitled to either. Davis v. Young, 35 La. Ann. 739 (1883); State v.
Heflin, 4 La. App. 322 (1926); Smith v. New Orleans Public Service, 179 So.
606 (La. App. 1938).
68. Art. 492, La. Code of Practice of 1870, as amended by La. Act 28 of
1922.
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The payment of costs is not a prerequisite, however, and the
plaintiff may have his suit discontinued upon his simple motion
to that effect."9 There is, therefore, no guaranty that a plaintiff
who has discontinued his suit will ever pay the costs incurred,
the only prohibition directed against him being that he shall
not be allowed to prosecute his suit anew, until he has paid them.
This situation has been remedied in the Parish of Orleans
by the passage of Act 186 of 1940 which provides that in parishes
of 200,000 inhabitants or more, no order dismissing or discontinuing any suit or reconventional demand on the voluntary motion of any one of the parties shall be issued or signed, unless and
of such
until all costs shall have first been paid and 7evidence
0
payment is made part of the motion to dismiss.

It will be noted, however, that the provisions of Articles 491
and 492 of the Code of Practice can have no application to suits
brought in forma pauperis where the parties have been excused
from the payment of costs, 7 1 and consequently the provisions of

Act 186 of 1940 can not apply to the
discontinuance of suits
72
brought under the forma pauperis act.

Also it should be pointed out that, as to the Parish of Orleans,
the provisions of Article 492 of the Code of Practice have been
rendered obsolete by the adoption of this act, since all costs must
have been paid before a discontinuance can be ordered.
It is to be deplored that this act has been limited to the Parish of Orleans, and it is urged that it be so amended as to make
its provisions applicable throughout the state.
Payment of court costs under paupers act. Act 322 of 1940 is
a special statute enacted pursuant to the constitutional provisions
which permit the passage of special laws, provided that the requirements thereof have been complied with.73 It stipulates that
the Police Jury of Ouachita Parish shall make monthly payments
to the Clerk of Court of that parish, of all court costs incurred
69. State v. Rost, 48 La. Ann. 455, 19 So. 256 (1896); Shreveport Long
Leaf Lumber Co. v. Jones, 188 La. 519, 177 So. 593 (1937).
70. La. Act 186 of 1940, § 1: ". . . no order or judgment shall be rendered
or signed by any court of the State of Louisiana, in parishes having a population of over 200,000 dismissing or discontinuing any suit or reconventional
demand, now pending or hereafter filed and pending, on the voluntary motion of any or all of the parties thereto, unless and until all costs and commissions due the Clerk of Court and the Sheriff shall first have been paid,
to be evidenced by certificates of those officers to be filed with and made
part of the motion to dismiss or discontinue."
71. Smith v. New Orleans Public Service, 179 So. 606 (La. App. 1938).
72. La. Act 156 of 1912 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 1400-1404].
73. La. Const. of 1921, Art. IV, § 6.
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under the pauper act, upon presentation of an itemized account
approved by either of the judges of the Fourth Judicial District
Court. The Police Jury is thereby subrogated to the rights of all
court officers as to all sums collected by them as costs in such
cases. It is further provided that all judgments rendered under
the act, in which the party availing himself of it is cast for costs,
are to be recorded by the Clerk of Court in the mortgage records
of the Parish of Ouachita, and when so recorded shall operate as
a judicial mortgage in favor of the Police Jury for the amount
of the costs so paid by it. This recordation may also be made at
the expense of the Police Jury in any other parish and when so
made shall have the same effect therein as when made in Ouachita Parish.
Public sale of movables under seizure after nonpayment of
storage. A 1940 act 74 provides that a sheriff or constable must
sell at public auction movable property under seizure which has
been stored in his warehouse for a period exceeding two years
without the payment of any storage charges by the parties in
interest. The procedure is summary and by rule against the seizing plaintiff and other parties in interest, as shown by the record,7 5 to show cause why the stored property should not be sold
to satisfy the storage and other charges. On trial of the rule, the
sheriff or constable, as the case may be, is entitled to a judgment
ordering the sale of the property upon producing evidence that
no storage charges have been paid for over two years.
When the property is ordered sold pursuant to the provisions
of the act, the sale is without appraisement, to the highest bidder,
for cash, after advertisement as required by law for the sale of
movable property.78 A suspensive appeal may be taken from an
74. La. Act 185 of 1940.
75. Provision is made for the appointment of a curator ad hoc to represent a party to the suit who cannot be served. Id. at § 1.
76. For the law relating to the judicial advertisement of movables, see
Arts. 655, 667-670, La. Code of Practice of 1870; Arts. 1116, 1117, La. Civil
Code of 1870; La. Act 49 of 1877, § 16 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4435]; La. Act
49 of 1877, § 17 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4436]; La. Act 49 of 1877, § 18, as
amended by La. Act 82 of 1900, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4437]; La. Act 270
of 1914, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4438]; La. Act 49 of 1877, § 15, as amended
by La. Act 75 of 1938, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4439]; La. Act 104 of 1878,
§ 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4440]; La. Act 274 of 1928, §§ 1-3 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) §§ 4441-4443]; La. Act 33 of 1916, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4444]; La.
Act 24 of 1914, §§ 1, 3 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4445, 4446]; La. Act 167 of 1914, §
1; La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 23 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4447]; La. Act 243 of
1908, § 1, as amended by La. Act 64 of 1932, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 9008];
La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 3410, as last amended by La. Act 146 of 1888, § 1
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 9009]; La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 3425 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) § 9014].
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order of sale if the appellant furnishes bond for double the
amount of the charges, costs and commissions due the sheriff or
constable." No proceedings to sell movables originally seized and
stored prior to the passage of the act may be taken or filed until
three months have elapsed since its effective date. 8
Recusation of judges. Prior to 1940, any judge having a personal interest in a suit pending in his court was under the ministerial duty to enter an order recusing himself, upon his recusable
interest being suggested by one of the parties whose interest is
opposed to that of the judge.1 9
In the case of Shreveport Long Leaf Lumber Company v.
Jones,80 the plaintiff applied to the supreme court for writs of
certiorari and mandamus to compel the trial judge to recuse himself and appoint a judge of an adjoining district to try the case.
The application, however, was denied on grounds of prematurity
and want of notice because the plaintiff failed to show that he
first applied to the trial judge asking that he recuse himself.,1
Furthermore, where proper application is first made upon the
judge, who disavows his interest in the case and therefore refuses to be recused, the motion for recusation must be referred
to a judge in an adjoining district.8 2 This is so because it would
be an unwarranted exercise of authority in the judge to assume
77. La. Act 185 of 1940, § 1. From the proceeds of the sale are deducted
first the costs of the sale, as well as the costs, charges and commission due
the office of the sheriff or constable, and any remaining balance is deposited
in the registry of the court, or turned over to the clerk in the absence of
such registry. Id. at § 3.
78. The act applies to movable property on storage with any sheriff or
constable at its effective date. Ibid.
79. La. Act 40 of 1880, as amended [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 1907-1913];
La. Act 74 of 1884 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 1914-1915]; La. Act 70 of 1876
[Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 1916-1918]; La. Act 177 of 1910, § 1 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) § 1919].
80. 185 La. 30, 168 So. 484 (1936).
81. The Supreme Court of Louisiana stated: "we feel confident that
when the district judge has been properly apprised of the motion of relator
to recuse himself, he will forthwith do his plain mandatory duty and appoint
a judge of the adjoining district to try the case. It is unthinkable that a
judge who is a party litigant would attempt to try his own case." Shreveport Long Leaf Lumber Co. v. Jones, 185 La. 30, 33-34, 168 So. 484, 485 (1936).
Where a district judge recuses himself because of interest and the litigant applies for the appointment of a lawyer having requisite qualifications
to hear and try the case, the district judge is required to make such an appointment, and is not authorized to select a judge of a neighboring district
to sit in his place. Central Lumber Co. v. Jones, 182 La. 1, 161 So. 1 (1935).
For a subsequent treatment of the same case, see 175 So. 849 (La App.
1937).
82. State v. Hingle, 48 La. Ann. 1074, 20 So. 280 (1896); State v. Livaudais,
161 La. 882, 109 So. 536 (1926).
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to determine a question so exclusively personal to himself and
which affects his own competency.18
Act 124 of 1940 has relieved the profession of such a detailed,
and often unsatisfactory, procedure for securing the recusation
of a judge who is alleged to be prejudiced. The new act reads as
follows:
"It is further provided that in cases in which a district
judge shall be recused for cause of interest, the party whose
interest is opposed to that of the district judge, shall have the
right if he so desires, to make application to the Court having
Appellate Jurisdiction of the matter for the appointment of
a judge to try said case, and the Appellate Court shall appoint a district judge of one of the judicial districts of the
State of Louisiana to try said case. In suits where there exists
no right of appeal, the application for recusation of the district judge shall be made directly to the Supreme Court."
Repeal of law regulating selection and fees of appraisers in
Orleans Parish.Act 293 of 1940 repeals the prior statute 4 regulating the selection, qualifications and fees of appraisers in the
Parish of Orleans. That statute directed the civil district judge
having jurisdiction of the legal proceedings to appoint appraisers
and fix their fees when he ordered an inventory to be taken of
any property, rights or claims within the jurisdiction of the Civil
District Court. As a result of the repeal, the selection of appraisers and the fixing of their fees in such cases is governed by the
general statutes on the subject.8 5
83. See State v. Nunez, 147 La. 394, 405, 85 So. 52, 56 (1920).
84. La. Act 837 of 1936 [Dart's Stats. (1939) H§ 1602.16-1602.22]. The constitutionality of this statute has been questioned and its repeal recommended. See Sarpy, Unreal Appraisements in Louisiana Estates (1940) 2 LOUISIANA
LAw REvIEW 426, 431n.
85. See Arts. 652, 653, 671-676, 770, 975, La. Code of Practice of 1870; Arts.
49, 66, 149, 316, 415, 1039, 1040, 1326, 1666, La. Civil Code of 1870; La. Act 33
of 1870, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1354]; La. Act 101 of 1870, § 10, as amended by La. Act 22 of 1935 (4 E.S.) § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1360]; La. Rev.
Stats. of 1870, § 2492 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 6286]; La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, §
3066 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 7417]; La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, §§ 64, 576, 3426
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 9017]. 2 McMahon, Louisiana Practice (1939) 1493, n.
34, and 1594n.
House Bill 110, introduced during the regular legislative session of 1940,
incorporated a proposed statute regulating in all parishes of the state the
selection of appraisers and prescribing their qualifications, duties and feds
when any state court ordered an inventory to be taken. Although the bill
was reported favorably by the House committee to which it was assigned,
the whole subject matter was tabled. See Calendar of the House of Repre-
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Sufficiency of affidavit for issuance of a writ of attachment.
Prior to the passage of Act 190 of 1912,6 the jurisprudence was to
the effect that, in order to obtain a writ of sequestration under
the provisions of Article 275 (8) of the Code of Practice,"7 the
plaintiff had to prove the particular grounds upon which he
based his fear that the defendant would remove, conceal or dispose of the property in controversy. 8 Since that time, it has been
repeatedly held that it is sufficient for a plaintiff, in order to be
entitled to the maintenance of the writ, to make an affidavit in
accordance with the language of the act, and that all it is necessary to allege is that it is within the power of the defendant to
dispose of, conceal, or part with the property in his possession
which belongs to the plaintiff or on which he has a privilege. 9
Similarly, in order to obtain a writ of attachment on any of
the grounds mentioned in Article 240 of the Code of Practice, it
is well settled that proof to sustain the allegations of the petition
must be made, otherwise the writ will be dissolved. 0 Thus,
though the affidavit or petition may be a sufficient basis for the
issuance of the writ, it is not per se proof of the allegations
sentatives, Legislature of Louisiana of the Regular Session of 1940, at 60.
For a complete discussion of this subject, see Sarpy, op. cit. supra note 84,
at 426-435.
86. La. Act 190 of 1912, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2156].
87. Art. 275(8), La. Code of Practice of 1870: "A sequestration may be
ordered in all cases, when one party fears that the other will conceal, part
with, or dispose of the movable in his possession, during the pendency of the
suit, upon complying with the requisites of the law."
88. American Furniture Co. v. Grant-Jung Furniture Co., 50 La. Ann.
931, 24 So. 182 (1898); Vives v. Robertson, 52 La. Ann. 11, 26 So. 756 (1899);
Pierce v. Sturdivant, 108 La. 558, 32 So. 530 (1902); Boimare v. St. Geme, 113
La. 898, 37 So. 869 (1904). But cf. Lowden v. Robertson, 40 La. Ann. 825, 5
So. 405 (1888), where it was held that the plaintiff need not show the particular grounds upon which he based his fear that the defendant would remove or otherwise conceal or dispose of the property. The rule of this case
was never expressly overruled despite following decisions to the contrary and
It was this which prompted the legislature to adopt Act 190 of 1912 which
codified the rule of the Robertson case, in accordance with the recommendations of the Louisiana Bar Association. Philip Werlein, Ltd. v. Lofas, 10 Orl.
App. 280 (La. App. 1913); Barnett Furniture Co. v. Martel, 3 La. App. 234
(1925).
89. Bomer-Ferguson Co. v. Shapiro, 148 La. 736, 87 So. 729 (1921); Gueydan v. T. P. Ranch Co., 156 La. 397, 100 So. 541 (1924); Barnett Furniture Co.
v. Martel, 3 La. App. 234 (1925); Le Blanc v. Guy, 14 La. App. 162, 128 So.
715 (1930); Blitz v. Guenin, 187 So. 690 (La. App. 1939).
90. Gordon v. Baillio, 13 La. Ann. 473 (1858); Hoy & Co. v. Weiss, 24 La.
Ann. 269 (1872); Winter v. Davis, 48 La. Ann. 260, 19 So. 263 (1896); Abel &
Bach Co. v. Duffy, 106 La. 260, 30 So. 833 (1901); Fidelity & Deposit Co. of
Maryland v. Johnston, 117 La. 880, 42 So. 357 (1906); Levy Sons Co. v. Hacker
& Fife, 6 La. App. 592 (1927); Newsom & Co. v. Smith, 9 La. App. 693, 120 So.
248 (1929); W. F. Taylor Co. v. Campisi, 14 La. App. 210, 128 So. 706 (1930).
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therein made, and the writ will be set aside if it appears on the
trial to have been obtained without sufficient cause. 91
The proof required to sustain an attachment under clauses
4 and 5 of Article 240 of the Code of Practice 2 isproof of an
act or acts showing the fraudulent intent of the defendant to
place his property beyond the reach of his creditors or to give an
unfair preference to some of them. "8
Act 105 of 1940, which tracks the language of Act 190 of 1912
insofar as possible, simplifies the procedure in cases where the
state is plaintiff in a suit to recover money or property alleged to
have been obtained through fraud or through rebates or overcharges in connection with any contract or transaction. In such
cases, when a writ of attachment is prayed for, all that it is
necessary to prove, in order to sustain the writ, is that it "lies
within the power of the defendant to mortgage, assign or dispose
of his property, rights or credits or some part thereof, or to convert his property into money or evidences of debt, during the
pendency of the suit." The act therefore has the effect of relaxing the proof required to sustain a writ of attachment whenever
the state is plaintiff in the cases therein enumerated, and accomplishes in a very limited manner what the Act of 1912 accomplished with regard to writs of sequestration.
It is apparent that the 1940 act was designed with the objective in mind of facilitating the attachment of property belonging to defendants involved in the recent state scandals. This
accounts for the fact that the benefits of its provisions are extended only to actions in which the state is plaintiff. This restriction appears to be sound. The abuse to which the provisions are
susceptible might well be a continuous source of embarrassment
to defendants.
91. Gordon v. Baillio, 13 La. Ann. 473 (1858).
92. Art. 240, La. Code of Practice of 1870: "A creditor may obtain such
attachment of the property of his debtor, in the following cases:"
"4. When he has mortgaged, assigned or disposed of, or is about to
mortgage, assign or dispose of his property, rights or credits, or some part
thereof with intent to defraud his creditors or give an unfair preference
to some of them.
"5. When he has converted, or is about to convert his property into
money or evidences of debt, with intent to place it beyond the reach of his
creditors."
93. Winter v. Davis, 48 La. Ann. 260, 19 So. 263 (1896); Abel & Bach Co.
v. Duffy, 106 La. 260, 30 So. 833 (1901); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
Sneed, 167 La. 432, 119 So. 417 (1929).
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III. MATTERS PERTAINING TO CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE
Presaging extensive offlicial investigations and legal actions
as a consequence of public scandals, the legislature created an
investigating commission1 and empowered its "agents or representatives ....

when specifically authorized by it, and/or the

Attorney General, under the Constitution and laws of the State
. . ." to inquire into the affairs, "functions, transactions, contracts,

purchases, sales and expenditures.. ." of all state employees, departments and subdivisions. 2 In effect, the Attorney General is
made the chief agent and executive officer of the commission, for
he is empowered (a) to institute or have instituted prosecutions
of any violations of state criminal statutes,3 either upon his own
motion or when instructed by the commission; (b) to take or
have taken depositions within or without the state; (c) to issue
subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents; and (d) to issue interrogatories covering
any matter relating to the disbursement or expenditure of public
moneys. 4 The law creating the commission is to be effective for
four years, and this body is ordered to make a report of its activities to the legislature at its next extraordinary or regular session,5 with a full report to be submitted to the legislature of 1944,
6
at which time the commission will stand dissolved.
A.

MATTERS RELATING TO SUBSTANTIVE LAW

Of the substantive criminal statutes designed to preserve the
integrity of public office, one of the most important is the new
1. La. Act 13 of 1940. The membership of the commission is composed

of the Governor as chairman, the Attorney General of the state and the
Executive Counsel to the Governor. Id. at § 1.

2. La. Act 13 of 1940, § 3(a).
3. Id. at § 3(c). Authority is also conferred to institute civil proceedings

in the name of the state for the recovery and return of anything of value
that may have been wrongfully diverted or acquired from the state. They
are further authorized to make settlement of or to compromise such claims.
Id. at §§ 2, 3(b). The laws relating to the prescription of civil proceedings
Instituted under the act or by order of the Attorney General are made inapplicable to them in view of a "paramount public interest"; the venue of
any such proceeding may lie in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court (Baton
Rouge), or at the domicile of the defendants or any one of several named
in the proceeding, at the discretion of the commission, and that body is relieved of the necessity of posting bond in the event it decides to commence
such a proceeding by attachment. Id. at § 3(b). See note 15, infra. In order
to expedite the work of the commission, there are provisions authorizing the
transfer of judges and the appointment of special judges ad hoc. Id. at § 5.
4. La. Act 13 of 1940, § 4.
5. Id. at §§ 6, 8.
6. Id. at § 9.
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law punishing dual office holding.' This was enacted upon the
recommendation of the Louisiana State Law Institute, although
it contains a greater number of exceptions to its application than
originally suggested by that body.' It has always been a fundamental principle in our state government that that government
should be divided into three distinct departments, and that no
one of them, nor any person or persons holding office in one
department should exercise power properly belonging to either
of the others, except as expressly directed or permitted by the
constitution." The constitutional prohibition against dual office
holding is a specific application of that principle. 0 The new act
tracks the language of this provision of the constitution more
closely than did the law enacted to execute it, and which the 1940
statute is intended to supersede." However, the recent enactment
7. La. Act 259 of 1940.
8. The proposal by the Louisiana State Law Institute is contained in the
Special Report of the Louisiana State Law Institute to the Legislature of
Louisiana Recommending Certain Criminal Statutes (May, 1940) 8-9. The
legislature excepted the following additional persons: (1) those pursuing a
learned profession who are employed by any subdivision of the state on a
fee or commission basis, (2) school teachers teaching in grade schools or in
high schools or other educational institutions, or (3) officers in the naval or
military service of the United States detailed to educational institutions in
the State of Louisiana. The act also does not apply to notaries public or to
officers in the National Guard or in the Reserve of the United States Army,
Navy or Marine Corps. La. Act 259 of 1940, § 1.
9. La. Const. (1812) Art. I, §§ 1, 2; La. Const. (1845) Arts. 1, 2; La. Const.
(1852) Arts. 1, 2; La. Const. (1864) Arts. 3, 4; La. Const. (1879) Arts. 14, 15;
La. Const. (1898) Arts. 16, 17; La. Const. (1913) Arts. 16, 17; La. Const. of
1921, Art. II, §§ 1, 2.
10. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XIX, § 4.
11. The Law Institute suggested the passage of the new statute in substitution for La. Act 123 of 1921 (E.S.) [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 7702-77043
which reads, in part:
"Section 1. ... no person shall hold or exercise, at the same time, more
than one office of profit, except that of justice of the peace or notary public."
La. Act 259 of 1940, § 1 states:
"Section 1. . . . no member of Congress, or person holding or exercising
any office or position or employment of profit under the United States or
under any state of the United States or under any foreign power shall be
eligible to be a member of the Legislature or shall hold or exercise any office
or position or employment of profit under the State of Louisiana; and no
person holding or exercising any office, position or employment of profit in
one of the three departments of government of the State of Louisiana shall
hold or exercise another office or position or employment of profit in that
department or any other department of the State . . . or in any parish, mu"
nicipality or Board, Commission or subdivision of the State ....
It will be noticed that there are two distinct general inhibitions in the
1940 act, as in Art. XIX, § 4 of the Constitution of 1921-one prohibiting
any person from holding or exercising an office under this state contemporaneously with his holding an office under another sovereignty; and the other
prohibiting any person from holding at the same time more than one office.
Cf. State v. Mason, 17 La. App. 504, 505, 133 So. 809, 810 (1931).
In drafting the 1940 law the Law Institute made no reference to any
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appears to supplement a related statute passed at the extra legislative session this year, since none of its provisions are in conflict
with it,12 although there is conflict with the preceding law.18 The
office or employment of "trust." This term was regarded as being merely
confusing. The vice to be condemned lies in the profit that flows from dual
office holding. (Special Report, op. cit. supra note 8, at 8).
12. La. Act 14 of 1940 (E.S.) prohibits any person's receiving over the
same period of time more than one salary for any service or employment as
an officer or employee of the state or of any state department, board, commission, or political corporation. Both Act 14 and the more recent act contain a proviso to the effect that nothing therein should in any way affect
state officials' salaries which are presently fixed by law and payable from
more than one source. Id. at § 1. The punishment therein provided applies
to any state officer or any member or officer of any state department, board,
commission, or political corporation, or any person found guilty of accepting
employment or public funds in violation of the act. Id. at § 2.
It is submitted that no change is made by La. Act 259 of 1940, § 2 In
the punishment provided in the above section, although the former act
specifies no place of imprisonment whereas the latter specifies the parish
jail. Other 1940 acts also fail to mention the place of imprisonment. La. Acts
9, § 4; 13, § 4(c); 15, § 1; 16, § 1; 28, § 3; 63, H§ 1, 2, 5; 76, § 2; 80, § 3; 113, §
2; 290, § 1. Generally, the courts have held that when a criminal statute prescribes the punishment of imprisonment without specifying the place thereof,
it implies imprisonment in the common jail or prison of the county. Brooks
v. People, 14 Colo. 413, 24 Pac. 553 (1890); Miller v. People, 104 Colo. 622, 94
P. (2d) 125 (1939); Walden v. State, 50 Fla. 151, 39 So. 151 (1905); State v.
Toy, 65 Mont. 507, 211 Pac. 303 (1922); Ex parte Cain, 20 Okla. 125, 93 Pac.
974 (1908); Commonwealth v. Francies, 250 Pa. 350, 95 Atl. 798 (1915); Commonwealth v. Smith, 116 Pa. Super. 146, 177 Atl. 73 (1935). But a statute
which provides that a crime shall be a felony, punishable by imprisonment,
by implication will be held to mean imprisonment in the state prison. In re
Pratt, 19 Colo. 138, Pac. 680 (1893); Chapman v. Lake, 112 Fla. 746, 151 So.
399 (1933). Cf. La. Act 63 of 1940, §§ 1, 2, 5.
Under Louisiana law every sentence to imprisonment without qualification as to nature or place means imprisonment with labor on public works.
La. Act 51 of 1906, § 1 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 679]. In State v. Cunningham, 130 La. 749, 759, 58 So. 558, 561 (1912) the Supreme Court of the
state has said:
"The single object of the Act [above cited] as expressed in the title is
to provide that all sentences to imprisonment, whether with fine or in default of payment of fine, and whether under state law or municipal or
parish ordinance, unless otherwise qualified (as, for instance, by the addition
of the words 'at hard labor,' which would mean in the penitentiary), shall
mean imprisonment with labor...."
(Italics supplied). But see State v.
Hebert, 158 La. 209, 215-217, 103 So. 742, 745 (1924).
Whenever the word imprisonment appears in a statute unqualified as to
nature, it means without hard labor. State v. Ryder, 36 La. Ann. 294 (1884);
State v. Hyland, 36 La. Ann. 709 (1884). Cf. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, §§ 980,
982, 1515, 1517 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) §§ 682, 684].
Art. 341, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, provides:
"A misdemeanor is defined to be an offense, the punishment of which
Is necessarily a fine or Imprisonment in the parish jail or both."
The Louisiana courts have held, both before and after the adoption of
the Code, that criminal statutes providing such punishment, although specifying no place of imprisonment, create misdemeanors-offenses which are
punishable by Imprisonment In the proper parish jail. State v. Eubanks, 114
La. 428, 38 So. 407 (1905); State v. Williams, 114 La. 940, 38 So. 686 (1905);
State v. Broxton, 188 La. 456, 177 So. 572 (1937). Cf. La. Act 123 of 1921 (E.S.)
§ 3 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 7704].
13. La. Act 123 of 1921 (E.S.) [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 7702-7704]. La. Act
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venue provision 1" of the recent act is modernized as recommended
by the Law Institute. 6 The prosecution may be brought either at
the defendant's domicile or in any parish in which he may perform the duties of either employment.
A 1940 law,"' more comprehensive than any other relating to
the same subject matter,' imposes both civil and criminal penalties on persons carried on the public pay rolls or employment
lists as "deadheads" and also on their employers. Any public
employee or employer who violates its provisions commits a
felony punishable by both fine and imprisonment, with or with14 of 1940 (E.S.) and La. Act 259 of 1940 repeal this statute by implication.
They purport to cover the whole subject matter of dual office holding which
is irreconcilable with its provisions. Furthermore, the punishment prescribed
by the 1921 law is repugnant to that provided by the two recent acts. State
v. Smith, 118 La. 248, 42 So. 791 (f907); State v. Jones, 127 La. 442, 53 So. 985
(1911); State v. Tate, 185 La. 1006, 171 So. 108 (1936). The 1940 statutes
change the punishment by: (1) prescribing a minimum fine of one hundred
dollars, while no minimum was fixed by the 1921 law, (2) increasing the
maximum imprisonment from six months to one year, and (3) omitting the
penalty of automatic vacation of the first employment by the acceptance of
a second. La. Act 259 of 1940 effects this last result by providing that no
person shall be eligible to accept a second office while holding another. Cf.
La. Act 123 of 1921 (E.S.) §§ 2, 3, [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 7703-7704]; La. Act
14 of 1940 (E.S.) § 2; La. Act 259 of 1940, §§ 1, 2.
14. La. Act 259 of 1940, § 2.
15. The venue provision was drafted in accordance with the following
observation of the Louisiana State Law Institute:
"One handicap that the state Is under that does not apply to the Federal
Government is the question of restricted venue, the restrictions of Section
9 of Article I of the Constitution holding the venue to one parish in which
the offense was committed in the absence of legislative authority to the contrary. It is well known that modern crimes are not confined to such small
units as a parish but almost every offense spreads through the channels of
commerce across parish and even state lines. Our criminal statutes on the
subject of venue should be modernized to keep pace with this progress of
crime, at the same time safeguarding even the criminal from double prosecution for the same offense." Special Report, op. cit. supra note 8, at 6. Cf.
La. Const. of 1921, Art. I, § 9; Art. 13, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
16. La. Act 63 of 1940.
17. La. Act 26 of 1873, as amended by La. Act 57 of 1888 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) §§ 7773-7775] and La. Act 155 of 1888 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) §
800]. The former law punishes for extortion in office (a) officials or employees
whose employment and compensation Is authorized by the constitution and
laws of Louisiana in either the executive, judicial, legislative or military departments of the state government or of its parishes, districts or municipalities, who fraudulently carry or cause to be carried upon the employment
or pay roll lists of their offices the names of persons as employees whose
salaries are allowed for services not rendered; and (b) such public officials
and employees who charge or receive or take, directly or indirectly, any
more than the lawful compensation for their services. La. Act 26 of 1873,
§§ 1, 2, as amended by La. Act 57 of 1888, §§ 1, 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§
7773-7774]. Quaere: Are these provisions unconstitutional on the ground that
their penal clause, providing that a conviction of the offender or a verdict
in favor of the party injured shall operate ipso facto as a vacation of the
office of the offending official or employee, violates Article IX of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 as an attempt by criminal proceedings to effect a
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out hard labor."' The state, or any of its institutions or subdivisions, is authorized to bring a civil action for the recovery against
both such employee and employer in solido of the amounts paid
out of its funds, together with a penalty of fifty per cent of that
sum wrongfully paid out and received.' Conviction under the
act operates ipso facto as a vacation of the employment of the
person so convicted. 20 The act is applicable to (a) any person
who (1) receives compensation from the state or its subdivisions
or institutions, or (2) permits his name to be carried on any
employment list or pay roll to receive such compensation, 21 for
services not actually rendered by himself or grossly inadequate
for the payment so received or listed,"2 with intent to defraud the
state or its various subdivisions; 2 (b) any elected official, employee, or appointee of the state or its subdivisions who (1)
removal of officials from public office in defiance of the constitutional method
of removal? Cf. State v. Thompson, 28 La. Ann. 444 (1876).
La. Act 155 of 1888 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 800] punishes any person who knowingly permits his name to be carried on the lists or pay rolls
of the state, parish, municipal or other political corporations as employee
and receives a salary for services not actually rendered.
La. Act 63 of 1940, § 8, provides that its passage shall not affect prosecutions or other actions based upon offenses committed under either of the
above laws before its effective date.
18. La. Act 63 of 1940, §§ 1, 2, 5. See note 12, supra. Violations of the
previous "deadhead" statutes were deemed m4sdemeanors on the part of
public employers, punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars and/or imprisonment not exceeding five years, at the court's discretion;
obtaining money by false pretenses by "deadhead" public employees, was
punishable by imprisonment at hard labor or otherwise not exceeding twelve
months. La. Act 26 of 1873, La. Act 57 of 1888, § 3 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §
7775]; La. Act 155 of 1888 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 800]. Both public employers and their "deadhead" employees violating the 1940 act are punishable by a minimum fine of $500 and a maximum of $5,000, and by imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for a minimum of six months or a maximum of five years. La. Act 63 of 1940, § 5.
19. La. Act 63 of 1940, § 7. Public "deadhead" employees under the old
law were made civilly liable for damages or injuries sustained by any person
aggrieved or injured by their acts. La. Act 26 of 1873, La. Act 57 of 1888, §
3 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 7775]. Formerly, no civil liability was imposed upon
"deadhead" employees. La. Act 155 of 1888 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 800].
20. La. Act 63 of 1940, § 6. This penalty applies both to public "deadhead" employees and their employers, while the former law penalized only
the latter, and also provided that a verdict in a civil action of an aggrieved
person also should have the same effect. La. Act 26 of 1873, § 3, as amended
by La. Act 57 of 1888, § 3 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 7775].
21. Permitting one's name to be carried on a public pay roll as a "deadhead" was regarded as merely incidental to the defense denounced by La.
Act 155 of 1888. State v. Matheny, 194 La. 198, 193 So. 587 (1940).
22. Under La. Act 155 of 1888 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 800] there
could be no crime unless the defendant received a salary or pay for services
not actually rendered either by himself or some other person. State v. Farrell, 130 La. 228, 57 So. 898 (1912); State v. Matheny, 194 La. 198, 193 So. 587
(1940).
23. La. Act 63 of 1940, § 1.
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carries, or causes or permits to be carried upon the employment
or pay roll list of his office the name of any person as employee
with knowledge that such person is receiving compensation for
services not actually rendered or grossly inadequate, or who (2)
permits any compensation to be paid for such services. 24 The
venue provisions of the "deadhead" law are illustrative of the
recent legislative trend toward modernization of our criminal
25
statutes in this respect.

It has been made a misdemeanor for a person convicted in
any federal or Louisiana court of a crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, and not afterward pardoned with
express restoration of franchise, to register, 26 vote,27 or hold office
or appointment of honor, trust, or profit in the state,2" and any
citizen of the state who is a duly registered and qualified voter
may institute legal proceedings to remove any person who thus
29
holds office illegally.

A number of statutes in the nature of corrupt practice acts,
relating to the administration of the state government and to
elections, were enacted at the recent session of the legislature.
The past practice of making deductions, uniform or otherwise,
24. Id. at § 2. La. Act 57 of 1888, § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 7774] prohibits
a public officer from carrying fraudulently a "deadhead," or pretended, employee on a pay roll for salaries or pay not rendered. Saint v. Irion, 165 La.
1035, 116 So. 549 (1928).
The continued receipt or payment of compensation to a bona fide employee who is absent from his job for a "reasonable time" due to illness does
not constitute a violation of the 1940 act either by such employee or his
employer. La. Act 63 of 1940, § 3.
25. See note 15, supra. The venue for prosecutions under La. Act 155 of
1888 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 800] is governed by the place where the
money or pay is knowingly received for services not actually rendered, for
that is where the offense is committed. State v. Matheny, 194 La. 198, 193
So. 587 (1940). Cf. La. Const. of 1921, Art. I, § 9; Art. 13, La. Code of Crim.
Proc. of 1928. La. Act 63 of 1940, § 4, provides that the venue for prosecutions under the statute will lie (1) in the parish wherein any check or draft
for the payment of any pretended services, prohibited by the statute, is
drawn, or (2) In the parish wherein the employment list or pay roll records
of the employment are ordinarily kept, or (3) in the parish wherein any
draft, check or payment for pretended services was received or cashed or
deposited.
26. Cf. La. Act 122 of 1921 (E.S.) §§ 7, 22, 31 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 2621,
2636, 2645].
27. Cf. La. Act 97 of 1922, § 10, as amended by La. Act 110 of 1934, § 1
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2660]; La. Act 130 of 1916, §§ 35, 36, 80, as amended by
La. Act 217 of 1934, La. Act 6 of 1934 (1 E.S.) [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 2742,
2743, 2787].
28. La. Act 129 of 1940. The act serves as an enabling statute under Art.
VIII, § 6, La. Const. of 1921. Cf. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VIII, § 23. As to the
effect of a pardon, see La. Act 85 of 1873 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) §§ 736,
737] and State v. Lee, 171 La. 744, 132 So. 219 (1931).
29. La. Act 129 of 1940, §§ 2, 3.

1940]

LOUISIANA LEGISLATION OF 1940

from the salaries of public employees is made criminal by Act
176 of 1940.80 This statute is directed to two classes of persons:
(a) any person holding any office (elective or otherwise) or employment for profit, including those who work on a commission
basis, under the state or its subdivisions or boards; (b) any other
person or organization. These persons are prohibited from soliciting or receiving for any purpose whatever money from any other
officer or employee when such payment is a reward for securing
such employment or is made under any suggestion or influence
the consequence of which will be the loss or impairment of value
to the employee of such office or employment. Proof that payments were collected from or paid by such public employees on a
uniform or progressive percentage basis constitutes prima facie
evidence that they were made under such suggestion or influence.81 Any public officer or employee who violates this act ipso
facto forfeits his employment 82 and is guilty of a misdemeanor
8
punishable by a fine or imprisonment or both.3
The legislature has enacted another law particularly designed to protect the pocketbooks of public employees from the
demands of a political machine for monetary contributions to the
campaign chest.8 ' It prohibits any public employee of the state or
its subdivisions who receives a salary of two hundred dollars per
month or less from contributing money for the purpose of any
general or primary election or from making any kind of contribution for any political purpose whatsoever.85 The act also stipulates that any person or organization soliciting or receiving such
contributions from any such public employee shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor punishable by a fine or jail sentence or both. 6 In
addition to this criminal penalty, it is provided that the office or
position held by the offending officer or employee should be
deemed vacated ipso facto upon the making of the prohibited
87
contribution.
Excepted from application of the statute88 are (1) persons
30. Cf. 43 Stat. 1073 (1925), 18 U.S.C.A. § 208 (1927); 35 Stat. 1110 (1909),
18 U.S.C.A. § 210 (1927); Note (1933) 85 A.L.R. 1146.
31. La. Act 176 of 1940, § 1.
32. Id. at § 2. Cf. 19 Stat. 169 (1876), 18 U.S.C.A. § 213 (1927).
33. La. Act 176 of 1940, § 3. Cf. 35 Stat. 1110 (1909), 18 U.S.C.A. § 212
(1927).
34. La. Act 298 of 1940. Cf. 43 Stat. 1073 (1925), 18 U.S.C.A. § 208 (1927);
35 Stat. 1110 (1909), 18 U.S.C.A. § 211 (1927); Note (1933) 85 A.L.R. 1146.
35. La. Act 298 of 1940, § 1.
36. Id. at §§ 2, 4.
37. Id. at §§ 3, 4.
38. Id. at § 1.
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holding either an elective office or an office, the appointment to
which is required by law to be confirmed by the state Senate; (2)
persons whose employment is secured by an irrevocable contract;
or (3) those who are in the classified civil service under the laws
recently enacted.2 9
The act does not prevent any person from serving as an authorized representative at the polls, for which no remuneration
is fixed by law, or from paying his own expenses while so serving.
Neither is it to be construed as preventing any person from being
a candidate for any elective office and from incurring and paying
all lawful expenditures incident to his candidacy and election
campaign.,0
Act 9 of 1940 is designed to prevent the padding of public
pay rolls preceding a gubernatorial election. This act declares it
unlawful for any officer, department head, board, commission or
commissioner, institution, or employee of the state or its subdivisions, during the six months immediately preceding an election
for governor to increase the number of its public employees more
than five per cent over its average number, or to increase its pay
roll or other operating expenses more than fifteen per cent over
the average amount of such expenditures, for each of the months
of the first six months in the twelve months preceding such election. 41 Punishment, as in the case of a misdemeanor, is provided
for any person and for each of the members of a body violating
the provisions of the statute. 42 It is noteworthy, however, that
the provisions of this law may be suspended in time of "public
emergency." 4
Act 76 of 1940 effects an increase in the severity of the
criminal penalty heretofore 44 provided in cases of bribing or
otherwise influencing a voter to cast or withhold his vote at any
general, special or primary election. The minimum fine is fixed
at five hundred dollars as compared with the former penalty of
one hundred dollars. Furthermore, the minimum and maximum
prison terms are set respectively at six months and one year
instead of thirty days and six months, respectively. 45 Insofar as
the earlier law on the subject imposed disfranchisement and
39. La. Acts 171 and 172 of 1940. The statute does not apply to officers
and employees of the state and of the City of New Orleans since they are
in the classified service under these new civil service laws.
40. La. Act 298 of 1940, § 1.
41. La. Act 9 of 1940, §§ 1, 2.
42. Id. at § 4.
43. Id. at § 3.
44. La. Act 9 of 1934 (2 E.S.) § 3 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2832.3].
45. Ibid.; La. Act 76 of 1940, § 2.
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deprivation of the right to hold public office as an additional
46
consequence of committing the offenses therein denounced it is
be read
unaffected by the recent enactment, as the two acts 4can
7
together and construed in harmony with each other.
To prevent the possibility of assigning names to public property in honor of persons who may later end their careers as criminal offenders, or other undesirable persons, the legislature has
recently provided that the naming of public property in honor of
any living person is prohibited and has ordered the removal of all
evidences of such designations which may have been made in
the past.48
To further protect public property and moneys, the legislature, upon the recommendation of the Louisiana State Law Institute, adopted three far-reaching substantive criminal laws.
Heretofore, no state statute directly punished the act of defrauding the state, and further, the general crime of conspiracy
had not been denounced in Louisiana, although combinations to
commit twelve named felonies have been made criminal.49 To
46. La. Act 9 of 1934 (2 E.S.) §§ 1, 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 2832.1-2832.2].
Cf. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VIII, § 6, 23.
47. Although containing no repealing clause, La. Act 76 of 1940 repeals
the 1934 statute by implication, to, and only to, the extent of any inconsistency or conflict, but both laws must be construed together as being related
to the same subject matter and read in harmony, for no clear purpose of
repeal is evidenced by the legislature. State v. Callac, 45 La. Ann. 27, 12 So.
119 (1893); State v. Police Jury of Parish of Plaquemines, 6 Orl. App. 229
(La. App. 1909); State v. Hanna, 142 La. 224, 76 So. 619 (1917). Cf. La. Act
78 of 1890, §§ 2, 3 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) §§ 797, 798].
48. La. Act 80 of 1940.
49. La. Act 8 of 1870 (E.S.) § 5-7 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 837-839].
There was no crime in Louisiana of a conspiracy to commit embezzlement.
State v. Smith, 194 La. 1015, 195 So. 523 (1940).
"These sections cover conspiracies to commit the crimes of murder,
rape, robbery, burglary, arson, perjury, forgery, assault and battery. It is a
serious offense, and has been so recognized by the federal government for
more than 30 years, and by most of the states of the Union, to conspire to
commit any offense against the state, whether a felony or a misdemeanor,
for this strikes at the very stability of government itself. A deliberate agreement to commit a misdemeanor is far more reprehensible than the commission of the misdemeanor itself. Furthermore, it is difficult to determine, in
advance of punishment, which are felonies and which are misdemeanors in
Louisiana.
"A conspiracy to defraud the State or its subdivisions or institutions
should also be punishable, as this Statute would provide, without resort to
the cumbersome 'confidence game' and 'false pretenses' statutes which often
do not apply to the facts in a definite fraud case." Notes of the Louisiana
State Law Institute in submitting its proposed draft of the 1940 statute
contained in its Special Report, op. cit. supra note 8, at 13. Cf. La. Act 107
of 1902, § 6, as amended by La. Act 151 of 1936, § 1 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (Supp.
1939) § 944]; La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 813, as amended by La. Act 151 of
1936, § 2 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (Supp. 1939) § 945]; La. Act 151 of 1936, §§ 3,
5 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (Supp. 1939) § 945.1, 945.2]; La. Act 43 of 1912, §§ 1-3
[Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) §§ 946-948]; State v. Smith, supra.
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remedy this situation, the legislature enacted Act 16 of 1940 which
denounces and punishes a conspiracy to commit any offense
against the state, or to defraud the state, its subdivisions or institutions.
It should be noted that the phrase, "any offense against the
State of Louisiana" is ambiguous. A reasonable deduction is that
the legislature intended to denounce all conspiracies to commit
any acts which have been made criminal by the laws of Louisiana. All crimes are offenses against the state, and the titles of
indictments are worded to carry out this idea. On the other hand,
it is possible that the legislature intended to make criminal only
conspiracies designed to injure the state in its political capacity.
If this latter interpretation is the correct one, the statute embraces only those combinations of persons who have acted together to destroy, injure, or convert the tangible or intangible
property of the state or its political subdivisions, or who have
conspired together to impede the exercise by the state of its
sovereign authority.
The present act was copied almost verbatim from a provision
of the federal criminal code. 50 Although the interpretation placed
upon this federal act by the United States courts is not binding
upon the judiciary of Louisiana, yet the federal interpretation
will probably be regarded as highly persuasive. 51
The federal courts have adopted the broader interpretation
and have regarded the provision in the United States Criminal
Code as embracing any and all conspiracies to commit any act
condemned as criminal by the laws of the United States.52
50. 35 Stat. 1096 (1909), 18 U.S.C.A. § 88 (1928).
51. In re Murff, 50 La. Ann. 998, 23 So. 965 (1898).
52. Thomas v. United States, 156 Fed. 897, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 720 (C.C.A.
8th, 1907); Radin v. United States, 189 Fed. 568 (C.C.A. 2d, 1911), cert. denied
220 U.S. 623, 31 S.Ct. 724, 55 L.Ed. 614 (1911). The crime of conspiring "to
commit an offense against the United States" has been further construed
to include any act prohibited by federal law in the interest of the public
policy of the United States although not of itself punishable by a criminal
proceeding. United States v. Hutto, 256 U.S. 524, 41 S.Ct. 541, 65 L.Ed. 1073
(1921); Biskind v. United States, 281 Fed. 47, 28 A.L.R. 1377 (C.C.A. 6th, 1922),
cert. denied 260 U.S. 731, 43 S.Ct. 93, 67 L.Ed. 486 (1922). Such conspiracy
may affect either private Interests or the rights of the government itself.
United States v. Sanche, 7 Fed. 715 (C.C. W. D. Tenn. 1881).
The offense of conspiring "to defraud the United States" has been restricted to the federal government in its sovereign capacity, and it is immaterial that the fraud contemplated has not been declared a crime by
federal law. United States v. Clark, 121 Fed. 190 (D.C. M.D. Pa. 1903); Curley
v. United States, 130 Fed. 1 (C.C.A. 1st, 1904), cert. denied 195 U.S. 628, 25
S.Ct. 787, 49 L.Ed. 351 (1904); Salas v. United States, 234 Fed. 842 (C.C.A.
2d, 1916); Falter v. United States, 23 F. (2d) 420 (C.C.A. 2d, 1928). cert. denied 277 U.S. 590, 48 S. Ct. 528, 72 L.Ed. 1003 (1928).
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The venue for prosecutions under the act may lie either in
the parish where the conspiracy was formed or where any of the
acts in furtherance thereof were committed.""
To supply another omission in our statutory definition and
punishment of serious criminal offenses, the legislature adopted
a statute,54 similar to a federal provision," punishing the making
or presenting of a false claim against the state, its subdivisions,
or its institutions.5 6
Upon the recommendation of the Louisiana State Law Institute,57 a legislative reenactment" of Article 225 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure was effected in order to validate that article
insofar as it purports to change substantive law which was in
force at the time of the adoption of the Code.5
The constitutional mandate 0 under which the Code was prepared and adopted referred only to a "Code of Criminal Procedure." Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Louisiana, in a decision which has attracted much comment,6 1 held that the power
conferred by this mandate authorizing the legislature to ignore
the usual formalities of lawmaking, must be restricted to matters
of criminal procedure. It stated emphatically that the Code of
Criminal Procedure, adopted pursuant to special constitutional
authority, must be confined exclusively to procedural matters,
and can make no changes in the substantive criminal law. In
53. La. Act 16 of 1940, § 1. See note 15, supra. Cf. La. Act 126 of 1936
[Dart's Crim. Stats. (Supp. 1939) § 839.11; State v. Smith, 194 La. 1015, 195
So. 523 (1940).
54. La. Act 15 of 1940.
55. 40 Stat. 1015 (1918), 18 U.S.C.A. § 80 (1927). Cf. 52 Stat. 197 (1988), 18
U.S.C.A. § 80 (Supp. 1939).
56. The Louisiana State Law Institute, in referring to Its proposed draft
of the act stated:
"1...
Strangely, there is no statute covering this subject, except by resort
to the rather cumbersome 'confidence game' or 'false pretenses' statutes,
which do not fit many cases. For instance, false expense accounts or false
vouchers for services should be covered by a statute such as this, which the
Federal Government has used effectively since prior to 1910, and which has
been sustained many times." Special Report, op. cit. supra note 8, at 10.
57. See Special Report, op. cit. supra note 8, at 6-7, 14-15.
58. La. Act 57 of 1940.
59. La. Act 2 of 1928.
60. Constitutional amendment proposed by La. Act 262 of 1926; adopted
November 2, 1926. Cf. La. Act 276 of 1926 (enabling act).
61. State v. Rodosta, 173 La. 623, 138 So. 124 (1931), noted in (1932) 7 Tulane L. Rev. 144. This case held Article 238 of the Code of Criminal Procedure unconstitutional insofar as it abolishes the distinction between an
accessory before the fact and the principal, thereby changing substantive
law.
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line with this pronouncement, the supreme court has on several
occasions held invalid articles contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, on the ground that they effect changes in the substantive criminal law either by altering previous rules, or by
6
creating new provisions.

2

Article 225, now under discussion, consisted in part of an old
statute" which permitted the insertion of several counts in one
indictment for any number of distinct acts of stealing, embezzlement, obtaining money by false pretenses, or of swindling, all
committed during a period of six calendar months from the first
to the last. However, Article 225 also added a new provision
which directed that the grade of the offense charged should be
determined by aggregating the amounts or value of such thefts,
64
embezzlements, or other acts.
The necessity for legislative reenactment of the article was
disclosed as a result of a recent district court decision 5 holding
that the article is unconstitutional insofar as it attempts to grade
the crime of embezzlement, thereby changing the penalty for the
offense. The district judge stated that there was a law existing
prior to the adoption of the Code, which set the grade of the
62. State v. Rodosta, 173 La. 623, 138 So. 124 (1931); State v. Campbell,
173 La. 831, 138 So. 853 (1931); State v. Florane, 179 La. 453, 154 So. 417 (1934).
See State v. Whitlock, 193 La. 1044, 1054, 192 So. 697, 700 (1939); State v.
Clement, 194 La. 395, 401-402, 193 So. 685, 687 (1940).
63. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 1059.
64. Article 225 reads as follows: "It shall be lawful to insert several
counts in the same indictment against the same defendant for any number
of distinct acts of stealing, of embezzlement, of obtaining money by false
pretenses, or of swindling, which may have been committed by him against
the same person within the space of six calendar months from the first to
the last of such acts, and the aggregate amount of these thefts, embezzlements, obtaining by false pretenses, or swindling, shall determine the grade
of the offense charged; provided, that whenever anyone, by virtue of his
office or employment or of any fiduciary relationship which he shall have
towards another, shall have entrusted to him any money or other property,
and shall embezzle the same, while so entrusted to him, he may be charged
in one indictment and in one count with the embezzlement of the aggregate
amount embezzled by him during the entire time of his holding such office,
employment tr relationship, which said aggregate amount shall determine
the grade of tihe offense charged; provided, further, that proof of the embezzlement by defendant at any time during his term of office, employment,
or fiduciary relationship, of any part of the money or other property with
which he shall have been trusted shall warrant a verdict of guilty of that
grade of the offense shown by the value of such money or property to have
been committed." (Italics supplied.)
65. State v. Caldwell and Lorio, Criminal Docket No. 10,232, Division "B,"
Nineteenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge (La.
1940).
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therefor,". and
crime of embezzlement and prescribed the penalty
67
that this provision was substantive in nature.
Upon the basis of this decision, fortified by the supreme
court cases on the subject, 8 the article would seem to be unconstitutional also insofar as it attempts to grade the crimes of stealing and of obtaining by false pretenses, because laws were extant
before the Code of Criminal Procedure was adopted grading and
prescribing the punishment for these offenses and containing no
provisions permitting the state to charge in one indictment the
aggregate value of a number of separate commissions of these
crimes.69
In reenacting the article the 1940 act 0 adds a proviso prohibiting the cumulation in the same indictment of separate acts
of any two or more of the several offenses mentioned.
Other late pieces of criminal legislation relate to a variety
of offenses. Act 114 of 1940 was enacted in order to effect a statewide denouncement of prostitution and related crimes as offenses
against the state. 7'1 The scope of the statute is sufficiently comprehensive to apply to most of the common types of sexual offenders who menace the public morals of a community.72 Heretofore, our state laws relating to such crimes were designed to
deter prostitution and similar offenses only indirectly through
66. Id. at 12-13: "Certainly it cannot be said that an article of the Code
of Criminal Procedure grading the crime of embezzlement and changing
the penalty therefor as it previously existed, is merely a change in pleading,
evidence and practice. Substantive law provides the penalty; procedural law
provides the method of enforcing it. To permit the addition of various small
items of embezzlements, theretofore misdemeanors, triable by a jury of five,
thereby creating a felony, triable by a jury of twelve, and the changing of
the penalty for said offense, in my opinion, would be to permit the creation
of substantive law in the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the changing
of substantive law as it existed prior to the adoption of the Code, in violation of the constitutional mandate to the Legislature to adopt a Code of
Procedure only."
67. State v. Caldwell and Lorio, Criminal Docket No. 10,232, Division "B,"
Nineteenth Judicial Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge (La. 1940).
68. Note 62, supra.
69. See La. Act 107 of 1902, § 6 and La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 813 [Dart's
Crim. Stats. (1932) H§ 944-9451, as amended by La. Act 151 of 1936 [Dart's
Crim. Stats. (Supp. 1939) §§ 944-945.2] (false pretenses); La. Act 124 of 1874,
§ 8 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 10531, and La. Act 107 of 1902, § 5 [Dart's
Crim. Stats. (1932) § 10541, the latter amended by La. Act 150 of 1936 [Dart's
Crim. Stats. (Supp. 1939) §§ 1054.1-1054.31 (larceny).
70. La. Act 57 of 1940, § 1.
71. La. Act 159 of 1912, § 8.1, as added by La. Act 3 of 1935 (2 E.S.) § 1,
punishes as vagrants in the City of New Orleans any person who commits
the offenses now denounced by La. Act 114 of 1940, and its constitutionality
has been upheld. State v. Martin, 185 La. 1080, 171 So. 452 (1936).
72. Cf. La. Act 114 of 1940, § 1.
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punishing those who promote delinquency in women 7 8 while
leaving the streetwalkers themselves unpunished. The task of
directly striking at the latter class of persons was left by the
1
state to its political subdivisions, which, with one exception/"
were authorized, although not directed, to classify and penalize
these persons as vagrants.7 5 Although vagrancy has been a state
offense since 1855,76 such sexual offenders as are punished by the
1940 act were never classified as vagrants under that law.77 The
new law enables the state to supplement and check any parish
or municipal officers who are neglectful in curbing this type of
immorality in their several localities.
A recent statute makes it a misdemeanor for any person wilfully and knowingly to purchase, receive for sale, or accept a
donation of, pledged agricultural products from any pledgor with
the intention of depriving the pledgee of his pledge thereon, un7
less the latter has given his written consent to such disposals.
This law serves as a companion measure to an existing penal
statute applicable to a pledgor who wrongfully disposes of a
79
pledged agricultural product.

In order to further prevent the distribution of bogus legal
documents of value, the legislature has made criminal the act of
selling or offering to sell, causing to be sold or offering to be
73. La. Act 134 of 1890 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) §§ 1156-1158]; La. Act
40 of 1892 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 1160]; La. Act 167 of 1910, § 1 [Dart's
Crim. Stats. (1932) § 1155]; La. Act 287 of 1910, § 1 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932)
§ 1154]; La. Act 288 of 1910, § 1 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 1161]; La. Act
295 of 1910, § 1 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 1159]; La. Act 307 of 1910 [Dart's
Crim. Stats. (1932) §§ 1144-1153]; La. Act 226 of 1912 [Dart's Crim. Stats.
(1932) §§ 1243-1246]; La. Act 115 of 1918, § 1 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932)

§ 1143).

74. In 1935 the legislature denounced prostitution and related acts in New
Orleans as vagrancy. La. Act 3 of 1935 (2 E.S.) § 1, adding Section 8.1 to La.
Act 159 of 1912.
75. La. Act 178 of 1904, as amended by La. Act 205 of 1908 [Dart's Crim.
Stats. (1932) §§ 1247-1249]. Cf. State v. Westmoreland, 133 La. 1015, 63 So.
502 (1913); New Orleans v. Postek, 180 La. 1048, 158 So. 553 (1935). The 1940
act is not to be construed as repealing this law or any other law that defines "crimes and misdemeanors involving illegal sexual relations." La. Act
114 of 1940, § 3.
76. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, §§ 953-955, 3877-3890 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932)
§§ 1233-1242]. State v. Westmoreland, 133 La. 1015, 63 So. 502 (1913).
77. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, §§ 953, 3877 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 1233].
78. La. Act 139 of 1940. Crop pledges are authorized by La. Act 66 of
1874, as amended by La. Act 44 of 1874 and La. Act 93 of 1922 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) §§ 5058-5060].
79. La. Act 192 of 1908 [Dart's Stats. (1939) HI 5061-5062]. Art. 3173, La.
Civil Code of 1870 provides:
"The debtor who takes away the pledge without the creditor's consent,
commits a sort of theft."
Any other person who wrongfully assists in depriving the pledgee of his
pledge also commits a like offense and should be punished.
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sold, soliciting for or offering to purchase, any paper which
simulates an official document such as is issued by or from any
judicial or administrative tribunal and intended to secure or
collect a sum of money or other thing of value.8 0 The statute is
supplementary to an earlier law prohibiting the uttering, issuing,
circulating and disposal of simulated legal papers."'
Act 28 of 1940 punishes the presenting of an affidavit or other
document known to contain false information for the purpose of
securing any one of the many tax exemption benefits granted by
Article X, Section 4, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921.82 The
same act attempts to punish another prevailing practice with
respect to tax exemption. Tax assessors and other officials and
employees of the state or its political subdivisions are prohibited
from listing at any excessive value for purposes of taxation any
property for which an exemption under the constitution has been
applied. 8

B. MATTERS RELATING TO PROCEDURAL LAW
Amendments to Specific Articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure'
Article 151. Number of witnesses citable at the expense of
the parish in criminal cases. Articles 150 and 151 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, as last amended, 8 provided that without
a formal judicial application not more than six witnesses could
be summoned on each side at the expense of the parish in misdemeanor cases and twelve in trials for felonies. The 1940 session
has again amended 86 Article 151, so that now, in the absence of
a special application to the judge, only twelve witnesses on each
side may be cited at parish expense. This limitation applies
equally to trials for misdemeanors and felonies. Furthermore,
the maximum number of witnesses which in any event may be
called at parish expense is set at twenty for each side. Insofar as
the amendment places trials of all offenses on the same footing,
80. La. Act 290 of 1940.
81. La. Act 135 of 1932 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (Supp. 1939) § 943.1].
82. La. Act 28 of 1940, § 1, 3. All property declared exempt by the constitutional provision mentioned in the 1940 act is exempted from the annual
state levy authorized by La. Act 109 of 1921 (E.S.) § 3 (Dart's Stats. (1939)
§ 8294].
83. La. Act 28 of 1940, §§ 2, 3.
84. La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
85. Arts. 150, 151, as amended by La. Act 367 of 1938, La. Code of Crim.
Proc. of 1928 (Supp. 1939). See Hebert and Lazarus, The Louisiana Legislation of 1938 (1938) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REvmw 80, 128.
86. La. Act 106 of 1940.
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it marks a return to the policy of the original provisions of the
Code of 1928.87

The amended codal provision applies to and governs the
summoning of witnesses at parish expense upon the trial of
motions to quash an indictment, a bill of information, a petit
or grand jury venire or panel, or a plea in bar in addition to the
final trial of a criminal case. 8
Since Article 151 operates as a limitation upon the effect of
Article 150, there is no conflict between them, and, therefore, the
failure of the legislature to correspondingly amend the latter
codal provision, although an unfortunate oversight, cannot be
regarded as a restriction of the former's effect.8 9
Articles 189 and 200. Term of service of grand juries.90 Article
18991 regulates the time at which grand juries shall be impaneled
in the parishes composing their respective districts, except Orleans Parish, 2 and provides, with certain restrictions, that each
grand jury shall "remain in office until a succeeding Grand Jury
is impaneled." Article 2001 relates exclusively to the Parish of
Orleans. It provides that the "grand jury of the Parish of Orleans shall serve for six months unless sooner discharged by the
court.

'9 4

The legislature amended both codal articles by adding

provisions to the effect that in the Parish of Orleans the grand
jury or any of its members may not be discharged before the expiration of six months service unless for legal cause," and that
87. Arts. 150, 151, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.

88. Ibid.
89. Art. 150, as amended by La. Act 367 of 1938, La. Code of Crim. Proc.
of 1928 (Supp. 1939), states that its provisions apply "except as provided in
the next succeeding section [Art. 151]." Cf. Hebert and Lazarus, loc. cit.
supra note 85.
90. Cf. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 42.
91. Art. 189, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
92. Cf. Art. 196, as amended by La. Act 23 of 1934 (2 E.S.) § 1, La. Code
of Crim. Proc. of 1928 (Supp. 1939), and La. Act 194 of 1940, infra page 165
et seq., fixing the time for impaneling the grand jury in Orleans Parish.
93. Art. 200, as reenacted by La. Act 23 of 1934 (2 E.S.) § 1, La. Code of
Crim. Proc. of 1928 (Supp. 1939).
94. There must be a grand jury impaneled in each parish in the state
at least twice a year for not more than eight or less than four months, except in Cameron Parish wherein at least one grand jury must be impaneled
in each year. Art. 189, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
95. Cf. Art. 172, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928. This article reads in
part as follows: ". . . the District Judge shall have discretion to decide upon
the competency of jurors in particular cases where from physical infirmity
or from relationship, or other causes, the person may be, in the opinion of
the judge, incompetent to sit upon the trial of any particular case." (Italics
supplied.)
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in all other parishes in the state the grand jury or any of its
members may not be discharged before the time fixed by the district judge for the impaneling of a new grand jury unless it be
for such cause.
Any grand juror is entitled to apply to the supreme court
for an immediate preferential review of the order by which he
was discharged; but his application for review '" must be made
within two days from the date of the order. Pending action on
the appeal, the applicant must continue to serve as a grand juror.
Even though the court affirms the order or denies the application
for review, this does not affect the validity of indictments returned by the grand jury between the date of the discharge order
and the date of the court's action on the application. 7 Within
two days after the order of discharge is affirmed by the supreme
court or becomes final, the district judge must make the necessary appointment as prescribed by law98 to fill any vacancies resulting therefrom.
Article 194. Preparationof the jury list for the Parish of
Orleans. Under Article 194 as it originally appeared in the Code
of Criminal Procedure, the Orleans Parish Board of Jury Commissioners was directed to select for jury service a minimum
number of one thousand persons. In 1934 the article was amended
so as arbitrarily to place the number of persons so selected at
exactly one thousand. 9 At the 1940 legislative session the article
was again amended'0 ° so as to restore the original version, providing for the selection of "not less than one thousand persons."
Article 195. Method of drawing and assigning petit jurors in
Orleans Parish. Article 195 was reenacted in substantially its
96. Cf. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, §§ 2, 10(1); Rules IX, §§ 2, 3, and
XIII, Rules of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, as amended to January 3,
1939. In the past, grand jurors aggrieved by their discharge at the order of
the district judge, after they had been impaneled and sworn, have sought
supreme court review of the order by petitioning the court to invoke its
supervisory jurisdiction in the case and grant writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. State v. Platt, 193 La. 928, 192 So. 659 (1939).
97. Quaere: Can it properly be said that such a grand jury, composed of
eleven qualified men and one disqualified man, meets the requirements of La.
Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 42? There is probably no serious difficulty here.
Since the legislature has the power to define the qualifications of jurors, it
would appear that it can set forth the terms and conditions upon which
disqualifications shall become operative. Cf. Art. 172, La. Code of Crim. Proc.
of 1928.
98. Arts. 184 and 197, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928 (Supp. 1939), as
amended by La. Act 23 of 1934 (2 E.S.) § 1 and La. Act 194 of 1940.
99. La. Act 23 of 1934 (2 E.S.) § 1.
100. La. Act 194 of 1940, § 1.
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original codal form. 101 Subsequent amendments' 10 2 had directed
that the Board of Jury Commissioners for Orleans Parish draw
from the jury wheel 150 names when petit jurors were to be
summoned for service in only two sections of the criminal district court, and not less than 75 additional names for each section
of the court ordering a drawing for a special petit jury term (the
number of jurors to be designated in the court order). The amendments provided further that, where the names were drawn, the
commissioners should assign the number of jurors so drawn to the
court for which the drawing was held. The 1940 amendments'"2
require that the commissioners, together with the criminal sheriff,
draw not less than 150 names in the first instance and not less
than 75 nor more than 150 additional names in the second instance, without the requirement that the number of jurors be
designated by the court in its order. The commissioners are then
directed to assign not less than 75 of the jurors to each section
of the criminal district court for which the drawing was held.
Article 196. Powers and control of the grand jury for Orleans Parish. It clearly appears that the 1940 amendments 0
to Article 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure'0 5 are intended
to incorporate language therein substantially corresponding to
the interpretation placed upon that article by the dissenting
6
opinion of Chief Justice O'Niell in the case of State v. Platt.10
This decision involved an appeal to the supreme court by certain members of the grand jury then impaneled for Orleans
Parish from an order of a district judge discharging them from
the grand jury before the expiration of their normal term of
service. The district judge based his action on the ground that
legal cause for removal was supplied by the grand jurors' contempt of court in reading in open court a petition addressed to
the judge. The petition that gave rise to the incident contained
a request that the court employ special counsel to conduct the
grand jury investigations then in progress and to recuse the
district attorney and his entire staff because of alleged misconduct and non-cooperation in conducting the proceedings.
101. Art. 195, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
102. La. Act 23 of 1934 (2 E.S.) § 1; La. Act 34 of 1936, § 1. See Art. 195,
La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928 (Supp. 1939).
103. La. Act 194 of 1940, § 1.
104. Ibid.

105. The article was previously amended by La. Act 23 of 1934 (2 E.S.)

§ 1.

106. 193 La. 928, 996, 192 So. 659, 681 (1939).
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With the recent amendments in italics, Article 196 now
reads, in part:
".... The judge of the section of the Criminal District Court

who shall have appointed said grand jury shall have control
and instruction over the grand jury, exclusive of all other
judges of the Criminal District Court, and such grand jury
shall make all findings and returns in open court to said
judge; and in addition thereto, may make reports and requests
in open court as provided by law....",0o
The dissenting opinion in the above cited case stated:
"The declaration in article 196 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, that each grand jury, in the Parish of Orleans,
shall be under the exclusive control and instruction of the
judge who empaneled the grand jury, means nothing more
than that that judge's authority to control and instruct the
grand jury shall not be interfered with by any other judge
of the criminal district court. The expression 'exclusive control and instruction' is not intended to prevent the grand
jurors from doing anything but what the judge or the district
attorney instructs them to do."10 8
The opinion continues by citing Article 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which prescribes the oath of the grand juror and
Section 2140 of the Revised Statutes of 1870, supplying the penalty for the failure of a grand juror to comply with his oath.
Article 210. Restrictions upon the powers of the grand jury
to act. As in the preceding instance, the guide for the draftsman in amending Article 210 may be found in the expressions
contained in the dissenting opinion in the Platt case. It was argued in that case that the grand jurors' attempt to read the petition in question violated Article 210 restricting the powers of
the grand jury to act. The 1940 amendments to this article 101 and
also to Article 196 have the effect of enlarging the powers of the
grand jury in order to permit it to submit "reports or requests"
to the court of the type under discussion in that decision, while
107. Cf. Art. 210, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, as amended by La.
Act 194 of 1940, § 1.
108. O'Niell, C. J., dissenting in State v. Platt, 193 La. 928, 1000-1001, 192
So. 659, 682-683 (1939). The phrase "exclusive control and instruction," as
above used, appeared In the original article prior to the 1940 amendment.

109. La. Act 194 of 1940, § 1.
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otherwise restricting it to returning indictments, presentments,
or inspectional reports."1
The dissenting opinion in the Platt case declared:
"The long list of decisions quoted in the majority opinion
in this case, putting a limit upon what grand juries may say
in their reports, have nothing to do with this case, because
the petition which the seven grand jurors signed, in this case,
and which Powell and De Armas attempted to read in open
court, was not in any sense a grand-jury report. The report
of a grand jury has a well defined meaning, and is something
very different from the complaint and request made by the
seven grand jurors in their petition to Judge Platt.
"It is argued that Powell and De Armas, by attempting
to read the petition which was signed by them and by five
other members of the grand jury, were attempting to violate
article 210 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But it seems
to me that that article has no reference whatever to such a
document as Powell and De Armas were about to read. The
article of the Code has reference only to the findings, such as
a true bill, or not a true bill, and the reports which are required to be made by not less than a quorum of the grand
jury.... But the report referred to in these articles [210 and
211] of the Code is the grand-jury report, properly so-called,
which must be made by not less than a quorum, of nine members, of the grand jury. That has nothing to do with such a
document or petition as that which caused Powell and De
Armas to be discharged from the grand jury. Their attempt
to read the document was not a violation of any law ....,,l
110. Art. 210, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, as amended by La. Act
194 of 1940, § 1, provides in part:
"The grand jury shall have power to act only in one of the following
ways:"
"It shall make no reports to the court other than the return of presentment or indictment or reports or requests provided by law." (Amendment
italicized.)
Prior to the 1940 amendment, the pertinent part of the article read:
"It shall make no reports to the court other than the return of presentment or indictment, except as specifically provided in Article 211 hereof."
(Italics supplied.)
Article 211 of the Code of Criminal Procedure imposes upon the grand
jury the duty of inspecting "every prison, place of detention, asylum and
hospital within the parish" and requires it to make a report to the district
judge of the results of such inspections.
111. O'Niell, C. J., dissenting in State v. Platt, 193 La. 928, 1002-1003, 192
So. 659, 683 (1939).
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Article 197. Method of filling vacancies in the Orleans Parish
grand jury. As originally enacted in the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure of 1928, Article 197 provided inter alia 112 that vacancies occurring in the membership of the Orleans Parish grand
jury may be filled by drawing from the jury wheel not less than
twelve names from which the district judge shall select the persons necessary to fill the vacancies. In 1934 this article was
amended " " so as to delete the words in italics above, thus restricting the number to be drawn to precisely twelve names. The
latest amendment, made in the 1940 session,"1 reinstates the
original wording of the article.
Article 199. Method of summoning tales jurors for petit jury
service in the Parish of Orleans. The 1940 amendment"1 5 to
Article 199116 transfers the function of drawing names of tales
jurors for petit jury service in Orleans Parish from the Board of
Jury Commissioners or any one of them to the criminal sheriff or
17
one of his. deputies, as the original codal provision directed.
Article 205. Charge to be given to all grand juries. Article
205" 8 has been amended"" so that upon the impaneling of the
grand jury, the district judge is directed to charge the members
in open court upon their duties and obligations as grand jurors,
as well as to instruct them concerning their powers and .rights
in such capacity, and at the same time, it is required of the judge
that he present to the grand jurors a written copy of the charge
and instructions so given, with the right being granted to the
jury at any time to ask for additional charges or instructions
concerning these matters, which must be given in a like manner.
These provisions, in effect, remedy the complaint presented
by the grand jurors in the Platt case: that the district judge
called the jury into private consultation, and there, "'with the
admonition of secrecy under their oath,'" they "'were given
112. Another method of selection provided to fill vacancies in the grand
jury is for the judge of the impaneling section of the court to select the
necessary number of persons from the petit jury panel of his section.
See Art. 184, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, for the manner of filling
vacancies in the membership of the grand juries outside the Parish of
Orleans.
113. La. Act 23 of 1934 (2 E.S.).
114. La. Act 194 of 1940, § 1.
115. Ibid.
116. Art. 199, as amended by La. Act 23 of 1934 (2 E.S.) § 1, La. Code of
Crim. Proc. of 1928 (Supp. 1939).
117. Art. 199, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
118. La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
119. La. Act 194 of 1940, § 1.
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certain instructions as to the mode of their procedure, the conduct of their hearings, and the scope of their administrative
powers, and the extent of the control of the District Attorney
over the members of the Grand Jury and their proceedings,' ""o
all of which "intimidated and confused" them and "were erroneous and had the effect of unlawfully curtailing and bridling
the investigatory powers of the Grand Jury.

'121

Article 207. Time, place and adjournment of meetings of
the grand jury. The amendments of 1940122 to Article 207 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure provide that not only shall the grand
jury meet "at the parish seat at such times as the judge may
order," but shall also "meet at the parish seat at such times as
they may assemble on their own motion, at any time and at any
place within the parish, as directed by the judge or by a majority
of the grand jury." Thus, the legislature took a further step toward making the grand jury a more autonomous body, and curtailed the degree of control over its actions which may be exercised by the district judge.
Articles 569 and 570. Electrocution substituted for hanging
as the method of executing the death sentence. Act 14 of 1940
amends Articles 569 and 570122 by substituting electrocution in

the place of hanging as the legal method of executing prisoners
condemned to death.1 24 The law is to become effective June 1,
1941, or at such prior date as an electric chair may be obtained
by the general manager of the state penitentiary, and when such
fact has been certified by him to the sheriffs in the state. 1 25 If

electricity is not available in the prison of the parish where the
execution is to be performed, the sheriff, with the Governor's
consent, may change the place of execution to an adjacent parish. 2 6 No one is permitted to be in the execution chamber

"except those permitted by law," such persons being designated
in the statute; and no person under the age of twenty-one
2
may be allowed there.

7

Codal Article Repealed
Article 208. The repeal of Article 208 of the Code of Criminal
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

State v. Platt, 193 La. 928, 934, 192 So. 659, 660 (1939).
193 La. 928, 935, 192 So. 659, 661 (1939).
La. Act 194 of 1940, § 1.
La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
La. Act 14 of 1940, § 1.
Id. at § 2.
Id. at § 1.
Ibid.
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Procedure1 2 8 and the recent amendments to Article 207,129 granting to the majority of members of the grand jury the right to
determine at what times and places that body shall meet within
the parish, would seem to resolve most possible conflicts with the
district judge as to such matters in favor of the members of the
80
grand jury.
Other ProceduralStatutes
The alternate juror law. Upon the recommendation of the
Louisiana State Law Institute, the legislature adopted a draft' 8'
128. La. Act 194 of 1940, § 2. The article provided:
"The grand jury may be called in special meeting at any time or at any
place within the parish by the district judge, or by the foreman with the
approval of the district judge."
129. La. Act 194 of 1940, § 1. See p. 165 et seq., supra.
130. In State v. Johnson, 116 La. 856, 863-864, 41 So. 117, 119 (1906), the
supreme court made the following statement in answer to a charge by defendant that the grand jury illegally left the court house and visited the
scene of the homicide, without being authorized by the court:
".... As to the charge that the grand jury visited the scene of the homicide without obtaining permission from the court, it appears that the place
visited is within the corporate limits of Donaldsonville, the parish seat of
Ascension Parish, and the judge in signing the bill [of exception] in relation
to the matter, says:
"'Being of opinion that the defendants were not concerned with the
nature of the evidence taken and considered by the grand jury, this motion to quash on this ground is overruled,' etc.
"The law requires a grand jury to hold its sessions at the seat of justice
of the parish (Act 135, p. 221, of 1898, § 8); but it also requires it to visit the
prisons within its district (Rev. St. 1870, § 2139), from which it follows that
the sessions of the body are not, necessarily, to be held at the courthouse.
A grand jury is authorized to act on evidence submitted to It, but Its members are also required, under a very severe penalty in case of failure so to
do, to act upon facts within their own knowledge (Rev. St. 1870, § 2140y,
from which it also follows that they do not require the permission of the
court to investigate crime, but are bound to take the initiative and determine
for themselves the character of the evidence, or the sufficiency of the facts,
necessary to their findings. Under these circumstances, we see no reason for
holding that the action of the grand jury here complained of was unauthorized.... We therefore conclude that the motion to quash was properly
overruled." (Italics supplied.)
131. La. Act 6 of 1940. It was thought by the Louisiana Law Institute that
an amendment of La. Const. of 1921, Art. I, § 9, relating to restrictions of a
jury trial, would not be necessary to validate the statute as the federal alternate juror statute has been considered valid, and in every case where an
attack upon the constitutionality of such a law has been made, It has been
unsuccessful. California: People v. Peete, 54 Cal. App. 333, 202 Pac. 51 (1921);
New York: People v. Mitchell, 266 N.Y. 15, 193 N.E. 445, 96 A.L.R. 791 (1934);
North Carolina: State v. Dalton, 206 N.C. 507, 174 S.E. 422 (1934); New Jersey: State v. Dolbow, 117 N.J. Law 560, 189 Atl. 915 (1937), where the law
permitted the court to dismiss a juror for any cause which, in his opinion,
justifies dismissal, and to proceed with one of the alternate jurors as substituted; Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. Fugmann, 330 Pa. 4, 198 Atl. 99
(1938). In addition to these states, alternate juror provisions also exist In
Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
See Special Report, op. cit. supra note 8, at 16-18.
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82
which provided
of an act modeled after a federal enactment
33
for the selection of alternate jurors in the trial of criminal
cases in order to meet the contingency of a juror becoming so
ill as to be unable to perform his duties or of the death of a
juror before a verdict has been rendered.'"4 The new act provides that if the district judge, before whom a criminal case is
about to be tried, is of the opinion that the trial will be a protracted one, he may, after causing an entry to be made in the
court minutes to that effect, and after the jury is impaneled and
sworn, direct the selection of one or two alternate jurors, in his
discretion. These jurors must take the same oath, be drawn from
the same source, in the same manner and have the same qualifications and be subject to the same examination, orders of court
and challenges as the regular jurors, in whose company they
must attend the trial at all times. Each defendant is entitled to
one peremptory challenge to each of the alternate jurors, and the
prosecution is entitled to one challenge to each of the alternate
jurors for each defendant.1 5 Such jurors may be discharged upon
the final submission of the case to the regular jury unless before
that time one of the regular jurors dies or becomes too ill to perform his duty, in which event the court may order him discharged

132. 47 Stat. 380 (1932), 28 U.S.C.A. § 417a (Supp. 1939). Section 285 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure of the American Law Institute consists of
an alternate juror provision also similar to the Louisiana statute.
133. The view was expressed by a committee section of the Louisiana
State Law Institute that, although such a provision if desirable did not come
within its scope, it may be thought advisable to provide for alternate jurors
in the trial of civil cases, but that the contingency of an ill juror in a civil
case can usually be met by agreement of counsel. It might be said also that
civil juries are rarely employed in most Louisiana courts. See Report by
the Criminal Law Section of the Program and Work Committee to the Annual Meeting of the Louisiana State Law Institute, March 16, 1940, at 10-11.
Such an alternate juror provision is contained in Rule 47(b), Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
134. Cf. Art. 397, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, and annotations thereto,
for cases warranting an order discharging the jury and an entry of a mistrial before rendition of the verdict.
135. As to the number of peremptory challenges to the regular jurors
allowed for the prosecution and each defendant, Louisiana law provides
that:
"In all trials for any crime punishable with death, or necessarily with
imprisonment at hard labor, each defendant shall be entitled to challenge
peremptorily twelve (12) jurors, and the prosecution twelve (12) for each
defendant. In all other criminal cases each defendant shall have six (6)
peremptory challenges and the state six (6) for each defendant." Art. 354,
as amended by La. Act 365 of 1938, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928 (Supp.
1939).
The number of regular jurors in a criminal case may be either five or
twelve, depending upon the nature of the penalty which may be inflicted
upon conviction. La. Const. of 1921, Art. I, § 9, and Art. VII, § 41; Arts.
337-339, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928. See supra note 131.
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and draw the name of an alternate juror who thereafter serves
in his place.
It is suggested that further provision should be made in the
statute to take care of instances when there is serious illness or
death in the family of a juror or any other unforeseen emergency
of such nature that a juror should not be expected to continue his
duties. Alternate juror provisions in several of the states have
provided for these contingencies. 18 6
Grand juries authorized to adopt their own rules of procedure. Grand juries throughout the state are authorized 1 7 to
adopt, with judicial approval, rules of procedure to govern their
ministerial functions. This act also appears to be a consequence
of the friction between the court and grand jury which was the
subject of the dispute in State v. Platt.' It is another effort by
the legislature to impart a measure of independence to the grand
jury.189
District Attorneys required to submit report to every new
grand jury. The legislature has enacted that district attorneys
throughout the state are required to submit in open court to
the judge and every new grand jury a report setting out in
detail the existing status or disposition made of indictments
brought in by the two preceding grand juries, together with
reasons why any indictments have not been acted upon, if such
is the case.14°
C. MISCELLANEOUS

The State Police Act'41 was amended by Act 113 of 1940 so
as to compel any police employee of the department making an
136. See for example: Cal. Pen. Code (Deering, 1931) § 1089, as amended
by Laws of 1933, c. 521; New York Code of Criminal Procedure (McKinney,
1938) § 358-a, as amended by N.Y. Law of 1933, c. 588, N.Y. Law of 1939, c.
199; North Carolina Public Laws (1931) c. 103, as amended by Public Laws
(1939) c. 35; Pa. St~t. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 17, § 1153.
137. La. Act 8 of 1940.
138. 193 La. 928, 192 So. 659 (1939). The court said in that case:
"Therefore, the District Judge properly instructed these grand jurors in
their meeting of October 6, 1939, that the grand jurors could not make rules
and regulations to govern themselves, which were contrary to law and that
they must realize that the law which gave them the official status as grand
jurors, likewise made the District Attorney and his staff their legal advisors
and placed them under the direction and instructions of the District Judge."
(193 La. at 962-963, 192 So. at 670.)
139. See the dissenting opinion in State v. Platt, 193 La. 928, 996, 192 So.
659, 682 (1939), in which Chief Justice O'Niell states that the grand jury is
"the most important institution in America."
140. La. Act 61 of 1940.
141. La. Act 94 of 1936 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 9307.1-9307.28].
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arrest to immediately thereafter place any person so arrested in
the jail of the parish in which the arrest was made, under penalty of a fine or imprisonment or both. 142 The new amendment
also withdraws the authority by which the Superintendent of
State Police formerly could call upon local peace officers for
assistance in performing the duties imposed upon state police
employees. 14 8
Act 237 of 1940 makes the statute'44 regulating the possession
and transfer of firearms inapplicable to sheriffs or to municipalities of more than ten thousand inhabitants. 45

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
During the 1940 regular session of the Louisiana legislature
twenty-eight amendments to the Louisiana Constitution of 1921
were proposed. These will be submitted to the people for ratification at the regular election to be held November 5, 1940.1 The
amendments cover a great variety of subjects, including matters
of political and governmental reform, and taxation. These two
topics enumerated above have been separately treated elsewhere
in the Louisiana Law Review, and a discussion of the pertinent
142. Id. at § 16 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 9307.16], as amended by La. Act
113 of 1940, § 1.
143. La. Act 94 of 1936, § 21, as amended by La. Act 57 of 1938, § 1 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 9307.21], as amended by La. Act 113 of 1940, § 2.
144. La. Act 17 of 1935 (4 E.S.) [Dart's Crim. Stats. (Supp. 1939) §§
1279.7-1279.21].
145. Id. at § 14 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (Supp. 1939) § 1279.20], as amended
by La. Act 237 of 1940, § 1.
1. As this issue goes to press (November 11, 1940) it appears probable
that nineteen of the twenty-eight proposed amendments have been ratified
by the voters of Louisiana. The following proposed amendments apparently
have been defeated:
Amendment 4, Taxation Exemption for Waste Materials and Income Tax
Amendment (La. Act 382 of 1940).
Amendment 12, Taxation Exemptions to New Industries (La. Act 399 of
1940).
Amendment 14, Retirement and Pension of State Offlcials (La. Act 378
of 1940).
Amendment 15, Exempting from Taxation Property of Electric Cooperatives Organized Under Federal Rural Electrification Act (La. Act
376 of 1940).
Amendment 20, Limiting Taxes of Tensas Basin Levee District (La. Act
393 of 1940).
Amendment 23, New Orleans Union Station (La. Act 385 of 1940).
Amendment 26, Bank Tax Exemptions (La. Act 389 of 1940).
Amendment 27, Exemptions of Lodges, etc., from Taxation (La. Act 398
of 1940).
Amendment 28, Legislators' Salaries (La. Act 379 of 1940).
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constitutional amendments will be found therein. 2 The remaining proposed amendments are discussed in the paragraphs that
follow.
Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University
A complete reorganization of the Board of Supervisors of
Louisiana State University has been proposed through constitutional amendment." The ultimate objective of the amendment is
the creation of a board of fourteen members (exclusive of the
Governor, who serves ex-officio as a member). Each member
shall serve for fourteen years. The terms shall be overlapping,
two members retiring on June first of each even numbered year.
In order to place this scheme into operation with a minimum of
disturbance of the tenure of presently appointed incumbents, the
following provision has been made:
"... the successors to those members whose terms expire on
January 1, 1941, shall be appointed to serve until June 1, 1942;
the members whose terms expire on January 1, 1942, shall
serve until June 1, 1944; the members whose terms expire on
January 1, 1943, shall serve until June 1, 1946; the successors
to those members whose terms expire on January 1, 1944,
shall be appointed to serve until June 1, 1948; the members
whose terms expire on January 1, 1945, shall serve until June
2. The following proposed amendments are discussed by Professor Hyneman, Political and Administrative Reform in the 1940 Legislature (1940) 3
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 1.

Voting Machines (La. Acts 372 and 375 of 1940) pp. 34-35.
Poll Tax Repeal (La. Act 374 of 1940) p. 29.
Legislators' Salaries (La. Act 379 of 1940) pp. 26-28.
Civil Service. (La. Act 381 of 1940) p. 15.
Reorganization (La. Act 384 of 1940) p. 1 et seq., p. 23 et seq.
The following proposed amendments are discussed by Professor Dakin,
Louisiana Tax Legislation of 1940 (1940) 3 LouIsIANA LAW REVIEW 55.
License Plate Reduction (La. Act 373 of 1940) p. 82, n. 149; p. 85, n. 167.
Rural Electrification (La. Act 376 of 1940) p. 90.
Highway Commission Bonds (La. Act 377 of 1940) p. 82.
Severance Tax Fund (La. Act 380 of 1940) p. 80, n. 133.
Taxation Exemption for Waste Materials and Income Tax Amendment
(La. Act 382 of 1940) pp. 57-58.
State Bond Issue (La. Act 383 of 1940) p. 87.
Bank Tax Exemptions (La. Act 389 of 1940) pp. 89-90.
Severance Tax on Natural Resources (La. Act 392 of 1940). pp. 79-80.
Prohibiting Gasoline Taxes by Municipalities (La. Act 395 of 1940) pp.
81-82.
Property Exemptions from Taxation (La. Act 398 of 1940) pp. 89-90.
Tax Exemptions to New Industries (La. Act 399 of 1940) p. 90.
3. La. Act 397 of 1940. See La. Act 196 of 1940, §§ 5, 6, 8, being the enabling provisions of the "Louisiana State University Code" under the amendment.
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1, 1950; the members whose terms expire on January 1, 1946,
shall serve until June 1, 1952; the members whose terms expire on January 1, 1947, shall serve until June 1, 1954. ..."
Vacancies are to be filled by the Governor for unexpired terms
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. More than
one member may be appointed from the same parish and at
least seven members must be graduates of the University. The
board shall elect from its appointive members a chairman and
a vice-chairman; and also a secretary, who need not be a member
of the board.
Bond To Secure Amount Due Producers of Milk
It is proposed to add a new section to Article III of the Constitution of 19215 whereby the legislature may require manufacturers, pasteurizers and distributors of milk or milk products
to furnish bond as security for the payment of amounts which
may be due or become due by them to the producers of milk.
Coast-Guard Station
Act 396 of 1940 proposes to amend Article XVI, Section 7 (h) 6
of the Constitution of 1921 so as to grant authority to the Board
of Levee Commissioners of the Orleans Levee District "to give,
grant and donate unto the United States of America" a tract of
land for the purposes of erecting a coast-guard station on Lake
Pontchartrain, the location and size of which is to be determined
by the Board.
Confederate Pensions
By another proposed constitutional amendment,7 confederate
veterans or their widows whose pensions were reduced from
sixty to thirty dollars per month on June 1, 1932, are to be reimbursed one thousand and eighty dollars in order to make up the
deficiency from June 1, 1932, to June 1, 1935, when the pensions
were again increased to sixty dollars. The State Board of Liquidation is authorized to incur an indebtedness of nine hundred
thousand dollars to secure the necessary funds for this purpose.
Dock Board
It is proposed that the Board of Commissioners of the Port
of New Orleans, organized by Article VI, Section 17 of the Con4. La. Act 397 of 1940.
5. The proposed new section will be Section 44, La. Act 394 of 1940.
6. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XVI, § 7(h), as amended in accordance with
the proposal in La. Act 292 of 1928.
7. La. Act 390 of 1940.
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stitution of 1921, be entirely reorganized by constitutional amendment." Upon its adoption, the terms of all present members will
terminate. The new board is to be composed of members appointed by the Governor for four, five, six, seven and eight years,
respectively, according to the procedure therein outlined. All
appointments shall be made without confirmation by the Senate.
Judges-JudicialDistricts
Under the Constitution of 1921, the legislature was prohibited
from passing laws affecting either the salary, term of office, or
jurisdiction as to amount of any judge of the courts of the state,
whether said judge was appointed or elected.! Any laws so affecting judges would take effect only at the expiration of the term
of the judge to be affected thereby. The proposed 1940 constitutional amendment 0 reenacts the main features of the previous
provisions with the following changes: (a) the prohibition applies only with regard to elected judges; (b) the provisions of
the amendment are not to affect existing constitutional provisions with respect to judges appointed to fill an unexpired term
of less than one year;" (c) nor is the salary, term or jurisdiction
of such appointed judges changed thereby. With the exception
of the City Judge of Baton Rouge,' 2 all judges are elected. 8 The
result is that the effect of this amendment is the exclusion of
the City Judge of Baton Rouge from the prohibition contained
in the constitution.
By another proposed constitutional amendment a new judicial district is to be created. Article VII, Section 31 of the Constitution of 1921, as amended pursuant to Act 79 of 1926, created
twenty-six judicial districts. The eighth district was then composed of the parishes of Caldwell, Winn, and LaSalle. In 1928
this district was reconstituted so as to embrace the Parish of
Grant' 4 which formerly was included in the ninth judicial district. The thirteenth district was composed of the parishes of St.
Landry and Evangeline; but in 1936, a new judicial district was
created from the Parish of St. Landry, bringing the total num8. La. Act 388 of 1940.
9. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 40.
10. La. Act 386 of 1940.
11. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 7, 21, 69.
12. Id. at § 51, as amended in accordance with the proposal in La. Act
63 of 1936.
13. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, §H 7, 21, 33.
14. La. Act 261 of 1928.
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ber of judicial districts to twenty-seven." The 1940 constitutional
amendment 0 creates an additional district bringing the total
number to twenty-eight. This new district is to be composed of
the parishes of LaSalle and Caldwell, with the result that the
eighth district will be composed of the parishes of Grant and
Winn. Provision is also made for the appointment of the district
attorneys and for the election of the district judge for the newly
created judicial district.
New Orleans Union Station
Act 385 of 1940 proposes the repeal of Section 31.3 of Article
XIV of the Louisiana Constitution. The subsection to be affected
was inserted in the constitution in accordance with the proposal
in Act 385 of 1938. Under Section 31.3, as it presently exists, the
City of New Orleans is authorized to "acquire, construct, maintain or operate one of more railroad passenger stations."
Refunding Bonds of Public Belt Railroad
Act 391 of 1940 proposes to amend Article XIV, Section 27 of
the Constitution of 1921 by adding thereto a new paragraph
whereby the City of New Orleans is authorized to issue bonds,
or notes to be known as City of New Orleans Public Belt Bonds,
or Notes, the proceeds of which are to be used for the retirement
or redemption of New Orleans Public Belt Railroad Bonds issued
pursuant to the Constitution of 192117 or New Orleans Public Belt
Bonds issued pursuant to Act 45 of 1938,1 or for the payment or
redemption of those bonds or notes authorized by this amendment.
Retirement and Pension of State Officials
It is proposed that a new section be added to Article XVIII
of the constitution,", providing for the retirement of any elected
officer of the executive department on two-thirds pay at the age
20
of seventy after twenty-four years of continuous service.
15. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 31, as amended in accordance with the
proposal in La. Act 62 of 1936.
16. La. Act 387 of 1940.
17. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XIV, § 27.
18. Ibid., as amended in accordance with the proposal in La. Act 45 of
1938.
19. La. Act 378 of 1940.
20. It is generally understood that this amendment was designed to
cover one specific case. It is unlikely that many officers elected to any branch
of the executive department will meet the qualifications that are laid down
for retirement.
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Tensas Basin Levee District
Article XVI, Section 2 of the Constitution of 1921 is to be
amended 2 so as to provide that the Tensas Basin Levee District
may levy annually a tax of not more than one and one-half mills
on the dollar on all taxable property within the alluvial portion
of said district subject to overflow, for the purpose of maintaining levees. At present, all levee districts are authorized to levy
not more than five mills on the dollar.

V. MISCELLANEOUS LEGISLATION
Banks and Banking
Banks and trust companies authorized to secure fiduciary
deposits, which are transferred from trust, to banking departments, by obligations or assets other than capital stock. Any savings, safe deposit, or trust banking company in Louisiana is authorized by law' to act as an executor, administrator, or other
fiduciary, when appointed by any court or person. However, if
appointed by a court as a fiduciary, or if a court authorizes the
deposit of any valuables with it, the bank or trust company must
let its paid-in capital stock serve as collateral security, unless the
2
court otherwise orders.
Two 1940 acts 8 afford to such companies a means of preventing their capital stock from serving as security for fiduciary obligations. Any bank or trust company' acting as a fiduciary, whose
trust department deposits with its banking department moneys
for which it is responsible in the capacity of trustee, is authorized
by the 1940 legislation to secure such deposits by delivering collateral to its trust department. This collateral must consist of
readily marketable bonds or other obligations or assets which
have and shall maintain a market value of at least an amount
equal to that of the same deposits.
Banks in liquidation regulated in respect to granting mineral
leases. Act 73 of 1940 requires all mineral leases entered into by
state banks in liquidation to be subject to the approval of the
21. La. Act 393 of 1940.
1. La. Act 45 of 1902, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 582].
2. Id. at § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 583].
3. La. Acts 94 and 98 of 1940. The former statute authorizes the action
therein provided when it is required by the Federal Reserve System.
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Department of Minerals and of the district court having juris4
diction of the liquidation.
Bank deposits received when insolvent. Act 243 of 1940 punishes the bank officer or owner who assents to the reception of
deposits, or to the creation of debts by his institution, after knowing that it is insolvent or in failing circumstances, and makes him
individually responsible for such deposits and debts.5 Although
a similar statute6 existed previously, this act makes bank officials
even more strictly accountable to the public than did the preceding law, which it expressly repealed." For example, the earlier
law did not create any individual liability on the part of a bank
officer. 8 Moreover, it relieved him of any criminal responsibility
if he could show that the insolvency or failing circumstances of
his institution, at the time of the reception of deposits or creation
of debts, was a consequence of the depreciation of assets due to
a general economic depression affecting all banks similarly situated, or if his case fell within three other stipulated exceptions.'
Building and loan associations. A number of amendments
have been made to the Louisiana Homestead and Building and
4. Cf. La. Act 93 of 1936, as amended by La. Act 80 of 1938 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) §§ 4725.1-4725.21] and La. Act 92 of 1940; La. Act 47 of 1940, tit. XXII.
5. The 1940 statute substantially reenacts La. Act 108 of 1884 which was
probably passed to execute the provisions of Article 241 of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1879. These provisions were retained in Article 269 of the
Louisiana Constitutions of 1898 and 1921.
6. La. Act 10 of 1934 [Dart's Stats. (1939) H§ 672-673.1]. This act expressly
repealed La. Act 108 of 1884. It contained more severe penal provisions than
either the acts of 1884 or 1940, but their significance was lessened by other
provisions affording relief from the coverage of the act in certain instances.
The penalty in the 1934 statute consisted of imprisonment in the penitentiary
at hard labor from six to twelve years, or a fine not exceeding $5,000, or
both. The other two acts authorize a prison sentence of not less than five nor
more than ten years, but omit any pecuniary punishment. See La. Act 108
of 1884, § 2; La. Act 10 of 1934, § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 673]; La. Act 243 of
1940, § 2.
7. La. Act 243 of 1940, § 3.
8. However, even prior to the passage of La. Act 10 of 1934, a depositor
could bring an action in tort against a bank officer to recover any loss
suffered as a result of his violation of La. Act 108 of 1884, although that
statute did not impose any civil liability. Art. 2315, La. Civil Code of 1870.
Ellett v. Newland, 171 La. 1019, 132 So. 761 (1931).
9. (1) If the Insolvency or failing circumstances serving as the basis for
prosecution under the act could be fairly construed as having been caused
by depreciation of assets as a result of a general banking crisis caused by
contemporaneous circumstances wherein the bank officer or owner could not
reasonably apprehend or measure such depreciation, or (2) if there was no
personal fraud, dishonesty or defalcation by the accused, or (3) if the state
banking commissioner had been previously called in and the operation of the
bank continued without objection from him. La. Act 10 of 1934, § 1 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 672].
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Loan Statute. Associations organized under its provisions in St.
Landry Parish are authorized to make loans upon real estate in
the Parish of Evangeline, but the geographical limitations on the
operation of associations organized in other parishes remain unchanged. 10 Subject to the regulations and approval of the State
Bank Commissioner and Supervisor of Homestead and Building
and Loan Associations, 1 these organizations, savings and loan
associations,' 2 et cetera, are authorized to sell, without recourse,
any notes held by them, which were issued by the Federal Housing Administrator 8 under the provisions of the National Housing
Act.' 4 The recordation of the vendor's privilege and first mortgage securing a loan by a homestead association is made effective
for a period of twenty years from that date, without their being
reinscribed on the mortgage records. 15 During the existence of
any vendor's privilege and first mortgage, the statute now permits any association to advance money, under certain conditions,
to a borrower for the payment of taxes, insurance premiums,
special assessments on, repairs to, and maintenance of the property on which the original loan was made. 16 Also, in connection
with and as part of a real estate loan to be made by it, an association may accept, under certain terms, its own full paid or
optional shares in addition to the special mortgage and vendor's
7
privilege.
Federal savings and loan associations. Act 95 of 1940 regulates the business of federal savings and loan associations 8 in
10. La. Act 246 of 1940, amending La. Act 140 of 1932, § 15 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) § 727]. See Hebert and Lazarus, The Louisiana Legislation of 1938
(1938)

1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 80, 124.

11. Cf. La. Act 16 of 1921, § 1, as last amended by La. Act 258 of 1928, § 1
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 515]; La. Act 140 of 1932, § 64, as amended by La. Act
337 of 1938, § 9 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 744.32].
12. Apparently the term "savings and loan associations" is intended to
include federal savings and loan associations. See La. Act 95 of 1940, discussed at page 181 et seq., infra.
13. La. Act 312 of 1940, § 2, amending La. Act 140 of 1932, § 11 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 7231.
14. 53 Stat. 804 (1939), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1703 (Supp. 1939).
15. La. Act 312 of 1940, § 3, amending La. Act 140 of 1932, § 50, as previously amended by La. Act 337 of 1938, § 8 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 744.183.
The amendatory act of 1938 failed to clearly state when the twenty year
effective period began. Compare La. Act 280 of 1916, § 9, with La. Act 140
of 1932, § 50. Cf. State v. Recorder of Mortgages, 186 La. 661, 173 So. 139
(1937).
16. La. Act 312 of 1940, § 3(b), amending La. Act 140 of 1932, § 50, as
previously amended by La. Act 337 of 1938, § 8 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 744.18).
17. La. Act 312 of 1940, § 3(c), amending La. Act 140 of 1932, § 50, as
previously amended by La. Act 337 of 1938, § 8 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 744.18].
18. See 48 Stat. 647 (1934), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1468 (1936); 49 Stat. 297 (1935),
12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1464, 1465, 1467 (1936); 53 Stat. 1402, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(h)
(Supp. 1939).
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Louisiana, and ratifies all prior conversions of state chartered
homestead or building and loan associations into such federal
associations. The act contains the admonition, however, that it
is not to be construed as granting the-state's consent to any such
future conversions.19 Most of the regulations governing the federal associations are duplicates of the rules presently controlling
homestead or building and loan organizations. 20 These provisions
relate to the shares of minors, 21 the investment of funds in the
names of two or more persons, 22 the manner in which mortgages
upon immovable property held by an association are affected by
succession or other types of sales, 28 the purchase and sale of property by an association, 24 the sale of property without the consent

of the mortgagee association, 21 foreclosure via executiva, 26 the

inspection of records by members and shareholders,2" liability for
false statements tending to affect the financial stability of an
association 28 and for being bribed to procure a loan from an association, 29 and the transfer of shares to legatees and heirs of a
deceased shareholder.9 0
Variations from homestead or building and loan regulations
are found in the provisions relating to the shares of married
women and the ranking of mortgages in favor of federal associations. The 1940 act provides that married women may own, transfer, pledge, subscribe for, borrow upon and surrender shares in
federal savings and loan associations without their husbands' authorization. Those shares are not to be regarded as forming part
19. La. Act 95 of 1940, § 1.
20. La. Act 140 of 1932 as amended [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 716-723, 724744.49].
21. La. Act 95 of 1940, § 3; La. Act 140 of 1932, § 32 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§ 744].
22. La. Act 95 of 1940, § 4; La. Act 140 of 1932, § 35 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§ 744.3].
23. La. Act 95 of 1940, § 5; La. Act 140 of 1932, § 52 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§ 744.20].
24. La. Act 95 of 1940, § 6; La. Act 140 of 1932, § 50, as amended by La.
Act 337 of 1938, § 8 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 744.18].
25. La. Act 95 of 1940, § 7; La. Act 140 of 1932, § 51 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§ 744.19].
26. La. Act 95 of 1940, § 8; La. Act 140 of 1932, § 47 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§ 744.15].
27. La. Act 95 of 1940, § 9; La. Act 140 of 1932, § 55 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§ 744.23]. Cf. State v. Italo-American Homestead Ass'n, 177 La. 766, 149 So.
449 (1933).
28. La. Act 95 of 1940, § 10; La. Act 140 of 1932, § 68 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§ 744.36].
29. La. Act 95 of 1940, § 11; La. Act 140 of 1932, § 69 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§ 744.37].
30. La. Act 95 of 1940, § 12; La. Act 140 of 1932, § 77 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§ 744.45].
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of the marital community, but are separate and paraphernal
property of the wife when purchased with her separate and
paraphernal funds.8 1 A married woman can deal with shares of
associations governed by the Homestead and Building and Loan
Statute "as a femme sole. ' 32 This apparently subjects such shares
to the rules of community property where such rules are otherwise applicable.8
Under the Homestead Statute, a recorded vendor's privilege
and mortgage in favor of a homestead or building and loan association enjoys priority over all other encumbrances and claims
upon the property and its improvements subsequently recorded
or claimed. This includes all tax liens except for ad valorem real
estate taxes, corporation franchise taxes, and paving assessments.8 4 The 1940 act accords the same ranking to the recorded
privilege and mortgage in favor of a federal association, except
that corporation franchise tax liens constitute no exception.
There is a slight variation between the two laws in respect
to the periods from which and during which the vendor's privilege and mortgage remain effective. In the case of homestead or
building and loan organizations the recordation of the privilege
and mortgage is effective without the necessity of being reinscribed in the mortgage records for a period of twenty years
from the date of inscription. 6 A vendor's privilege and mortgage
in favor of a federal savings and loan association is effective from
the date of its filing for a period of twenty-five years or for twenty years from the date of any reinscription. 7
Maximum interest rate on small loans reduced. Act 108 of
1940, over which there was bitter legislative controversy, effects
a reduction of one per cent a month in the maximum rate of
interest formerly permitted to be charged by small loan licensees
on amounts not exceeding three hundred dollars. 8
31. La. Act 95 of 1940, § 2.
32. La. Act 140 of 1932, § 34, as amended by La. Act 337 of 1938,'§ 5
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 744.2].
33. See Hebert and Lazarus, The Louisiana Legislation of 1938 (1938) 1
LOUISIANA LAw REvmiw 80, 125.

34. La. Act 140 of 1932, § 50, as amended by La. Act 337 of 1938,
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 744.18].
35. La. Act 95 of 1940, § 5.
36. La. Act 140 of 1932, § 50, as amended by La. Act 337 of 1938,
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 744.18]; La. Act 312 of 1940, § 3.
37. La. Act 95 of 1940, § 5.
38. The maximum rate is reduced from 3%% to 2%% per month.
La. Act 108 of 1940, amending and reenacting La. Act 92 of 1928, § 13;
Act 7 of 1928 (E.S.) § 13 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 780].
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An opinion of the Attorney General has held the act invalid
as attempting to amend and reenact a law which had already
been repealed.39 Undoubtedly, the enactment of Act 7 of the
extra session of 1928 impliedly repealed not only Section 13 of
Act 92 of 1928, which is sought to be amended and reenacted by
the 1940 statute, but also the remaining provisions of that act.
Since its passage, Act 7 of the 1928 extra session has been recognized by the courts as Louisiana's "Small Loan Law," and Act
92 of 1928 has been judicially ignored even as to its non-conflicting provisions. 40 The later statute covers the whole subject of
licensing and regulating the small loan business in such manner
as to clearly indicate a legislative purpose not only to substitute
its provisions for those of the earlier law which are inconsistent
1
with it, but also to impliedly repeal that law as a whole.4
According to a declaration of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, the doctrine that a repealed law cannot be amended is a
sound proposition insofar as it goes; but the doctrine means only
that amending a repealed law, without reenacting or reviving it,
accomplishes nothing. 2 This question usually involves the issue
of whether or not the amending and reviving statute has corn39. See Baton Rouge State Times, July 80, 1940, at p. 9.
40. Semble Foundation Finance Co. v. Robbins, 179 La. 259, 153 So. 833
(1934); Unity Plan Finance Co. v. Green, 179 La. 1070, 155 So. 900 (1934);
Morris Plan Bank v. Schmidt, 164 So. 270 (La. App. 1935); South Shreveport
Finance & Loan Co. v. Stephenson, 184 La. 916, 168 So. 100 (1936); Natchitoches Finance Co. v. Smith, 175 So. 915 (La. App. 1937); General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Swain, 176 So. 636 (La. App. 1937); Industrial Loan Co.
of Monroe v. Noe, 183 So. 175 (La. App. 1938).
"The purpose of the Legislature in enacting the Small Loan Law [La.
Act 7 of 1928 (E.S.)] was not merely to regulate the lending of money in
sums of $300 or less, but to regulate the charging, contracting for, or receiving interest on the money at a rate in excess of 8 per cent. per annum.
Whenever a money lender desires to obtain a larger return on his money
than 8 per cent. per annum interest, he may do so by paying the license,
giving the bond, and complying with the other requirements of the statute
granting the privilege." South Shreveport Finance & Loan Co. v. Stephenson,
184 La. 916, 920, 168 So. 100, 101 (1936).
For conflicting provisions, see La. Act 92 of 1928, §§ 2, 6, 13, 14, 19, 20;
La. Act 7 of 1928 (E.S.) §§ 2, 6, 13, 14, 19, 20 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 769, 773,
780, 781, 786, 787].
41. United States v. Tynen, 78 U.S. 88, 20 L.Ed. 153 (1871); State v.
Henderson, 120 La. 535, 45 So. 430 (1908); Knight v. Webster Parish School
Board, 164 La. 482, 114 So. 104 (1927); Hymel v. Central Farms & Shipping
Co., 183 La. 991, 165 So. 177 (1935); State v. Tate, 185 La. 1006, 171 So. 108
(1936).
42. State v. Walters, 135 La. 1070, 66 So. 364 (1914); Williams v. Guerre,
182 La. 745, 162 So. 609 (1935). Cf. State v. Cognevich, 124 La. 414, 50 So.
439 (1909); State v. Long, 132 La. 170, 61 So. 154 (1913); State v. Nelson, 135
La. 678, 65 So. 893 (1914); Police Jury of Caddo Parish v. Mayor and City
Council of Shreveport, 137 La. 1032, 69 So. 828 (1915).
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plied with all the constitutional requirements. If the object is
expressed in the title, it is well settled that the legislature, in
reviving or reenacting a law or section thereof, may make such
amendments as relate to the subject or object of the original
statute."4 The fact that the title of the statute fails to refer to an
intervening repealing law is immaterial.4 5
Therefore, it may be concluded that there is legal justification for upholding the validity of the 1940 act though it amends
a repealed law without mentioning the intervening repealing
statute enacted during the extra legislative session of 1928. The
act does not seek merely to amend the repealed statute,46 for at
the same time it revives or reenacts a section of that statute as
amended and expresses that object in its title. Indeed, it goes
further than merely indicating that object and specifically declares the object intended to be accomplished. 1 The body of the
1940 law executes the object indicated in the title by amending
and reenacting Section 13 of Act 92 of 1928 as amended. 4
Security for deposit of state funds. To the list of collateral
which the state or any of its subdivisions must require of fiscal
agent banks as security for deposits of state funds therein,'49 the
1940 legislature added bonds and other obligations issued by a
43. Ibid. See La. Const. (1913) Arts. 31, 32; La. Const. of 1921, Art. III,

§§ 16, 17.
44. State v. Nelson, 135 La. 678, 65 So. 893 (1914); State v. Walters, 135
La. 1070, 66 So. 364 (1914); Williams v. Guerre, 182 La. 745, 162 So. 609 (1935).
See Police Jury of Caddo Parish v. Mayor and City Council of Shreveport,
137 La. 1032, 1041-1042, 69 So. 828, 831 (1915).
45. State v. Walters, 135 La. 1070, 66 So. 364 (1914). See Police Jury of
Caddo Parish v. Mayor and City Council of Shreveport, 137 La. 1032, 10411042, 69 So. 828, 831 (1915).
46. Cf. Williams v. Guerre, 182 La. 745, 162 So. 609 (1935).
47. The title of La. Act 108 of 1940 reads as follows: "AN ACT To amend
and re-enact, as amended, Section 13 of Act 92 of 1928; providing that every
person, co-partnership and corporation, licensed under the provisions of said
Act, may loan any sum of money not exceeding in amount the sum of Three
Hundred ($300.00) Dollars, and may charge, contract for and receive thereon
interest at a rate not to exceed two and one-half (21h) per centum per month,
the said Act to remain otherwise in full force and effect." See La. Const.
(1913) Art. 31, and Williams v. Guerre, 182 La. 745, 162 So. 609 (1935).
It should be conceded that the remaining sections of Act 92 of 1928 are
not reenacted or revived by the language in the above title stating that "the
said Act [is] to remain otherwise in full force and effect," for if they have
been impliedly repealed by Act 7 of 1928 (E.S.), they cannot be revived, at
least without their reenactment in the body of the amending statute; and,
furthermore, it is doubtful if that object is sufficiently indicated in the title.
48. The enacting portion of La. Act 108 of 1940 states: "Section 1. Be
it enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana, That Section 13 of Act 92 of 1928
is hereby amended and re-enacted so as to read as follows:"
49. La. Act 77 of 1938, § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 6632.23J.
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housing authority pursuant to the Housing Authorities Law"
These obligations must be secured by a pledge of annual contributions to be paid by the United States government or any of
its agencies. 1
Corporations
Act 221 of 1940, amending Act 61 of 1898,52 authorizes certain
public service and mining corporations to borrow such money as
may be required for their corporate purposes. For this purpose
they may issue bonds or other obligations secured by mortgage
or pledge of any kind of property, whether owned at the time
the mortgage is granted, or acquired thereafter.53 Ithad been
suggested that the 1898 act was perhaps rendered obsolete, so far
as it relates to domestic corporations, by Section 12, 11 (h) of the
Business Corporation Act, 5 4 but that it was still operative so far

as foreign corporations were concerned. 5 However, the 1940
amendment specifically covers both domestic and foreign corporations, thus signifying a legislative intent of singling out the
corporations therein enumerated for special treatment.
With regard to domestic corporations, the 1940 amendment
is a more detailed enumeration of, and in one respect a further
limitation on, their authority to borrow money than is found in
the Business Corporation Act. In addition to the general limitation that the act of borrowing be done in furtherance of, or inci50. La. Act 275 of 1936 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 6280.1-6280,26] is amended
by La. Acts 208 and 209 of 1940. Cf. Act 277 of 1938, §§ 3(c), 4(b) [Dart's
Stats. (1939) Hi 62 8 0.31(c), 6280.32(b)].
51. La. Act 211 of 1940 amends La. Act 77 of 1938, § 2(a) (1) [Dart's Stats.
(1939) § 6632.23(a)(1)].
52, Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1157.
53. Art. 3304, La. Civil Code of 1870 recognizes as valid a mortgage on
after-acquired property. La. Act 221 of 1940 provides that "Any such mortgage shall be effective as to after-acquired or future property to the extent
set forth therein. In any such mortgage it shall be sufficient to describe the
property subject or to be subject thereto in general terms, and no recordation thereof shall be requisite except in the real estate mortgage records of
the parish or parishes in which such property is situated."
54. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 12 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1092], the pertinent
provision of which provides:
"II. Without limiting or enlarging the grant of authority contained in
subdivision I of this section, it is hereby specifically provided that every
such corporation shall have authority"
"(h) to borrow money and to issue, sell, pledge or otherwise dispose of, its
bonds, debentures, promissory notes, bills of exchange and other obligations
and evidences of indebtedness, and to secure the same by mortgage, pledge
or other hypothecation of any kind of property ... ." See Bennett, The Louisiana Business Corporation Act of 1928 (1940) 2 LoUIsINA LAw REvmw 597,
607-613.
55. See the compiler's note to Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1157.
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dental to, the corporate purpose,56 the 1940 amendment requires
that any person, firm or corporation operating a motor coach or
bus line under a permit from the Louisiana Public Service Commission secure the consent of the Commission before a mortgage
or pledge of their permit can be given as security.
To more adequately prevent fraud in the sale of securities,
a new Blue Sky Law"7 has been adopted which conforms in sub58
stance to the provisions of the Uniform Sale of Securities Act,
the Federal Securities Act of 1933,11 and the acts of the states of
New York6" and South Carolina.61
Act 266 of 1940 provides for the organization of cooperative,
nonprofit membership corporations for the purpose of supplying,
promoting, and extending the use of electric energy. The act is
so worded as to enable corporations formed under it to take advantage of the benefits offered by the Federal Rural Electrifica62
tion Act.
Another statute to be noted is Act 190 of 1940, which dissolves certain charitable and benevolent corporations authorized
by Article 447 of the Civil Code." The reason which induced the
legislature to pass the act was that the corporations had ceased
to exercise their franchise, thus failing to accomplish the conditions upon which they had been given corporate life. In compliance with the requirements set forth in Article 447, adequate
provision is made for establishing any contingent right or claim
which anyone may have against the defunct institutions.6
Debt Moratorium
By Act 2 of 1940 the debt moratorium statute which suspended all laws relative to the enforcement of debts was repealed.5
56. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 12, I [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1092, I].
57. La. Act 262 of 1940. This act amends La. Act 177 of 1920, as amended
by La. Act 17 of 1934 (2 E.S.), La. Act 163 of 1936, and La. Act 209 of 1936

[Dart's Stats. (1939) 3H 1165-1179].
58. Uniform Sale of Securities Act, 9 U.L.A. 385 (1932).
59. 48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77(a)-77(a)(a) (Supp. 1939).
60. New York General Business Law, §§ 352-359(h).
61. S.C. Code (1932) H8 8114-8136.
62. 49 Stat. 1363 (1936), 7 U.S.C.A. §H 901-914 (1939). The act provides for
an administrator appointed by the President, who is authorized to make
loans to cooperative, nonprofit and limited-dividend associations, among
others mentioned, for the purpose of rural electrification.
63. It should be noted that Article 447 of the Civil Code of 1870 first
appeared as Article 438 of the Code of 1808, which was eleven years before
the decision of the famous Dartmouth College case (Trustees of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 4 L.Ed. 629 (1819)).

64. School Board v. Meredith, 139 La. 35, 71 So. 209 (1916). Cf. Montpelier
Academy v. George, 14 La. 395, 33 Am. Dec. 585 (1839).

65. La. Act 126 of 1938 was a reenactment of La. Act 2 of 1936 which wab
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Because the necessity for the immediate passage of the act was
became effective
certified by the Governor to the legislature, it
66
Governor.
the
by
immediately upon approval
Gambling-Abatement of Nuisance
Act 120 of 1940 abrogates the effect of Act 49 of 1938, which
made difficult the abatement of nuisances created by gambling
houses, and substantially restores earlier statutory provisions on
the same subject. Whereas the 1938 law provided that the right
to file suit to abate such nuisances could not be exercised unless
the action was brought by twenty-five real estate taxpayers
who had resided and voted continuously for five years in the
locality of the alleged nuisance, 7 the 1940 act substantially reenacts the original statute 8 by giving such right to ten taxpayers,
whether natural or artificial persons and whether citizens or nonresidents.6 It also dispenses with the requirement 70 that the
plaintiff in abatement proceedings must furnish bond to indemnify the defendant if the injunction is set aside, and restores the
earlier provision"' that the plaintiff's petition must be supported
clearly estabby the ex parte affidavits of two reputable citizens
72
lishing the existence of the alleged nuisance.
Insurance
Of particular interest in the field of insurance is the enactment of the Uniform Unauthorized Insurance Act, which imposes
severe restrictions on foreign insurers not qualified to transact
business in the state.7 8 The evident purpose of the statute is to
itself a reenactment of La. Act 2 of 1934 (2 E.S.) which in turn had replaced
La. Act 159 of 1934. For a discussion of the 1938 act see Hebert and Lazarus,
The Louisiana Legislation of 1938 (1938) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 80, 128.
66. La. Act 2 of 1940, § 2.
67. La. Act 49 of 1938, § 1, amending La. Act 192 of 1920, § 3 [Dart's
Crim. Stats. (Supp. 1939) § 1026].
68. La. Act 192 of 1920, § 3 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 1026).
69. La. Act 120 of 1940, § 1.
70. La. Act 49 of 1938, § 1, amending La. Act 192 of 1920, § 10 [Dart's
Crim. Stats. (Supp. 1939) § 1033].
71. La. Act 192 of 1920, § 10 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 1033].
72. La. Act 120 of 1940, § 1.
73. La. Act 159 of 1940. The Uniform Act is found in 9 U.L.A. 278 (Supp.
1939). It was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1938. The act has also been adopted by Arkansas
and South Dakota: Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, Supp. 1940) 411; S. D. Session
Laws (1939) 160, c. 129.
Section 1 prohibits one from acting as an agent in this state for any
insurer not authorized to transact business in Louisiana or from acting in
this state for an insured in placing insurance with an unauthorized insurer.
Section 2 prohibits one from aiding in this state any unauthorized insurer in transacting insurance business in Louisiana.
Section 3.prohibits one from representing or aiding in this state any
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place unauthorized insurers in as disadvantageous a position as
the constitution will permit.7'
Under the provisions of a 1938 statute, foreign and domestic
insurance companies (with certain exceptions) were required
insurer in effecting insurance covering any risk in any other state where
such insurer is not authorized to transact business in the state where the
risk is located.
Section 4 makes certain exceptions which are obviously desirable.
Section 5 provides for substituted service of process upon the Secretary
of State in all proceedings arising out of insurance business transacted in
this state with any of its citizens or residents. Cf. La. Act 105 of 1898, Art.
II, §§ 1-3 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4018-4020]. It is submitted that "implied
consent" as the basis of jurisdiction over nonresident motorists is also applicable to the assumption of jurisdiction by a state over business transacted
within its borders by an unauthorized insurance company. Compare the
following authorities which established the "implied consent" doctrine as
applied to the nonresident motorist statutes: 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935)
359, § 84.2; Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) §§ 81-94. See Doherty & Co.
v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 55 S. Ct. 553, 79 L.Ed. 1097 (1935), discussed in
Goodrich, Conflict of Laws Since the Restatement (1937) 23 A.B.A.J. 119. For
a discussion of the Louisiana nonresident motorist statute and similar problems arising under it, see Note (1939) 1 LoUISIANA LAw REviEw 451. The explanation of its constitutionality will be founded upon the theory that to require the unauthorized insurer to "consent" to service upon a statutory agent
is a reasonable exercise of the police power of the state. Cf. Spearman v.
Stover, 170 So. 259 (La. App. 1936); Galloway v. Wyatt Metal & Boiler Works,
189 La. 837, 181 So. 187 (1938); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 37 S. Ct. 30,
61 L.Ed. 222 (1916); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 632, 71 L.Ed. 1091
(1927); Schilling v. Odlebak, 177 Minn. 90, 224 N.W. 694 (1929). The statute
contains provisions for notification reasonably calculated to inform the defendant of the pending action. Hence, a judgment obtained thereunder would
be valid, and not subject to the attack of denial of "due process of law."
Cf. Spearman v. Stover, 170 So. 259 (La. App. 1936); Wuchter v. Pizzutti,
276 U.S. 13, 48 S.Ct. 259, 72 L.Ed. 446, 57 A.L.R. 1230 (1928); Restatement,
Conflict of Laws (1934) § 75 and Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Louisiana
Annotations (1937) § 75.
Section 6 prohibits any unauthorized insurer from Instituting any action,
suit or proceeding In this state to enforce any right, claim or demand arising out of the transaction of any business in Louisiana until such insurer
shall have obtained a certificate of authority to transact business in this
state. In this respect the 1940 act Is similar to La. Act 8 of 1935 (3 E.S.)
[Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 1247.1-1247.3]. On this point see R. J. Brown Co. v.
Grosjean, 189 La. 778, 180 So. 634 (1938).
Section 7 requires all unauthorized insurers to either post bond or procure a certificate of authority to transact the business of insurance in this
state as conditions precedent to the filing of pleadings by such insurers in
all proceedings instituted against them. As to the constitutionality of this
section, see Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 41 S.Ct. 433, 65 L.Ed. 837 (1921).
Section 8 fixes a penalty for violating the provisions of the act.
Section 9 provides that the act shall be so interpreted and construed as
to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states
which enacted it.
Section 10 declares the provisions of the act severable in the event any
section is held invalid.
Section 11 provides that the 1940 act shall not be deemed or construed
to repeal or affect any of the provisions of La. Act 8 of 1935 (3 E.S.) [Dart's
Stats. (1939) §H 1247.1-1247.3].
74. The commissioners' prefatory note states that "care was taken In
the drafting of the Act to keep the same within constitutional bounds, and
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annually to give a $20,000 bond in favor of the State of Louisiana,
to assure prompt payment of all claims arising out of any policy
issued by such companies. Act 184 of 1940 restricts the application of this act to foreign companies only, thus returning the
7
law on this subject to its status prior to the 1938 amendment. 5
Legal reserve life insurance companies are exempted from furnishing bond if they maintain $100,000 unimpaired capital in the
case of a stock company, and $100,000 surplus above all liabilities
if a mutual company, and if they maintain a $100,000 deposit in
Louisiana or in another state. 6
Act 105 of 1898, which governs the organization and management of insurance companies, was amended at the recent session
of the legislature to make lawful the increase by any domestic
insurance company of its capital stock by means of stock dividends.

77

Three changes of major importance affecting domestic industrial life insurance companies should be noted:
7 it was held that
(1) Voting Rights. In State v. Carradine,.
the Business Corporation Act (allowing one vote for each share) 7
was a general law relating to the right of shareholders to vote,
and must yield to the special provisions of Act 105 of 1898, which
limits the vote of each stockholder to ten per cent of the total
stock, regardless of the amount owned. 0 The 1940 amendment
vitiates the holding of this case by allowing stockholders in industrial life insurance companies one vote for each share standing
in their names on the books of the corporation."'
especially within the bounds of the doctrine of the cases of Fidelity Deposit
Co. vs. Tafoya, 270 U.S. 426, 46 Sup. Ct. 331, 70 Law Ed. 664; New York Life
Ins. Co. vs. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 34 Sup. Ct. 879, 58 Law Ed. 1259; Allgeyer vs.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 17 Sup. Ct. 427, 41 Law Ed. 832." 9 U.L.A. 279, § 7
(Supp. 1939).
75. La. Act 184 of 1940 repeals La. Act 139 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§ 4254] which amended La. Act 158 of 1932 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4254]. The
1932 act, like Act 184 of 1940, was applicable only to foreign insurance companies.
76. La. Act 184 of 1940, § 2, provides that the requirements imposed by
the act are In addition to those now prescribed by law.
77. La. Act 102 of 1940, amending La. Act 105 of 1898, Art. I, § 11 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 4011]. The 1898 act provided: "It shall not be lawful for any
insurance company to increase its capital stock by the distribution of any
portion of Its net surplus." The same restrictions on the payment of cash
dividends should be held to be applicable to the payment of stock dividends.
La. Act 105 of 1898, Art. I, § 7, as amended [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4007].
78. 12 La. App. 42, 125 So. 135 (1929).
79. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 32, I [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1112, I].
80. La. Act 105 of 1898, Art. I, § 4(b), as amended [Dart's Stats. (1939)

§ 4004].
81. La. Act 102 of 1940, § 4(b).

19401

LOUISIANA LEGISLATION OF 1940

(2) Investments. Whereas no insurance company organized
under the provisions of Act 105 of 1898 is permitted to lend more
than eighty per cent of its assets on real estate mortgages, nor
more than ten per cent of its assets in any one mortgage, 2 the
1940 amendment prohibits industrial life insurance companies
from investing more than five per cent of their assets in any one
8
mortgage.1
(3) Real Estate Holdings. Under the 1898 act, the value of
the buildings in which any insurance company has its principal
office, the land upon which it stands, and other real property
necessary in the transaction of its business cannot exceed fifty
per cent of the company's total capital and net surplus.8 ' As to
industrial life insurance companies, the 1940 amendment limits
the total value of such holdings to twenty per cent of the com-,
pany's total admitted assets.8 5
Prior to 1940, in all cases, the court was vested with unlimited discretion in appointing corporate receivers, appointing
whomever it deemed best suited to the office. 8 Act 197 of 1940
accords a preference, in the event of an ancillary receivership in
this state, to attorneys and employees of foreign insurance companies authorized to do business in Louisiana. The ancillary
receiver is required to be domiciled in Louisiana, and, if an
attorney, he must have been admitted to practice law in this
state.
Since the business of insurance is almost wholly in the hands
of corporations which can act only through agents, Act 83 of
1940 is of particular interest. The conduct of insurance agents
has been held to be a matter of public concern; hence, complete
legislative control does not violate the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment." By the terms of the 1940 statute it is un82. La. Act 105 of 1898, Art. I, § 5(d), as amended [Dart's Stats. (1939) §
4005].
83. La. Act 102 of 1940, § 4(d).
84. La. Act 105 of 1898, Art. I, § 6, as amended [Dart's Stats. (1939) §
4006].
85. La. Act 102 of 1940, § 6.
86. General Motors Truck Co. v. Caddo Transfer & Warehouse Co., 176
La. 181, 145 So. 372 (1932).
In Louisiana, the practice of appointing receivers (whether primary or
ancillary) is governed by La. Act 159 of 1898, as amended [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§§ 1209-1218]. See also La. Act 227 of 1932 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4022.1-4022.
13].
87. U.S. Const., Amend. XIV. Nutting v. Massachusetts, 183 U.S. 553, 22
S.Ct. 238, 46 L.Ed. 324 (1902); LaTourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465, 39 S.Ct.
160, 63 L.Ed. 362 (1919).
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lawful for any insurance agent to make, or counsel or aid others
to make, a derogatory and untrue statement about any insurance
company authorized to do business in Louisiana (or in the process of organization), where such statement is made with the
intent to injure the company. Section 3 makes it unlawful for
any insurance agent to misrepresent the provisions, terms and
conditions contained in insurance contracts, to rebate any insurance premium, or to make misleading comparisons of policies of
different insurance companies for the purpose of inducing any
person to allow his insurance policy to lapse, or to forfeit or surrender it. Any violation of the statute subjects the insurance
agent to the penalty of revocation or suspension of his license.
For the purposes of the act, a very detailed definition of an insurance agent is provided.
Another statute allows assessment insurance associations8 8
doing business under the provisions of Act 20 of the second extra
session of 1935 and which have accumulated admitted assets and
reserves in excess of $100,000, to write life and accident insurance
policies (the form to be approved by the Secretary of State) on
the stipulated premium plan.89 The forms of such life and accident policies need not have printed thereon the words "Assessment Plan."90
Act 371 of 1940 requires the Casualty and Surety Rating
Commission"' to furnish to any claimant, or attorney representing a claimant, under either a compensation or personal injury
claim, the name of the employer's insurers, the amount of the
policy, and the provisions and conditions of its coverage.92 The
request for such information must be made at a "reasonable
time."
88. "'Assessment insurance' exists when benefit to be paid is dependent
upon collection of such assessments as may be necessary for paying the
amounts to the insured. In other words, it is 'assessment insurance' if
payments to be made by insured are not fixed unalterably by contract. On
the
contrary, an 'oldtime policy' Is a contract where the amount to be paid-by
the insured is fixed, the premiums to be paid are unalterable, and
the
liability incurred by the defendant company is also fixed, definite, and
unchangeable." 1 Words & Phrases (5th Series, 1939) 566.
In Louisiana, no assessment insurance policy can exceed $5,000 and it
must have plainly written in red ink on the first page thereof the words
"Assessment Plan." La. Act 264 of 1940, amending La. Act 20 of 1935 (2 E.S.)
§ 9 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4170.221.
89. La. Act 264 of 1940 amends La. Act 20 of 1935 (2 E.S.) § 9 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 4170.22].
90. See note 73, supra.
91. This commission was created by La. Act 44 of 1936, as amended by
La. Act 186 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4277.1-4277.12].
92. La. Act 371 of 1940.
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Act 160 of 1940 prohibits any companies doing business as
casualty, surety, fidelity, guaranty or bonding insurers from paying commissions on premiums paid for bonds or insurance executed under the terms or requirements of any contract with the
State of Louisiana or any of its political subdivisions, to persons
who are not duly licensed as insurance agents in this state (under
penalty of revocation of the license of the company or agent).
The purpose of the statute is to prevent companies from insuring
risks arising out of state contracts and allowing nonresident
agents to earn the commission therefrom. Act 353 of 1938,1- which
was repealed at the recent session of the legislature,9 4 was a
much more comprehensive statute. It prohibited the paying of
commissions to nonresident agents on account of policies written
as protection against risks arising in Louisiana.
Legal Holidays
A new statute was enacted designating the days which are
to be regarded as legal holidays and half-holidays in this state.9
The act is intended to be all-inclusive, thus abrogating the confusion resulting from three similar statutes passed at the 1938
session of the legislature.90 However, the 1940 amendment limits
Mardi Gras as a legal holiday to certain designated parishes and
municipalities within the state2Y This raises the question of the
constitutionality of the act. Is it a local law within the meaning
of the constitution and thus invalid because notice of intention
to apply for its passage was not published?9 8
Municipal Corporations
Act 231 of 1940 authorizes municipalities with a population
in excess of 12,500 to install and operate parking meters as an
93. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4278.10-4278.14. A discussion of this act was
made in the last legislation article: Hebert and Lazarus, The Louisiana Legislation of 1938 (1938) 1 LOUISIANA LAW RSvIEw 80, 132.
94. La. Act 161 of 1940.
95. La. Act 285 of 1940, amending and reenacting La. Act 165 of 1932, § 1,
as amended [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 3795].
96. La. Acts 84, 91 and 307 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 3795]. All three
statutes amended La. Act 165 of 1932, § 1. For a discussion of the resulting
conflict on this subject after the passage of these three acts see Hebert and
Lazarus, The Louisiana Legislation of 1938 (1938) 1 LousIANA LAW RsvMw
80, 133-134.
97. Mardi Gras is made a holiday in the parishes of Orleans, St. Bernard, Jefferson, St. Charles, St. John the Baptist, and East Baton Rouge,
and in all municipalities in the State of Louisiana, where the governing authorities of the same so declare by ordinance.
98. La. Const. of 1921, Art. IV, § 6. Cf. State v. Clement, 188 La. 923, 178
So. 493 (1938), where a statute prohibiting trapping within 150 miles of Gulf
of Mexico was held invalid as a "local or special law."
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aid to the regulation and control of parking vehicles on their
streets. Provision is made whereby the municipality may fix and
require the payment of a fee for the privilege of parking opposite
such meters when they are in operation.
The case of Shreveport v. Brister9 9 involved a criminal prosecution instituted by the city for a violation of the provisions of
the Shreveport Parking Meter Ordinance. 100 The defendant had
parked a motor vehicle in a meter zone without depositing a
coin in the meter. In holding the ordinance ultra vires because
its adoption was prohibited by Act 10 of the first extra session
of 1934,101 the court said:

"The Statute here prohibits the levying of a license of any
character whatsoever, either under the municipality's taxing
power or police power, unless such a license is levied by the
1

State.

02

This decision was soon affirmed by the case of Monsour v. Shreveport.103 It was indicated, however, that Section 2 of the 1934 act
expressly validated such a license where express and special
legislative authority was previously secured.
In accordance with this dicta, the legislature passed Act 231
of 1940, which specifically provides:
"That all municipalities within the state of Louisiana with a
population of twelve thousand five hundred (12,500) or more,
are hereby authorized and empowered, in their discretion, to
provide by ordinance for the installation, operation, maintenance, policing and supervision of parking meters on their
streets, to be designated in an ordinance, as an aid to the
regulation and control of parking of vehicles therein, and to
fix and require the payment of a fee for the privilege of parking opposite such meters when they are in operation."
Public Records
Act 195 of 1940 effects a substantial revision of the provisions
contained in the Public Records Act. 0 4 The general result accom99. 194 La. 615, 194 So. 566 (1939).
100. Ordinance 40 of 1939 of the City of Shreveport, La.
101. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 8648.1-8648.8.
102. Shreveport v. Brister, 194 La. 615, 621, 194 So. 566, 568 (1939).
103. 194 La. 625, 194 So. 569 (1940). In Shreveport v. Brister, 194 La. 615,
194 So. 566 (1939), it was conceded that the ordinance in question, levying
the alleged license, was not expressly authorized by any provision of either
the constitution or statutes of Louisiana, and that the city was acting under
its implied or inherent powers.
104. La. Act 242 of 1912, as amended by La. Act 185 of 1916, La. Act 255
of 1920, and La. Act 267 of 1928 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 7825-7845]. La. Act
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plished is the greater facilitation of the inspection of public records by any person or judicial tribunal without unnecessary delay. Yet, it affords protection against harmful interference with
legislative investigations or criminal prosecutions by prohibiting
the use of records relevant to these matters until after the disposition of such investigation or prosecution. Only major provisions of the new act will be stated in order to reveal changes
made in the earlier statute. 10 5
Any elector of the state or taxpayer who has paid any tax
collected under legislative authority within a year of the day on
which application is made for the use of any record declared public by the act, or anyone presenting written authority to act for
such person, may exercise the privilege of examining, copying,
photographing and taking memoranda of any public records as
so defined.10 6
Delay in making a public record available to an authorized
applicant can be justified only on the ground that such record
is in active use at the time a request is made for it. In no case
will the fact that a record is being audited justify a refusal to
allow an inspection to be made, except when the record is in
active use by an auditor.'07 When the person to whom an application is made does not have the custody of the record in question, he must include in his certificate the name of the person
then having custody thereof. 10 8
Any suit to enforce the provisions of the act brought in a
court of original jurisdiction must be tried by preference and in
a summary manner. Any appellate court to which the suit may
5 of 1940 (E.S.), amending La. Act 6 of 1935 (2 E.S.), § 4 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§ 8911.4], declared the records of the State Bond and Tax Board "to be public and ... subject to inspection, photographing and copying as provided by
law." However, most of the functions heretofore vested in the Board have
been transferred to and vested in the Department of Finance by the Administrative Code of 1940. See La. Act 47 of 1940, tit. VI, § 2.
105. La. Act 195 of 1940, §§ 1, 6, 8, 12, 14 and 15 reenact without change
the provisions contained in La. Act 242 of 1912, § 1, as amended by La. Act
255 of 1920, § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 7825]; La. Act 242 of 1912, § 9 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 7833]; Id. at § 15 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 7839]; Id. at § 17
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 78411 Id. at § 18, as amended by La. Act 255 of 1920,
§ 4 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 7842]; La. Act 267 of 1928, §§ 1, 2 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) §§ 7843-7844]. The 1940 statute omits the provisions contained in La.
Act 242 of 1912, §§ 6, 8, 12-14 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 7830, 7832, 7836-7838].
106. La. Act 195 of 1940, § 7. Cf. La. Act 242 of 1912, § 7 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) § 7831].
107. La. Act 195 of 1940, § 9. Cf. La. Act 242 of 1912, § 10 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) § 7834].
108. La. Act 195 of 1940, § 10. Cf. La. Act 242 of,1912, § 11 [Dart's Stats.

(1939) § 7835].
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come must place it on its preferential docket, hear it without
delay and render a decision within ten days after the hearing. 10
If a record relating to any investigation being conducted under legislative auspices is in the custody of an attorney whose
duties are performed under legislative authority, it is not classified by the act as a public record. Thus it is not subject to inspection by authorized persons until after the investigation is
completed. 110 The provisions of the law also do not apply to any
records held by a state investigator or investigating agency as
evidence in the investigation of a criminal charge until after the
records have been used in open court or until final disposition
of the charge."' However, any citizen may file a petition in the
district court of the parish where the record is held to have
the district judge determine summarily and by preference, in
open court or in chambers, whether a record is being held bona
fide. No appeal may be taken from the district judge's decision.""
Gubernatorial records were not amenable to the provisions
of the earlier law."8 Although such records as are ordinarily kept
in the governor's custody in the usual course of the duties and
business of his office are not now available as public records, the
new act states that its provisions are not to be construed to prevent any person, otherwise authorized by the statute to do so,
from examining and copying any books or papers relating to
money or financial transactions in the control of or handled
1 14
through the governor.
The following records and documents are excluded from the
provisions of the Public Records Act: (1) tax returns or any
other information concerning persons applying for or receiving
old age assistance, aid to the blind or to dependent children;
(2) records in the custody of any state agent or agency whose
duty involves the investigation, management or liquidation of a
private business, when such records relate to the business and
are confidential in nature; (3) records held by the State Bank
Commissioner or his agent insofar as they concern solvent banks
engaged in the banking business at the time a request is made to
inspect them; (4) daily reports and indorsements of insurance
companies doing business in the state, filed with the Louisiana
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

La. Act
Id. at §
Id. at §
Ibid.
La. Act
La. Act

195 of 1940, § 11.
2.
3.
242 of 1912, § 4 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 7828].
195 of 1940, § 5.
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115
Casualty and Surety Rating Commission according to law;

(5) records of public hospitals in the state, except in certain
enumerated cases. 11
Not only is the offending custodian of public records made
subject to the penal provisions of the statute, but so also is any
other person who hinders or attempts to hinder the inspection of
any records declared subject thereto by any conspiracy, under7
standing or cooperation with any other person."
A 1940 act requires detailed monthly reports to be made by
various parish and district officers and boards (except the Parish
of Orleans) to the respective police juries and clerks of court to
be filed and kept as public records for a period of at least one
18
year."
Public Works Contracts
The amendment to the Public Works Contract Act governs
only contracts for public works or purchases of material where
the value exceeds five hundred dollars. Such public works by
any public corporation or political subdivision of the state and
purchases of materials and supplies to be paid for out of public
funds, must be advertised and let by contract to the lowest responsible bidder." 9
Sheriffs
Act 320 of 1940 requires sheriffs and deputy sheriffs of each
parish in the state (except Orleans and Caddo) to carry a life
insurance policy of the group insurance type. These policies must
be written by insurance companies legally authorized to do business in this state and through legally commissioned and licensed
agents residing in Louisiana.
Spouse Law
Act 15 of the extra session of 1940, prohibiting public employment of both spouses when the salary of either exceeded a
designated sum, was repealed in the regular session. 120 Although
115. Id. at § 4.
116. Id. at § 6. Quaere the effect of this provision upon La. Act 170 of
1932, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 10671; La. Act 108 of 1936; La. Act 90 of 1938,
§ 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1067.1]. See Hebert and Lazarus, The Louisiana
Legislation of 1938 (1938) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 80, 128-130.
117. La. Act 195 of 1940, § 13. Cf. La. Act 242 of 1912, § 16 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) § 7840].
118. La. Act 286 of 1940.
119. La. Act 127 of 1940, amending La. Act 73 of 1926, § 1, as previously
amended by La. Act 20 of 1935 (4 E.S.) § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 6730].
120. La. Act 229 of 1940.
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Louisiana was the only state having such an act, similar statutes
have been contemplated in twenty-one states. Most of these
either were killed in committee or rejected by the legislature. 1 1
In an advisory opinion submitted by the highest court of Massachusetts to the legislature of that state, six similar bills were
held unconstitutional in their entirety. 122 One writer has suggested that there is no fundamental distinction between the repealed
2
Louisiana law and the Massachusetts bills'

"[The] assumption of a marital status should not disqualify
one from entering into or continuing in the public service as
a public employee, since such status bears no relationship
whatever to ability. It would be a dangerous public policy
indeed to assume that marriage renders one unfit to perform
duties of a public nature, or that one's ability to serve the
state or the nation is hampered by assuming marital obliga12
tions., 4

Unfair Sales Act
Another weapon to compel the maintenance of prices in retail and wholesale trade was devised by the lawmakers at the
1940 regular session.'2 5 It is now declared to be unfair competition 120 and actionable injury to sell goods below cost as defined
in the statute.'21 Such a sale is made a misdemeanor subject to
punishment by fine,12 and district attorneys are authorized to
institute proceedings to prevent and restrain violations. 1 9 Persons
threatened with injury or who are injured as a result of violations of the act are given the right to sue for injunctive relief.
A successful litigant is to be allowed a reasonable attorney's
20
fee.
Uniform Laws
Four of the uniform laws approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws were passed at
121. Note (1940) 2 LOUIS2IAA LAW REvIEW 553, 556.
122. Opinion of the Justices, 22 N.E. (2d) 49 (Mass. 1939).
123. Note (1940) 2 LOUISANA LAw REvIEw 553.
124. Id. at 557.
125. La. Act 338 of 1940.
126. Id. at § 3.
127. Id. at § 2. Legitimate clearance sales, and sales of like character,
and sales on contract to a government institution are exempted. Id. at § 6.
128. Id. at § 4.
129. Id. at § 5.
130. Ibid.
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the recent session of the legislature. Act 99 of 1940, known as
the Uniform Federal Tax Lien Registration Act," 1 makes uniform the law relating to the registration of federal tax liens. It
was passed for the avowed purpose of authorizing the filing of
notices of tax liens in accordance with the provisions of Section
3186 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. 182
The Uniform Transfer of Dependents Act'33 authorizes the
Department of Public Welfare, subject to the approval of the
attorney general, to enter into reciprocal agreements with corresponding agencies of other states regarding interstate transportation and support of poor and indigent persons. 84
The Uniform Unauthorized Insurance Act' and the New
Blue Sky Law,"3 8 which conforms in substance to the Uniform
Sale of Securities Act, are discussed elsewhere in this article.
131. 9 U.L.A. 94 (Supp. 1939). The Uniform Federal Tax Lien Registration Act has been adopted by the following states and territories: Alaska
[Alaska Comp. Laws (1933) § 2101-2107]; Delaware [Del. Rev. Code (1935) §§
3355-3359]; Hawaii [Hawaii Rev. Laws (1935) §§ 5190-5195]; Idaho [Idaho Code
Ann. (1932) § 44-201 to 44-205, 44-210]; Kentucky [Ky. Stat. Ann. (1936) §§
4281t-8 to 4281t-13]; Maryland [Md. Ann. Code (Flack, Supp. 1935) Art. 17,
§§ 9, 9A-9F]; Montana [Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. (Anderson & McFarland,
1935) §§ 2155.1 to 2155.7]; Nevada [Nev. Comp. Laws (-Iillyer, 1929) §§ 21232131]; New Mexico [N.M. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1929) §§ 82-601 to 82-607];
New York [Lien Law, §§ 240-245]; Pennsylvania [74 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon,
1939) §§ 141-147]; South Carolina [S.C. Code (1932) § 2576(1-7)]; South Dakota [S. D. C. (1939) § 39.1601-39.1606]; Tennessee [Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934) § 8029-8034]; Utah [Utah Rev. Stat. Ann. (1933) §§ 52-6-1 Co
52-6-4]; Wisconsin [Wis. Stat. (1939) § 74.76]; Wyoming [Wyo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. (Courtright, 1931) §§ 66-901 to 66-907].
132. As amended by 37 Stat. 1016 (1913) and 43 Stat. 994 (1925), 26 U.S.
C.A. § 115 (1928).
133. La. Act 68 of 1940. The uniform act has been adopted by the following states: Colorado [Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1939) c. 124, § 18];
Maine [Me. Laws (1933) c. 188]; North Dakota [N.D. Laws (1939) c. 196];
South Dakota [S.D. Laws (1939) c. 201].
134. As to the difficulties inherent in necessary provisions for the care of
dependents, see the Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. 237, 238 (Supp.
1939).
135. Supra, p. 188 et seq.
136. Supra, p. 187.

